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PART 1: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND   - 2 - 
INTRODUCTION 
Over two centuries ago, Adam Smith suggested that the inland parts of Africa and Asia 
were the least developed areas of the world and that due to the difficulty of trade in those 
areas, they would not benefit from the gains to specialisation of their coastal neighbours.  
Two hundred years later, the Human Development Report 2002 paints a stark picture for 
the landlocked countries of the world: it classifies thirteen of the modern landlocked 
countries as low development; nine of these are amongst the world’s twelve least 
developed countries; none of the non-European landlocked countries
1 are classified as 
high human development. 
 
What are the specific challenges facing landlocked countries? While numerous planning 
papers, legal documents, and transport studies
2 have attempted to address these questions, 
these papers focus on specific nations or regions, thus precluding a global cross country 
analysis. Other papers consider agglomerated economic, social, and financial data for 
landlocked countries
3 thereby not addressing the specific problems of the political, transit 
and social environment in these countries. This report furthers the discussion by 
presenting a systematic assessment of all 30 landlocked countries with a Human 
Development Index less than 0.76. 
 
To distill the primary challenges facing landlocked countries, the report has been centred 
on 30 case studies. Each of these is divided into infrastructure, trade, and international 
relations sections, detailing the primary challenges that each of these countries faces in 
getting its goods to international markets. Because of the overlapping nature of 
infrastructure, trade and international relations, these sections should be read as a whole 
to provide an overall understanding of the problems facing each of the landlocked 
countries. 
 
Building on the information contained in the case studies, the report includes (1) a brief 
overview of the level of development of landlocked countries relative to their maritime 
neighbours; (2) measures of the relative degree of landlockness of the landlocked 
countries; (3) observations distilled from the case studies regarding the major issues 
facing landlocked countries; and (4) some successful strategies that have been employed 
to mitigate the challenges of being landlocked. 
                                                 
1 The European landlocked countries consist of Austria, Andorra, Belarus, Czech Republic, Holy See, 
Hungary, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, San Marino, Slovakia, Macedonia, Moldova and Switzerland.  
Moldova is the only European landlocked country with a HDI of less than 0.76. 
2 As detailed in Glassner (1995) 
3 For example, Limao and Venables (1999), MacKellar and Wörgötter (2000), Radalet and Sachs (1998) 
and Stone (2001)   - 3 - 
INDICATORS OF DEVELOPMENT 
The relative state of development of landlocked countries is illustrated in Table 1 by 
highlighting the position of the landlocked countries on the HDI rankings, giving an idea 
of the state of development both relative to maritime countries and relative to each other. 
An examination of this table shows the distribution of landlocked countries towards the 
bottom of the table. There are other broad trends: landlocked countries appear to do 
worse than other countries in the same region, and some landlocked countries (largely in 
Africa) appear to do worse than others (such as the former Soviet states). This section 
attempts to briefly examine these trends by giving: (1) a perspective of how landlocked 
countries fare relative to their maritime neighbours in terms of development, trade and 
growth; and (2) an idea of the level of landlockedness of the landlocked countries. 
 
This section makes use of the term “maritime neighbour”, which is defined as a 
neighbour with access to the high seas. This is in contrast to a “transit neighbour”, who is 
used for the transit of trade. The distinction can be made by examining Mali: while it has 
seven neighbours, five are maritime neighbours (Côte D’Ivoire, Guinea, Senegal, 
Mauritiana and Algeria) because two neighbours are landlocked; and only two of this five 
are transit neighbours (Côte D’Ivoire and Senegal) because the other maritime 
neighbours are blocked by physical barriers (the Sahara Desert), insufficient 
infrastructure levels or civil war. 
 
LANDLOCKED COUNTRIES AND THEIR MARITIME NEIGHBOURS 
Human Development 
A comparison of the levels of human development for landlocked countries with their 
maritime neighbours is shown in Figure 1. This shows the Human Development Index 
Rank of the landlocked country minus the average Human Development Rank of the their 
maritime neighbours, “Excess HDI Rankings over Maritime Neighbours’ Average” 
(larger implies the landlocked country is more developed). Some clear patterns emerge: 
-  The South American countries have a much worse level of human development 
than their maritime neighbours – the reasonable development levels in South 
America have not been realised by Bolivia and Paraguay. 
-  Despite the low levels of human development throughout western Africa 
(including in maritime countries), the western African landlocked countries still 
have a substantially lower level of human development than their maritime 
neighbours. 
-  Laos performs poorly relative to its neighbours, largely because of the presence of 
Thailand and China. 
-  Many of the Central Asian countries are performing better than their neighbours. 
The best ‘outperformers’ of these countries are Turkmenistan, Armenia, 
Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. 
-  Zimbabwe and Swaziland did better than their maritime neighbours, largely due 
to the very poor level of Mozambique, which has been involved in civil war.   - 4 - 
Decomposing the HDI into its three components the education, life expectancy (health), 
and GDP per capita indices (as shown in Table 2), allows a more subtle understanding of 
where the landlocked countries are faltering. Some key observations are: 
-  Landlocked countries are furthest behind their regional maritime neighbours in 
regard to GDP; only four times (Botswana, Swaziland, Kazakhstan, Uganda) does 
the GDP per capita of a landlocked country surpass the average of its regional 
maritime nations. The average ratio of GDP per capita of each landlocked country 
to its unique maritime transit neighbours is an astonishing 69% (WDI 2002). If 
GDP alone were used to define the level of development (rather than the HDI), 
then the situation of the landlocked countries would appear to be significantly 
worse. 
-  The landlocked countries of Southern Africa, Central Asia, the Caucasus and 
Moldova perform particularly well in the health and education components of the 
HDI relative to their landlocked neighbours. 
-  The out performance of the landlocked states in the education component is 
particularly striking for Central Asia – a result of both high levels of education in 
the former Soviet states as well as the poor education levels in Iran and Pakistan. 
Income Growth of Landlocked Countries 
The landlocked countries are not only significantly poorer than their maritime 
neighbours, but also, contrary to classical macroeconomic convergence theory, growing 
at a slower pace. Over the last decade, landlocked countries have grown at an average of 
25% less than their maritime transit neighbours, despite beginning the decade with a per 
capita income of only 55% that of the maritime nations. This observation confirms the 
results of other studies, which find that being landlocked slows the growth rate by 
between 0.7% (Radalet and Sachs 1998) – 1.5% (MacKellar, Wörgötter et al. 2000). 
Trade Patterns of Landlocked Countries 
Only three of the landlocked countries have a higher level of export value per capita than 
their maritime transit neighbours (see Table 3). Those countries are Swaziland, Malawi 
and Kazakhstan – the former two are pushed to the top of the list by the exceptionally 
poor performance of Mozambique. Kazakhstan has a high value because of oil exports, 
and, Botswana, the next highest exporter relative to neighbours, has a high value due to 
its export of diamonds. On average, the landlocked countries export 60% less value per 
person than their maritime transit nations. 
 
In almost every region the landlocked countries do not have a significantly higher 
concentration of intra-regional exports than their maritime transit nations (Table 4). The 
one notable exception to this is Latin America, where Paraguay and Bolivia both export 
primarily to Latin America, and do have a significantly higher concentration of intra-
regional trade than their neighbours: intra-Latin American trade accounts for 62% of 
Bolivian exports and 72% of Paraguayan exports, compared to only 20% of Peruvian and 
23% of Brazilian exports. This can be partially explained by the large quantities of 
hydrocarbon and hydroelectric exports
4, which are transported regionally through 
pipelines and electricity lines.  
                                                 
4 Minerals, oil and gas account for 47.5% of Bolivia’s total exports.    - 5 - 
Foreign Direct Investment 
In addition to low levels of trade, landlocked countries suffer from a very low level of 
foreign direct investment. The mean level of FDI inflows to the landlocked nations is 
1/49
th that of the maritime transit nations. Even if the richer maritime transit nations, 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, India, South Africa, and Thailand are ignored, and 
population accounted for, the average FDI inflow to the maritime transit nations is still 
greater than that to landlocked nations. Moreover, only two landlocked nations (Chad and 
Uganda) have a higher inflow of FDI per capita than their individual maritime transit 
neighbours and on average, a landlocked country receives 17 times less FDI per capita 
than its maritime transit neighbours. Perhaps even more startling, the average level of 
FDI per capita to landlocked countries is less than that to the Least Developed Countries 
(LDCs). 
 
MEASURES OF RELATIVE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AMONGST LANDLOCKED 
STATES 
A mapping of the human development rank for the landlocked countries is presented in 
Figure 2. The numerical rankings and Human Development Index scores is presented in 
Tables 1 and 2. Examination of these reveals a number of observations:  
 
-  While the South American landlocked countries are the least developed relative to 
their maritime neighbours, the west and east African landlocked countries that 
have the lowest absolute Human Development Index. Out of nine such countries, 
eight are among the twelve least developed countries. The ninth, Uganda ranks 
150
th out of 173 countries.  Much of this can be attributed to the ongoing regional 
conflicts, which have severely inhibited transit in these regions.  
-  The former Soviet states have a higher level of human development than most 
other landlocked states.  These regions also have the most extensive transport 
infrastructure, which was constructed during the Soviet era.  Much of this 
infrastructure, however, is now in a state of deterioration.   
-  Armenia has the highest level of human development amongst landlocked 
countries, largely due to its proximity to Europe.   
-  The African landlocked countries’ poor performance in the health area of human 
development can largely be attributed to the AIDS pandemic. 
-  Malawi and Zambia have significantly lower levels of human development than 
other southern African landlocked countries.  Zambia’s level of transport 
infrastructure is considered the worst in the region; and Malawi is primarily 
dependent on the dilapidated Mozambican corridor which suffered from years of 
civil war.     
-  Mongolia has significantly higher human development than other East Asia 
countries, and has the second highest level of human development amongst 
landlocked countries. 
   - 6 - 
MEASURES OF RELATIVE LANDLOCKEDNESS  
Table 5 presents a quantitative assessment of some of the variables considered in the case 
studies: infrastructure levels, international conflicts, distance to port, and freight costs.  
These variables are intended only to serve as proxies for the elements of landlockedness 
and are not intended to replace the qualitative assessment in the case studies. Often they 
do not accurately reflect what was found in the case studies: 
 
-  Rwanda, for example, while noted for its relatively good internal road network: it 
not only provides adequate linkages to the main regional corridors, but has an 
extensive system of secondary roads – the average distance from a household to a 
trunk road is 4 km, a relatively low figure for Africa, has one of the lowest 
proportion of paved roads figures amongst landlocked countries.   
-  The transit neighbor length and severity of civil conflict variable for Malawi, for 
example, is the lowest among all nations.  Yet, Malawi was one of the landlocked 
countries to suffer most acutely from surrounding war, as it had it divert its freight 
previously shipped to the ports of Mozambique (95% of its total freight) via more 
expensive routes to the ports of South Africa and Tanzania.   
-  Bhutan which has the worst paved road quality of neighbours, is actually 
surrounded by relatively good infrastructure. 
 
Moreover, the quantitative variables cannot capture some of the central, more nuanced 
challenges facing landlocked countries.   It is, for example, impossible to capture the 
actual costs of border delays.  Similarly, one cannot quantify Nepal’s complete 
dependence on Indian transport systems.  As the case studies indicate, such challenges 
often present significant barriers to foreign direct investment as well as hampering trade.   
 
Despite these shortcomings, several interesting observations can be gleaned from Table 5 
including: 
-  Kazakhstan is the most remote landlocked country, being furthest to port, but has 
the second lowest freight cost of all landlocked countries.   
-  Malawi has the highest freight cost, despite being only 803 km from port; much 
of this can be attributed to the civil war in Mozambique which effectively blocked 
Malawi’s primary trade route. 
-   For the sixteen landlocked countries for which there is data, eleven countries 
have better paved road quality than their neighbours. 
-  Botswana and Swaziland have the highest per capita export volumes of all 
landlocked countries; Botswana has benefited from its immense diamond 
resources, Swaziland is extremely open and benefited from high levels of FDI 
when economic sanctions were imposed on South Africa.   - 7 - 
PART 2: OBSERVATIONS FROM THE  
CASE STUDIES   - 8 - 
INTRODUCTION 
The case studies reveal a variety of problems that countries face from not having access 
to the sea. While this section does not attempt to cover the full spectrum of these 
problems, the recurring themes of the case studies are outlined below. These recurring 
themes tend to fall under two broad categories: (1) those themes relating to poor 
infrastructure, poor resources and poor co-ordination – that is, physical and 
administrational problems that limit transportation through transit nations; and (2) those 
themes relating to political burdens – where landlocked countries are compromised due to 
their political relation with their transit neighbour or due to political conflict (in 
particular, civil war) in their transit neighbour. 
 
Examples are provided from the case studies where these problems are occurring, where 
they are not occurring, and cases where strategies have been implemented successfully in 
minimizing the occurrence or impact of  
 
TRANSPORTATION CHALLENGES 
Dependence Upon Infrastructure Levels In Transit Nations 
Landlocked countries are completely dependent on their transit neighbours’ infrastructure 
for access to international markets. Where a landlocked country only has access to routes 
of poor quality, the cost of overland trade is significantly higher than they would 
otherwise be. Hence, the cost of trade of a landlocked country is heavily determined by 
the infrastructure levels, and, indirectly, by the level of development of its transit 
neighbours. 
 
Worst Affected Areas 
The challenges confronted by poor transit neighbour infrastructure are particularly acute 
in western and central Africa.  Burundi, for example, while boasting good internal road 
networks that have recently undergone significant improvements, is severely constrained 
by the surrounding infrastructure of its transit neighbours.  The most direct route to the 
sea from Burundi is through Tanzania to Dar es Salaam, which is known as the Central 
Corridor. Infrastructure levels on this route are so poor, however, that when Burundi’s 
primary transit corridor to Mombasa (Northern Corridor) was closed due to political 
reasons, an alternative transit route to the south via Mpulungu on Lake Tanganyika to 
Durban in South Africa was investigated.  The fact that this route was considered, and 
used, at a total distance of nearly 4,500km with several border crossings and modal 
changes, is indicative of Tanzania’s poor transit infrastructure.  The difficulties 
associated with the Central Corridor increase Rwanda’s dependence on the Northern 
Corridor, thereby limiting competition.   
 
Through much of western Africa similar poor transit neighbour infrastructure problems 
exist.  And while the western African landlocked nations generally have poor internal 
infrastructure themselves, the dilapidated condition of the surrounding corridors reduces 
the benefit of investment for internal transport infrastructure, thereby reducing the 
incentive.  Consider the case of the Central African Republic which does not have a   - 9 - 
dependable all-weather route to the sea.  Its corridor through Cameroon is often 
impassable during the rainy season, owing to the poor condition of Cameroonian roads; 
its other corridor through the DRC depends on the Oubangui River, which is impassable 
during the dry season due to low water levels (this corridor is currently impassable due to 
the ongoing crisis in the DRC).  It should be noted that in many of the regions where poor 
transit nation infrastructure is common, the effects of transit neighbour civil wars have 
been more significant.   
 
Least Affected Areas 
In contrast to the African landlocked countries, the landlocked countries of East Asia and 
South America are surrounded by relatively high quality transport infrastructure.  Instead, 
these countries have often failed to take advantage of the surrounding transit systems by 
neglecting their domestic networks. Laos, for example, which has not been able to 
effectively develop its internal transport network, borders Thailand with its modern 
infrastructure facilities.  This example is particularly startling as Thailand’s transport 
system is characterised by four line highways, while transport within Laos is quite 
limited. The Thai government has also recently extended its rail line to the Lao border; 
beyond the border, beyond which it does not continue. 
 
In a rare minority of cases, the level of transit infrastructure is less relevant.  In the case 
of Botswana, the economy’s heavy dependence on diamonds, which account for 84% of 
total exports, allows the country to bypass transit neighbour infrastructure by utilizing air 
transport.  The high value/weight and value/volume ratios for diamonds make this 
possible as air transport has a high cost/volume ratio.  Thus, for the large majority of its 
exports, Botswana need not worry about its neighbours’ transit infrastructure. 
 
Successful Strategies 
Bolivia has had moderate success in bypassing its neighbours’ transit network by 
capitalizing on its central geographic location to become the South American fiber optics 
hub.  This suggests that while landlocked countries have little potential for improving 
their transit neighbours’ infrastructure, it is possible to develop industries that do not 
depend heavily on this infrastructure.  Modern technological advancements and the 
development of telecommunications have expanded such opportunities for landlocked 
countries.  Moreover, the geographic position of landlocked countries would 
advantageous for the development of such industries, as many landlocked countries are 
centrally located in their respective regions.  A country such as Mongolia, could take 
advantage of its highly skilled population to develop a telecommunications sector, in 
which it would hold comparative advantage.   
   
The use of port fees, rail charges and road tolls in the presence of competition, while 
adding to transit costs, can be used to encourage investment by the transit nation. The low 
levels of infrastructure in Tanzania, as discussed above, are being partially improved 
because Tanzania has been forced to compete for the transit business of Burundi and 
Rwanda following the re-opening of the Northern Corridor through Uganda and Kenya. 
Tanzania has made material efforts to improve its rail infrastructure and has recently 
completed a dry dock at Isaka for the Burundi/Rwanda – Dar es Salaam transit trade. In   - 10 - 
addition, competition has encouraged a private company (the Trans Africa Railway 
Corporation) to build a transshipment facility at Kidatu (Tanzania) to allow a change in 
rail gauges. Due to this connection it is now possible to travel between Cape Town and 
Kampala by rail in ten days (InfraAfrica 2001). 
 
Fees and Direct Costs due to High Administrative Burden 
To transit a country, there are a host of transit and customs charges. Some of these must 
be paid upfront and some must be paid en route. In many cases, these charges must be 
paid in hard currency, where often there are no facilities to convert local currencies into 
hard currency. Sometimes agency fees at ports for transit freight will exceed that for 
domestic freight despite the fact that domestic freight is usually more difficult to clear 
through port than transit freight. Some of the transit and customs charges include transit 
goods licences, border fees, temporary road licences, foreign vehicle permits, toll 
charges, foreign commercial licences, cost of customs verification of containers, posting 
of security bonds, involvement with police and escort convoys and cancellation of bonds. 
The amount of these charges varies according to customs procedures but can amount to 
26 percent of the direct freight costs (Anyango 1997). The cost of bribes needed en route, 
while considered to be significant, has not been fully estimated. 
 
As well as the fees and charges, the paperwork required for transit is significant and 
costly to deal with. Planning papers, feasibility documents, legal studies and country 
studies detail the administrative procedures needed to transit a country. In almost all 
cases, the number of documents needed and the different authorities that must be dealt 
with are high and could only be negotiated by using a firm experienced in transit 
operations such as a clearing and forwarding agent
5. 
 
Least Affected Areas 
The one exception to these significant administrative burdens is that of Bhutan. All transit 
Bhutanese trade is handled by Bhutan’s customs and is never handled by Indian 
authorities. Hence, the administrative burden for Bhutanese traders is as if the country 
were not landlocked. This is largely because Bhutanese-Indian relations are strong and 
because Bhutanese transit trade is very small. 
 
Successful Strategies 
In some regions, there have been significant efforts to simplify procedures and reduce 
these administrative charges. For example, a common licence has been introduced into 
the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and into the Common Market 
                                                 
5 An example of the forms needed to transit from Bolivia (with one of the more simple transit regimes) are 
as follows: Form listing the documents; Commercial invoice or equivalent; Transport documents (air way 
bill, bill of lading, consignment note, original or copy); Report of reception, original; Certificate of 
previous inspection or custom declaration of value issued by the original importer; Certificate of insurance, 
copy; Invoice of port charges, original; Invoice of transport issued by the transport operator signing the 
transport manifest, copy; Packing list, original or copy; Certificate of origin, original; Certificate of 
previous licence, original; and, Other documents pertaining to the claimed regime (Castellón 2001).   - 11 - 
for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)
6, which allows for road freight travel 
between participating countries without the need for a local license or permit
7. Similar 
efforts are being made in South America through the regional trade institutions to 
simplify transit procedures. 
 
Worsening Procedures 
This pattern of administrative simplification is not universal. Through Central Asia, the 
administrative burdens due to transit are increasing, largely due to the souring of 
international relations in the area. During the soviet era, transport across the neighbouring 
countries of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan was largely 
administrative-free. A 72-hour visa system was introduced in the late 1990s to allow 
transit through countries without the need for a visa, but is no longer in effect due to poor 
and worsening international relations
8 (Dion 2000; Mayhew 2002). 
 
Time Delays due High Administrative Burden 
In addition to the direct fees and costs of high administration, passing through border 
points of foreign nations imposes long delays on transit traffic. Although often difficult to 
quantify, these delays impose a large burden on trade: in the SADC alone, delays are 
estimated to impose a burden of US$48 million annually (InfraAfrica 2001); and the cost 
of delays is estimated to be between $205 to $440 on a $10,000 cargo consignment from 
Rwanda or Burundi (Anyango 1997). 
 
Worst Affected Areas 
Throughout Africa, the average delay at a border crossing is estimated to be 24-48 hours 
(Evlo 1995; InfraAfrica 2001). However, there are many areas within Africa where 
delays are significantly worse than this average. Customs procedures at the CAR-
Cameroon border can take as long as two weeks, with goods often waiting at the border 
for the requisite information to be sent from Bangui. The full Doala to Bangui trip 
generally takes three weeks to a month. An average trip between Kampala and Mombasa 
(a route used by Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi) is estimated to take 21 days on average, 
with trips often taking as many as 60 days. The unreliability of the rail arrivals often 
make it impossible to book ships ahead of time at the port of Mombasa, causing further 
delays. Delays at the port of Abidjan, used by Burkina Faso, often take up to 10 days and 
delays at the port of Douala, used by the CAR and Chad can often extend to 30 days. In 
addition, the two main transit routes for Burkina Faso have customs escorts only three 
times a week so there are often large delays in waiting for an escort
9. 
                                                 
6 As at July 2001, the license was not yet in use in all COMESA countries because many country’s road 
industries had not yet been liberalised. 
7 Another interesting scheme is the COMESA Yellow Card, which guarantees third party insurance across 
signatory states, removing the need to purchase insurance at each border crossing, giving significant cost 
savings. For example, a Yellow Card for a truck between Harare and Nairobi costs about $70 per year. In 
the absence of the card, insurance would cost $350 (Mulenga 1998). 
8 Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are involved in a border dispute, Tajikistan is in a civil war and claims 
Uzbekistan is abusing its for political purposes, Kazakhstan fears the Islamic threat of militant Islam and 
terrorism from Tajikistan. Kyrgyzstan is reacting to the incursion of Tajik rebels (Dion 2000). 
9 Vehicles waiting for a convoy to form often wait on the side of the road, not only hindering normal road 
traffic, but also contributing to road damage.   - 12 - 
 
Such delays are often not the fault of the transit nation. In Burkina Faso there exists a 
special anti-competitive provision to protect Burkinabe truck companies, reserving two 
thirds of transit freight for carriage by Burkinabe trucks. Thus, there are often goods at 
maritime ports waiting for the arrival of vehicles from landlocked countries despite the 
presence of vehicles from maritime nations at the port who would be willing to transport 
the goods inland. 
 
Efforts are being made to improve the situation. Regional cooperation such as that in 
Latin America, in the SADC and in the COMESA are streamlining and coordinating 
border-crossing procedures. Non-regulatory schemes are also being introduced to 
minimise delays -Tanzanian railways, for example, is now offering Ugandan businesses 
their own “dedicated wagons” which will help alleviate delays at ports. 
 
POLITICAL CHALLENGES 
While transportation issues are important challenges that must be overcome by 
landlocked countries, political challenges are also a major issue for landlocked countries. 
In their most extreme cases, where countries may be totally isolated due to a blockade, 
political challenges have a much more severe effect on human development than lack of 
infrastructure. It is useful to distinguish between two different types of political 
challenges as it illustrates the range of problems that face landlocked nations. The first is 
the problem of a lack of negotiating power that landlocked countries face when 
negotiating for rights of access with their transit neighbours. These lack of rights of 
access can be at their most extreme during military conflict with a transit neighbour. The 
second political problem is civil conflict within the landlocked country – even while a 
landlocked country may have good relations with its transit neighbour, trade can be cut 
by border closures due to civil conflict. 
 
Diplomatic Relationship between Landlocked Countries and their Transit Neighbours 
The developing landlocked countries usually have little negotiating power over their 
transit neighbours when negotiating transit routes. While the landlocked country is 
usually very dependent upon its transit neighbour, in most cases, the neighbour does not 
need its landlocked country and may see a landlocked country’s demand for transit rights 
as an infringement on its own sovereignty.  
 
The legal basis for rights of transit are contained in Article 125(1) of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), stating: 
 
Land-locked States shall have the right of access to and from the sea for the purpose of 
exercising the rights provided for in this Convention including those relating to the freedom of 
the high seas and the common heritage of mankind. To this end, land-locked States shall enjoy 
freedom of transit through the territory of transit States by all means of transport.  
 
However in practice, this right of access must be agreed upon with the transit neighbour 
(Article 125(2) and (3)):   - 13 - 
 
The terms and modalities for exercising freedom of transit shall be agreed between the land-
locked States and transit States concerned through bilateral, sub regional or regional agreements.  
 
Transit States, in the exercise of their full sovereignty over their territory, shall have the right to 
take all measures necessary to ensure that the rights and facilities provided for in this Part for 
land-locked States shall in no way infringe their legitimate interests.  
 
A right of access is given to the landlocked country, but such a right is conditioned by the 
need for the transit nation to grant such a right. Whether a transit nation can legally deny 
the right of access is discussed in detail in the legal literature (Pechata 1973), but in 
practice determined by the relationship between the landlocked country and its transit 
neighbour. 
 
A contrasting example 
In the case of Nepal and Bhutan, the Himalayan ranges restrict most bilateral and all 
transit trade through China. Hence, both countries are entirely reliant on India for transit 
trade, and largely reliant for bilateral trade. Bhutan enjoys a generally very strong 
relationship with India and any friction between the two nations has been promptly 
minimised. Bhutan enjoys probably the best transit procedures of all of the countries in 
this study – all transit trade takes place under Royal Bhutan Customs. That is, there is 
almost no involvement of Indian Customs in Bhutan’s transit trade. An additional benefit 
to this is that there is no requirement for the insurance of goods in transit (Chakra 
Infrastructure Consultants 2001). 
 
In contrast, while Nepal has a generally positive relationship with India, where the 
policies of the two governments have been in significant disagreement, India has had a 
tremendous advantage over Nepal. This advantage was most evident through the 1990 
Indian blockade of Nepal, which was cited as a major cause of the overthrow of the 
Nepalese panchayat government. Relations were generally good, although between 2001 
and 2002 India placed significant trade restrictions on Nepal during the negotiation of a 
bilateral trade treaty. 
 
Worst Affected Areas 
This is an extreme case of lack of political power due to landlockedness – most 
landlocked countries have alternative trade routes through other transit neighbours. 
Nevertheless, there are still circumstances where trade can be blocked or severely 
restricted by transit nations. Sanctions were easily placed upon Burundi by its neighbours 
in 1996 (Dinar 1996). Bolivia has had severe difficulties transiting through Chile because 
of poor political relations that have lasted over 100 years. 
 
When political tensions result in military conflict between the landlocked state and their 
transit neighbour, the effect can be quite acute. Armenia is currently blockaded by 
Armenia and Turkey following the occupation of Kelbadiar (Azerbaijan) by ethnic 
Armenian forces. The alternative routes through Georgia and Iran are restricted due to 
geographic obstacles (mountains) and relatively poor infrastructure (Tavitan 2001). 
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The conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea has restricted Ethiopia’s access to the port of 
Assab where most of Ethiopian trade had passed through duty-free until 1997. Ethiopia is 
currently forced to use the port of Djibouti. Both the route to the port as well as the port 
of Djibouti itself are characterised by low infrastructure levels and are scarcely able to 
handle the bulk of Ethiopian trade. While alternative routes are being investigated 
through Kenya, Sudan and Somalia the routes are characterised by very low 
infrastructure levels, and in the case of Somalia, also internal civil conflict. 
 
Vulnerability to Conflict Within Transit Nations 
Even if a country has very good relations with its transit neighbour, it is still vulnerable to 
civil conflict within the transit nation and consequent border closures. 
 
Most Affected Areas 
The landlocked countries of west Africa have been particularly affected by civil war. 
While Mali has been recognised for its recent political stability and commitment to 
democracy, its economy has suffered incommensurately as a result of regional conflict 
and instability. Each of Mali’s coastal neighbours has been engaged in some form of 
violent civil conflict in the last decade often making transport routes unusable. Togo was 
devastated by violent political protests and deep internal conflict in the early 90s; Algeria 
was involved in a macabre civil war for much of the decade; Ghana suffered from ethnic 
violence primarily between 1993-4; Sierra Leone’s ten year civil war has just recently 
come to a tenuous settlement; Guinea has been stricken by a series of coups and rebel 
wars; Liberia’s has spent most of the decade in violent civil wars which have threatened 
to spillover into neighbouring countries, thus jeopardizing regional stability even further; 
and finally, and most importantly for Mali, Cote d’Ivoire has recently fallen into a 
devastating political crisis which continues to deepen and has had severe effects on 
Mali’s most important corridor to the sea. 
 
Due to the civil war in Mozambique (coupled with poor infrastructure levels in Namibia 
and Tanzania), much SADC trade is forced along north-south lines, largely relying upon 
the port of Durban in South Africa. During the period of the Mozambiquian civil war, 
Malawi was forced to reroute its freight, 95% of which normally passed through the ports 
of Beira and Nacala, to the significantly further ports of Durban and Dar es Salaam. It is 
estimated that the average surface costs to these ports are more than double those to the 
ports of Nacala and Beira via the traditional rail routes. The average transit times to 
Durban (7 days) and Dar es Salaam (6 days) are also nearly double that to Nacala (4 
days) and Beira (3 days). The unavoidable rerouting cost Malawi an additional US$50m-
75m per year, with insurance and freight costs doubling from 20% of the import bill in 
the early 1980s to 40% by the latter half of the decade. While the corridors to Beira and 
Nacal have been recently reopened, infrastructure damage from the war has thus far 
limited their use. 
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PART 3: COUNTRY CASE STUDIES   - 16 - 
AFRICA - SOUTHERN 
SOUTHERN AFRICA GENERAL OVERVIEW 
The landlocked countries of southern Africa are notably similar in the challenges they 
face.  Moreover, the southern African region has shown a relatively high degree of 
success at implementing regional agreements relative to both trade and transit.  Given 
such strong regional similarities and ties, an introduction to the regional issues facing 
southern Africa has been included.   Individual case studies follow this introduction and 
attempt to gauge the challenges facing each specific country relative to those of the 
region, and landlocked countries as a whole. 
TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE 
Road 
Relative to its neighbours and other African landlocked countries the landlocked 
Southern African nations of Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe are considered to have reasonably good transportation networks, although 
significant efficiency improvements are still required. The transit networks in this region 
are significantly better than those in East Africa, and offer more routing options 
(UNCTAD 7). Moreover, the transportation infrastructure of the SADC landlocked 
countries often surpass that of their war-torn maritime neighbours, Angola and 
Mozambique. Despite these higher infrastructure levels, the cost of freight and insurance 
for the SADC landlocked counties accounts for 14.8% of export values while for Angola 
and Mozambique accounts for 8.9% of exports (IMF BOPS 2001). 
 
The inefficiencies associated with the transportation system can be primarily ascribed to 
the poor condition of much of the infrastructure and the time delays associated with 
border crossings (UNCTAD 10). These in turn can be largely attributed to a lack of 
investment (SADC Transport 1) and differing border requirements and procedures. It is 
estimated that delays at the major border posts in the SADC region have cost US$48 
million annually (UNCTAD 27 from CargoInfo). Estimated average delays at regional 
border posts often exceed 24 hours (UNCTAD 28). 
 
The SADC nations, however, have shown great political commitment to improving the 
region’s physical integration and facilitating regional transportation. The SADC has 
instituted the Southern African Transport and Communications Commission to facilitate 
the region’s integration in addition to a series of agreements, including the  
-  legally binding SADC Protocol on Transport, Communications and Meteorology 
(PTCM) which incorporates the SADC Regional Trunk Route Network (RTRN) 
(Transport 7), 
-  SADC Protocol on Trade, 
-  Bilateral Agreements including Corridor Planning Committees,   - 17 - 
-  COMESA Carriers license,  
-  SADC driver’s licence which allows for a common license (UNCTAD 52), and 
-   Spatial Development Initiatives (SDI).  
 
These agreements and initiatives focus on the key issues facing landlocked countries: 
integrated transport policy, freedom of transit, and regional infrastructure. In fact, the 
PTCM directly requires that Member States apply the principle of “the right of land-
locked Member States to unimpeded access to and from the sea” (Article 3.2). While the 
purported level of agreement for such regional integration and harmonization is high, 
problems of implementation and issues of national sovereignty have hindered progress 
(UN 21). 
 
Roads have become the most important means of transportation (for both freight and 
passenger) in Southern Africa, as they now represent 80% of total traffic movement 
(UNCTAD 23). This increasing dependency on roads reflects an efficiency gap between 
road and rail transport. The 1999 UNCTAD report places the cost of shipping a TEU 
container via road from Durban to Ndula at $2,673 while rail transport cost US$ 3,714. It 
also took an additional 2 weeks to transport the container via rail (15); shipping via rail 
also required an additional two weeks than by road.  
 
While the roads in Southern Africa are generally better than those in Eastern Africa, they 
are still considered to be in rather poor condition. Of the Southern Africa countries, the 
nations of Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Zimbabwe have better road infrastructure 
than Zambia and Malawi. According to the SADC Transport and Communications 
Report (Feb. 1997) (UNCTAD 17) 56% of paved roads were in good condition, 24 % in 
fair condition, and 20% in poor condition. 
 
Recent initiatives such as the COMESA carrier license and SADC driver’s license have 
been introduced to streamline the border crossing process and limit delays and associated 
inefficiencies. In addition to this, African nations have been liberalizing transport 
services and road infrastructure management (SADC Update 5) in order to improve the 
maintenance of roads. Road boards and autonomous road agencies, established to 
“manage programming and procurement of private sector investors” have been created 
for this purpose. Only three of the SADC landlocked countries (Lesotho, Malawi, 
Zambia), however, have initiated the establishment of a road board or fund. And only 
Malawi has established a road agency. On the other hand, all four surrounding maritime 
countries, Angola, Namibia, Mozambique, and South Africa have instituted both road 
funds or boards, and road agencies.  
Rail 
During the last two decades, the condition of the Southern African railway system has 
deteriorated significantly (UNCTAD 01 29, SADC Transport 2). The SADC landlocked 
countries generally have better railroad infrastructure than their maritime neighbours 
Angola and Mozambique. In fact, the Interconnected Regional Rail Network (IRRN) of 
the region does not reach the Mozambique port of Nacala or any of the Angolan ports 
(Transport and Communications 9). While some investment has been channeled towards   - 18 - 
building new railways and equipment, very little has been directed towards maintenance. 
Low levels of investment have been compounded by political turmoil (in particular, 
Angola and Mozambique) and the recent floods in 2000. SATCC estimated that $300 
million in maintenance costs was required for the SADC countries (excluding Angola, 
the DRC, and Tanzania) in 1997 (SADC Transport 2). In 1995/6 alone there were 100 
train derailments on main and branch lines attributed to poor maintenance.  
 
Despite this decline, recent attempts have been made to improve the system including 
attempts to engage the private sector. The Southern African Railways Association has 
been organised in an attempt to better integrate the southern African railways through 
railway revitalization (31 UNCTAD). In addition to SARA, the Railways Rolling Stock 
Information System (RSIS) project has been initiated to improve tracking and transport 
communications systems: one of the most frequent complaints of railway customers has 
been a lack of information concerning a shipments whereabouts. International train 
tables, through train movements, agreement on performance standards, single inspections 
at borders, and backloading of wagons have been cited as some recent successes (31). In 
sum, while the potential for connectivity remains great, significant improvements in rail 
condition and maintenance are required before this potential can be achieved.  
Ports and Waterways 
There are currently 14 (Pg 12 UNCTAD) continental SADC ports: eight on the Indian 
ocean and six on the Atlantic coast. While recent investments in container terminals, port 
systems, and coordination with terrestrial transport systems will take some time to reach 
their full potential, improvements are already being seen (UNCTAD 29, SADC 4). 
Restructuring of the port industry, including attempts to attract private sector involvement 
and promote private/public partnerships is also taking place. Prior to thee recent 
improvements, the SADC ports suffered from poor surrounding infrastructure, local 
conflicts, regional sanctions, lack of investment, and poor management (SADC).  
 
The most important port in the region continues to be Durban, which handles cargo from 
the landlocked countries Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe. The 
other principal ports for the landlocked countries are Nacala (used mostly by Malawi), 
Beira (Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi) and Maputo (Swaziland). (TRANSPORT 12) The 
landlocked countries have been generally unable to access the Angolan ports due to the 
ongoing conflict in the region. The port at Walvis Bay, however, has recently been made 
accessible to Botswana, Zambia, Zimbabwe as a result of the recently completed Trans-
Kalahari Highway,  
Despite recent improvements, other SADC ports continue to primarily serve domestic 
demand.  
  
The primary waterways of the region include Lake Kariba, Lake Malawi, Lake 
Tanganyikas, Shire River, and the Zambezi River. While many of these waterways 
provide important means of accessing regional corridors for the landlocked countries, 
there are many navigational difficulties including waterfalls, dams, and narrow gorges 
(http://cgee.hamline.edu/rivers/MA2001/MA2000/Guests/archive/keen3.html). A study 
on the navigability of the Zamebzi and Shire rivers has being outlined to fully explore   - 19 - 
their potential for regional trade. In addition to this, several bilateral agreements, and the 
legally binding Protocol on Shared Watercourse Systems have been negotiated and 
promise to further integrate the waterways of the region 
(http://www.sadcwscu.org.ls/programme/rsap/prog_regionalstrag_pcn28-22.htm). 
TRADE 
The economies of the landlocked countries in Southern Africa, with the exception of 
Botswana, are heavily dependent on agriculture and other primary products, accounting 
for as much as 29% of total output value, and 69% of total exports in Malawi (Free trade 
WB 3). In Botswana, primary products only account for 2% of total output, while mining 
plays a dominant role, accounting for as much as 28.1% of total output value and 75% of 
exports in Botswana. The other predominant sector in the landlocked SADC countries is 
food processing which accounts for more than 10% of the total output value in Malawi, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe.   
 
Despite attempts at regional integration, intra-regional trade is minimal and of ancillary 
importance to trade with the EU. The EU is responsible for 76% of Botswana’s exports 
(primarily in the diamond-mining industry), 39% of Malawi’s, and 28 % of Zambia’s 
(taken from WB paper for GTAP). This is to be contrasted with the high levels of intra-
South American trade for both Bolivia and Paraguay. 
 
Despite the low level of intra-African trade volume for the landlocked countries, import 
protection on the chief exports (i.e. agricultural and food processing) within the region is 
significantly lower than that between the region and the EU. Zambia, for example, which 
faces 41.2% ad valorem import protection from the EU on grain, faces no protection from 
South Africa, Malawi, Mozambique or Tanzania on grain imports and less than 1% 
percent from Zimbabwe. Botswana, Malawi, and Zimbabwe are faced with protection 
rates of over 70% for food processing and 33, 16 and 24% respectively for grain from the 
EU
10. The one notable exception to the low intra-regional tariffs in the region is 
Zimbabwe, which faces uncharacteristically high regional tariffs; for example, Botswana 
which presents no bilateral import tariffs and non-tarrif barriers against Malawi, 
Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia in the food processing sector has a 69.8% ad 
valorem protection against Zimbabwe in this sector. Conversely, Zimbabwe has the 
highest average rates against other SADC countries.  
 
The SADC nations have been involved in several recent trade liberalization agreements. 
Recent initiatives include the free trade agreement negotiated between South Africa and 
the European Union; the Cotonou Convention agreement between the ACP group and the 
EU; the EU “Everything but Arms Initiative” which directly affects Malawi, Zamibia and 
Lesotho; a proposed SADC FTA; and the US Africa Growth and Opportunities Act for 
which all landlocked SADC countries except Zimbabwe and Swaziland are eligible. In 
addition to these open trade initiatives, Southern Africa has witnessed an explosion of 
regional organizations including SADC, SACU, COMESA, and the African Union. 
SADC’s primary goals include the promotion of regional trade, integration, and 
                                                 
10 Note that the EU has a higher rate of protection against each landlocked LDC country than any of these 
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economic independence. (EIU ZIm 38). In September 2000 the SADC Trade Protocol, 
designed to eliminate import protection within the region, was launched. This agreement 
has only had limited success thus far, with South Africa being the only SADC nation to 
commit concretely to lowering its tariffs. Concerns over South Africa’s FTA with the 
EU, national agendas, and the fact that many countries belong to both COMESA and 
SADC (Malawi, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe), which often have conflicting agendas, 
has slowed progress. Tensions between Zimbabwe and the SADC have also hindered 
progress.  
 
The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), which includes 
Malawi, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, was intended to liberalise and promote 
intra-regional trade. Intra-regional trade, however, has remained low and the free-trade 
zone proposed in October 2000 has not been fully implemented; only nine members 
including Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, out of 20 agreed to participate fully. There 
are also preparations for a COMESA customs union by 2004.  
 
Despite these recent efforts to integrate and liberalise regional trade, progress has been 
slow and delays in implementation dates are likely. For example, while Zambia and 
Zimbabwe both agreed to the COMESA free-trade zone Zambia has instituted a complete 
ban on 14 Zimbabwean products due to Zimbabwean currency devaluations (country 
reports, article EIU?). The EIU cites a businessman who comments that "Ministers sign 
free-trade protocols but they mean nothing. There are more trade barriers between 
Zambia and Zimbabwe now than there were before either COMESA or SADC launched 
their free-trade areas."  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
Political tensions in the Southern Africa region have also hindered the progress of the 
landlocked countries. One of the central sources of tension in the SADC community is 
current Zimbabwe President, Robert Mugabe, who is seen to be much of the cause of 
Zimambwe’s recent international political isolation. The recent election of March 2002 
received international criticism from the EU and US governments, and most significantly 
the Southern African Development Community and the Commonwealth. The 
Commonwealth even suspended Mr. Mugabe from the organisation. Relations with South 
Africa have been particularly strained over both trade disputes and personal differences 
between Mr. Mugabe and Thabo Mbeki, president of South Africa. Interestingly, while 
alienating some of his immediate neighbours Mr. Mugabe has attempted to foster 
stronger ties with DRC by sending troops to support President Laurent Kabila against 
rebels supported by Uganda and Rwanda. Mr. Mugabe’s relations with the donor nations 
have also deteriorated.  
 
Internal conflict in Angola and Mozambique, as well as the war in DR Congo which 
directly involved Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, and Uganda, has further 
hindered integration of the region and has kept political tensions high.   - 21 - 
BOTSWANA 
TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE 
Relative both to the regional landlocked countries, and African countries in general, 
Botswana enjoys particularly good transport infrastructure. Moreover, with its economy 
primarily dependent on diamonds, Botswana has the opportunity to utilise air transport 
for much of its trade. For surface transport, Botswana mainly uses the well-developed 
South African corridors.  
Road 
The surrounding South African road network that Botswana depends on for its 
international freight is considered to be the best on the continent. Botswana’s internal 
road network is also relatively good and adequate for its trade purposes. The completion 
of the trans-Kalahari in 1998 has further improved access to the country’s remote western 
districts. In addition to maintaining the physical infrastructure of its road network, 
Botswana has taken part in several bilateral road transit agreements with its neighbours. 
Rail 
Botswana’s main railway runs from Gaborone on the South Africa border to Plumtree on 
the Zimbabwe border. The infrastructure is in excellent condition (USAID) and provides 
an important link for several mining towns to the South African corridors. Transport 
along this corridor is further facilitated by the bilateral working agreement between 
Botswana and Spoornet, South Africa’s rail service. Botswana has also recently 
undertaken a survey of the potential for a direct Botswana and Zambia connection.  
Ports 
Although Botswana’s geographic position allows it access to several regional ports, the 
majority of its trade passes through the South African ports. The Mozambiquan and 
Namibian ports are of ancillary importance. These ports are all considered to be operating 
adequately. For a more detailed discussion, refer to the above section on Southern Africa. 
TRADE 
Botswana’s external trade is dominated by its abundant diamond resources which 
accounted for 84% of total exports in 2000 (IMF DOTS 2002). Because of these vast 
resources, Botswana has been one of the only landlocked countries to record trade 
surpluses. While Europe is the primary destination for Botswana’s diamonds, its 
Southern African neighbours, and South Africa in particular are the primary source of 
imports.  
 
Botswana’s economy is considered to be very open. It is a member of the Southern 
African Customs Union and the Southern African Development Community, the 
strongest of Africa’s regional organizations. Despite Botswana’s commitment to regional 
integration, disputes over rules of origin have somewhat destabilised export growth.   - 22 - 
Botswana also has privileged access to the EU under the GSP and the Africa Growth 
Opportunities Act.  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
Botswana’s relations with its most important regional trading partner, and transit nation, 
South Africa, are particularly strong. Both countries are liberal democratic states and 
cooperate closely on many regional issues, including increased economic integration and 
conflict resolution. They have worked together closely on the recent crises in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo and Angola, as well as the instability in Mozambique, 
Swaziland and Zimbabwe. The two nations recently formed a joint commission on 
defense and security, which first met in November 2000.  
 
While Botswana’s relations with South Africa continue to improve, its relations with its 
western neighbour, Namibia, have recently been strained. A seven year border dispute 
over the island of Kasikili; a dispute over water resource rights on the Okavango River; 
an influx of Namibian refugees to Botswana resulting from the uprising in the Caprivi 
Strip; and Botswana’s construction a fence along the Namibian border all contributed to 
the rising tensions. Within the last year, however, both countries have made efforts to 
improve their relations and have launched several bilateral initiatives.  
 
Relations with Zimbabwe, which have traditionally been cool but proper, have recently 
suffered from the continuing political instability in Zimbabwe. President Festus Mogae of 
Botswana has publicly criticised Zimbabwe’s political and economic policies. The 
presence of Zimbabwean refugees in Botswana has also contributed to deteriorating 
relations.    - 23 - 
LESOTHO 
TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE 
Surrounded by South Africa, Lesotho is completely dependent on its only neighbour’s 
well-developed transport system for its external trade. Such unilateral dependence, 
however, negates any advantages associated with Lesotho’s proximity to the port of 
Durban (347km) and the good condition of its surrounding infrastructure. Limao and 
Venables (1999) determine that the cost of shipping a 40’ container from Baltimore 
(USA) via Durban to Maseru (Lesotho) is US$10,000, compared to only US$5,000 to 
Lusaka (Zambia) which is 1,300km and several border crossings further.  
 
Lesotho’s internal transport is complicated by the highly mountainous, rugged terrain of 
the eastern highlands. These geographical constraints prevent the direct eastward 
transport of freight from Lesotho to the port of Durban. Instead freight must be routed 
north from Maseru and around the border of Lesotho through South Africa. As a result, 
the majority of transport sector investments have focused on the lowland trunk routes 
linking Lesotho to South Africa’s corridors.  
Road 
Lesotho’s main roads, many of which provide linkage to the South African corridor 
routes, are in good condition. A 1995 survey reported that 84% of Lesotho’s paved roads 
are in “good” condition, while only 5% are considered “poor.” Lesotho, however, 
continues to face the challenge of providing all-weather access to the highlands. To deal 
with such problems, the government initiated a US$40 million Road Rehabilitation and 
Maintenance Project in 1996. The construction of the Lesotho Highlands Water 
Development Project has led to the further improvement of many such interior roads.  
Rail 
The only rail in Lesotho is a 2.6 km segment of the South African railway system that 
extends from the South African border to Maseru. The railway is both owned and 
operated by South Africa. The South African rail system to which Lesotho connects is of 
very good quality. 
Ports 
All of Lesotho’s import and export traffic is routed through South African ports, and in 
particular the port of Durban. These ports are considered to be the most efficient in the 
region. For a more in depth discussion, please refer to the section of the report on 
Southern Africa. 
TRADE 
Lesotho’s overwhelming dependence on the SACU (of which it is a member), mainly 
South Africa, for its exports has been recently decreasing with the promotion of a new 
export-oriented manufacturing industry. The Lesotho Central Bank reports that SACU 
accounted for only 39% of Lesotho’s total exports in 2000, compared to 87% in 1985.   - 24 - 
Similarly, exports to North America have increased from 34% of total exports in 1997 to 
over 60% in 2000. Lesotho’s imports, however, still come almost exclusively from the 
SACU.  
 
Lesotho also depends heavily on remittances from migrant mineworkers in South Africa. 
Recently, the number of South African mineworkers has been declining.  
 
As a member of SACU, Lesotho is required to follow the common external tariff of the 
regional group. This tariff was, until recently, determined by South Africa and reflected 
the needs of South Africa’s relatively advanced economy, not those of Lesotho’s. South 
Africa, however, has recently liberalised its trade policy in accordance with the South 
Africa- EU trade agreement and to comply with WTO guidelines.  The SACU external 
tariffs were consequently reduced.  However, it is estimated that the SACU member 
countries will lose US$117m per year in revenues as a result of the South Africa-EU 
agreement. Goods imported from within the SACU are duty free.   
 
The recent development of the Lesotho Highlands Water Development Project, which 
includes the construction of a network of dams and channels in Lesotho’s highlands, will 
now allow Lesotho to export its abundant water resources to South Africa. Previous 
attempts to do so failed when the two governments could not reach agreement on 
payment for water exports. This time, however, the two governments reached agreement 
as defined in the “Treaty on the LHWP between the Government of the Kingdom of 
Lesotho and the Government of the Republic of South Africa.” South Africa has agreed 
to pay for all water delivery costs and provide any necessary loan guarantees. The project 
not only provides Lesotho with a new source of export revenue, but also eliminates its 
dependence on South Africa for electricity. Once completely dependene on South Africa, 
Lesotho is not producing surplus electricity, which could potentially be exported to South 
Africa. 
 
Lesotho is also a member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), 
Common Monetary Area
11, and the WTO. It also took part in the Cotonou agreement 
providing preferential trade with the EU. Lesotho left the Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa (COMESA) in 1997 in order to focus on its participation in SADC.  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
As South Africa is Lesotho’s only neighbour and major trade partner, Lesotho’s 
international affairs are strongly dominated by this bilateral relationship.Relations with 
South Africa remained strained from the time of independence until the military coup in 
1986. Diplomatic ties were not established until 1992. Since then, relations have become 
increasingly close as displayed by the cooperation over the Lesotho Highlands Water 
Development Project. After a debated 1998 election, South Africa intervened in Lesotho 
to support the precarious government facing a coup. Following this intervention, the two 
nations agreed to a security pact, which allows the government of Lesotho to invoke the 
assistance of South Africa to maintain domestic stability. Further evidencing the 
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improving relations, was President Thabo Mbeki’s 2001 state visit to Lesotho, which 
included the symbolic gift of a cow to King Letsie. During the visit, a bilateral 
commission to support economic development in Lesotho was established.  
 
Despite the improving relations, some sources of tension remain between the two 
countries including South Africa’s decision to offer permanent residence to qualifying 
Basotho migrant workers, and the withdrawal of multiple-entry visas for Basotho 
traveling to and from South Africa. Cross-border raids also continues to be a problem but 
both governments have agreed to address the issue.   - 26 - 
MALAWI 
TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE 
Malawi’s cheapest and shortest routes to the sea, via rail to the Mozambican ports of 
Beira and Nacala, have just recently been reopened after remaining closed for nearly two 
decades during Mozambique’s civil war. During this period, Malawi was forced to 
reroute its freight, 95% of which normally passed through the ports of Beira and Nacala, 
to the significantly further ports of Durban and Dar es Salaam. It is estimated that the 
average surface costs to these ports are more than double those to the ports of Nacala and 
Beira via the traditional rail routes. The average transit times to Durban (7 days) and Dar 
es Salaam (6 days) are also nearly double that to Nacala (4 days) and Beira (3 days). The 
unavoidable rerouting cost Malawi an additional US$50m-75m per year, with insurance 
and freight costs doubling from 20% of the import bill in the early 1980s to 40% by the 
latter half of the decade. While the corridors to Beira and Nacal have been recently 
reopened, infrastructure damage from the war has thus far limited their use. It is hoped 
that as much as 75% of Malawi’s trade will ultimately return to the Nacala corridor. 
 
The recent closure of the Mozambican corridors underscores Malawi’s dependence on its 
infrastructurally weaker neighbours. The poor surrounding infrastructure of Mozambique, 
Tanzania and Zambia have severely limited the efficiency of Malawi’s transport 
corridors. 
Road 
While Malawi suffers from one of the highest accident rates per 1000 vehicles in the 
world
12 and poorly maintained rural feeder roads, it has an extensive highway system 
adequately linking major towns and border crossings. These primary roads are considered 
to be of relatively better quality than most of Malawi’s neighbours, with the exception of 
Zimbabwe. Malawi’s roads have recently suffered, however, from the increased stress 
placed on them due to the increase traffic associated with the closure of the 
Mozambiquan railways. 
 
The Malawian government has made recent efforts to improve road safety and road 
maintenance and the World Bank approved US$30 million Road Maintenance and 
Rehabilitation Project. It also has bilateral road transport agreements with Mozambique, 
Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
Rail 
Prior to the war in Mozambique, Malawi depended heavily on the rail corridor to the port 
of Nacala for its transit freight. The closure of this corridor for nearly two decades has 
left the condition of the railway in a state of disrepair. Recent projects have been 
undertaken by the World Food Programme and the Mozambican government (with a 
US$100 million loan from the World Bank) to improve this vital corridor. Moreover, the 
Central East African Railway Company (CEARC), which operates Malawi’s rail system, 
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announced in 2000 an additional investment of US$26m over 15 years. This will include 
a US$4.8m investment targeted at improving the company’s rolling stock. Improvements 
are already being seen, as the volume of external trade traffic increased by 63% in 2001. 
The Malawi government estimates that the refurbished rail corridor could save more than 
$700m a year in transport costs.  
Ports 
During the civil war in Mozambique, most of Malawi’s freight was redirected to the ports 
of Durban and Tanzania
13. Approximately 80% of Malawi’s total freight traffic passed 
through the South African ports. The recent reopening of the Mozambican corridors has 
reduced the importance of these ports. For further discussion of these ports, refer to the 
Southern Africa section of the report. 
 
Malawi has two ports on Lake Malawi at Chipoka and Chilumba (Simuyemba). Lake 
transport is principally used to access the northern port of Dar es Salaam. The ports suffer 
from a lack of storage facilities, outdated infrastructure, and the failure to synchronise 
with road and rail transport. These ports, however, are not likely to play a major role in 
Malawi’s future freight transport as the northern corridor continues to diminish in 
importance.  
TRADE 
Malawi’s heavy dependence on its agricultural sector, which accounts for 90% of total 
exports, and tobacco in particular, makes its economy particularly vulnerable to the high 
transport costs that it faces. Most of these transit exports are destined for the industrial 
countries, in particular, the United States (18%), Germany (13%), and New Zealand 
(7%). Amongst African countries, South Africa is the largest export destination for 
Malawian goods (8.7%). Malawi, however, faces the highest average tariff rate (21%) 
amongst SADC nations from South Africa. While Malawi exports are spread around the 
globe, it imports almost exclusively (73% of total imports) from other African nations. 
The most important of these nations is South Africa (48% of total imports). Malawi, 
however, imposes a higher average tariff against South African goods than any other 
southern African country.  
 
The Malawian government has undertaken significant economic liberalization since the 
1980s, which has included a general lowering of the simple average MFN tariff. Over the 
last five years this average fell from 21% to 14%. Malawi is a member of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the 
Common Market of East and Southern Africa (COMESA), and receives preferential 
access to the US market under the US Africa Growth and Opportunity Act. For further 
discussion on the regional organization, please refer to the Southern Africa section of the 
report. 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
                                                 
13 The war in Mozambique led the SADC to develop the northern corridor route to the port of Dar es 
Salaam. The project costs US$863m and uses Malawi’s roads and lake transport to link to the Tanzanian 
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Malawi has benefited from internal stability and relatively cordial relations with its 
neighbours. Relations with Mozambique have greatly improved following the overthrow 
(and death) of Malawi’s longtime ruler Dr Hastings Kamuzu Banda in 1994. Dr. Banda 
was accused of supporting the Mozambican rebel group Resistencia Nacional de 
Mocambique (Renamo). Conversely, documents indicated a Mozambican plot to 
overthrow Dr. Banda’s regime. The improving relations between Malawi and 
Mozambique have been further improved by the repatriation of Mozambican refugees 
and the continuing cooperation to improve the Nacala corridor.  
 
Malawi’s commitment to maintaining border security was recently demonstrated 
following communal clashes along the Malawi-Tanzania border. After conflict flared in 
early 2001, both Malawian and Tanzanian security personnel met and agreed to send 
more patrols to the border to prevent further violence. 
 
Moreover, Malawian President Bakili Muluzi has just become, in August 2001, chairman 
of the SADC. This role should allow Malawi a greater role in regional integration and 
diplomacy.    - 29 - 
SWAZILAND 
Although Swaziland is a landlocked country, its geographical location allows it 
convenient and direct access to port.  Moreover, unlike Lesotho, Swaziland is not 
completely dependent on South Africa for transit freight; it can use either the 
Mozambiquan corridor to Maputo (224km) or South Africa’s corridors to Durban (562 
km) and Richards Bay (480 km).  Both of these corridors require only one border 
crossing.  Swaziland’s propitious location is complemented by its extensive, diverse and 
well-maintained transport infrastructure.  
TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE 
Road 
Swaziland’s roads are in very good condition and considered to be operating relatively 
efficiently.  The main road from Mbabane to Manzini has recently been upgraded to a 
double carriage highway.  Moreover, Swaziland has successfully committed itself to 
providing transport links for rural communities to access the main network.   
Rail 
Swaziland Railways (SR) is one of only a few profitable railways in Africa and is 
considered to run efficiently. With 300 km of internal rails, SR provides essential links to 
the rail systems of South Africa and Mozambique, which ultimately connect to the ports 
of Durban, Richards Bay and Maputo.  The rail system has benefited from the recent 
US$67 million rehabilitation and expansion of the line to Mozambique.  Moreover, in 
1995 Swaziland Railways signed an agreement with the Mozambican Railway 
Authorities that provides for the cooperation of the two countries’ rail systems.  The 
agreement promises to reduce railroad transit costs.   
Port 
Swaziland traditionally depends primarily on the port of Maputo.  During Mozambique’s 
civil war, much of this trade was diverted to the port of Durban.  Both of these ports are 
among the largest and most efficient ports in the region.  For further discussion on these 
ports, please refer to the Southern African section of the report. 
 
Swaziland’s transport system is further aided by the dry port at Matsapha, whose 
presence saves both time and money for importers and exporters.  The port is in the 
process of being upgraded with a grant from the Taiwanese government. 
TRADE 
Like Lesotho, Swaziland’ trade is overwhelmingly dominated by South Africa which 
accounted for 93% of Swaziland’s total imports, and 60% of its exports.  The rest of the 
SADC accounted for another 17% of Swaziland’s exports.  Moreover, while Swaziland is 
considered to be extremely open, further relaxing import controls in 2000 by eliminating 
permit requirements on primary inputs for industrial use, it faces similar challenges to 
Lesotho as a member of the SACU: it must adhere to the external Southern African   - 30 - 
Customs Union (SACU) tariff which was set, until recently, by South Africa.  The tariff 
has consequently reflected the needs of the more advanced South African economy, 
focusing on import substitution rather than export promotion. The trade policy report of 
the World Trade Organization states the development of an export oriented tariff 
structure will be crucial to the development of Swaziland’s economy.  SouthAfrica, 
however, has recently liberalised its trade policy in accordance with the South Africa- EU 
trade agreement and to comply with WTO guidelines.  The SACU external tariffs were 
consequently reduced.  However, it is estimated that the SACU member countries will 
lose US$117m per year in revenues as a result of the South Africa-EU agreement.  Goods 
imported from within the SACU are duty free. 
 
In addition to playing a considerable role in the direction of trade, Swaziland’s 
geographic location has markedly affected foreign direct investment in the country.  
When economic sanctions were imposed on South Africa in the 1980s, many foreign 
investors simply relocated to nearby Swaziland to avoid the sanctions.  Since the 
sanctions have been removed investors are returning to South Africa.  Swaziland’s 
growth rate has slipped from 7 percent a year, to current rates of 3%.   
 
Swaziland is a member of the Southern African Customs Union, Southern African 
Development Community, Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, Common 
Monetary Area, and is a signature to the Cotonou Agreement. Swaziland is also eligible 
to receive the benefits of the African Growth Opportunities Act, although it temporarily 
risked being excluded in 2001.   
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
Under its Tikundla system of dual monarchy, Swaziland has maintained a general 
atmosphere of relative political stability.  Its strikingly homogenous ethnic composition 
has prevented many of the ethnic conflicts common of the continent.  Recently, however, 
the country’s monarchy has been receiving increasing pressure both internally and 
externally to democratise.  Such pressure has been the prime source of regional tension 
for Swaziland.   
 
Relations with South Africa have been proper but strained at times.  While the African 
National Congress in South Africa has refused to openly assist progressive groups in 
Swaziland, it has maintained pressure in other ways.  The SADC also refuses to openly 
criticise Swaziland’s current regime.  The South African Trade Unions and exiled Swazi 
pro-democracy supporters in South Africa, however, continue to openly back progressive 
movements in Swaziland and have included support for border blockades during national 
strikes.   - 31 - 
ZAMBIA 
TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE 
While Zambia shares its border with eight different countries and could potentially have 
numerous outlets to the sea, surrounding conflicts (in particular, in the DRC and Angola) 
and poor internal infrastructure severely hamper Zambia’s transit system. Its internal 
transportation infrastructure is severely dilapidated and significantly worse than near all 
of its regional neighbours. This is reflected in relatively high transport costs, which are 
estimated to account for 60-70% of the total cost of production for many goods (EIU). 
Currently unable to transport westward through Angola because of the ongoing civil war, 
Zambia relies primarily on the South African, Tanzanian (Dar es Salaam) and 
Mozambiquan corridors.  
 
The Zambian government has recently demonstrated increased commitment to improving 
transport efficiency. Significant infrastructure improvements have been undertaken with 
assistance from the World Bank, including a US$70 million Road Sector Investment 
Program, and US$27 million Railways Restructuring Project. Before the recent upsurge 
in investment, resource allocation to the transport sector was markedly low and 
continually declining.  
Road 
Both Zambia’s trunk roads, connecting Zambia to the regional corridors, and its rural 
feeder network are in poor condition. In 1995, over 50% of Zambia’s paved roads were 
considered to be in poor condition; in 1984 this proportion was 30%. The main roads are 
littered with craterous potholes often forcing one to drive on the gravel shoulders for 
several hundred meters at a time. Zambia also has one of the highest fatality rates 
amongst developing countries. Moreover, an estimated 90% of rural feeder roads were 
classified as poor according to a Zambian Roads Department study. This further 
complicates the challenges faced by Zambia’s widely dispersed rural population.  
 
The aforementioned Road Sector Investment Project (1997-2007) hopes to increase the 
number of roads in “good condition” to at least 50% of total roads. It will also address the 
issue of road safety. In addition, the Zambian government has negotiated bilateral road 
transport agreements with Botswana, Zimbabwe, Malawi and Tanzania.  
Rail 
Zambia’s two railways TAZARA (jointly owned with Tanzania) and Zambia railways are 
both operating at under half capacityand are plagued by old tracks, inadequate rolling 
stock, and maintenance negligence. The Zambian government has recently undertaken a 
US$27 million Railways Restructuring Project “to enable Zambia Railways (ZR), 
through restructuring and privatization, to substantially increase its operating efficiency, 
reduce its cost of operations, and configure its freight services and tariffs to meet 
customers’ requirements and expectations, and consequently, to increase its share of the 
local, international, and transit freight traffic.” (WB RR) Zambia Railways has bilateral   - 32 - 
working agreements with the national railways of Zimbabwe, South Africa (Spoornet), 
and Tanzania.  
Ports/Waterways 
Zambia’s primary transit ports are those of South Africa (mainly Durban), Mozambique 
(mainly Beira) and the Tanzanian port of Dar es Salaam. While Beira is the closest port 
to Zambia, Durban is the best equipped and also directly accessible by rail. Both the ports 
of Beira and Durban have been expanding their market share in Zambia at the expense of 
the Dar es Salaam port. For further discussion on the regional ports, refer to the Southern 
Africa section of the report. 
 
Inland water transport holds potential for freight transport to DRC, Burundi and Tanzania 
but has been thus far underdeveloped and poorly maintained. The port of Mpulungu on 
Lake Tanganyika is considered to be in poor condition and is not linked with the railway 
network further limiting demand. (EIU, WB) 
TRADE 
Zambia has one of the highest export concentration indices in the world. Its exports are 
overwhelmingly dominated by copper and other minerals. Despite being highly 
dependent on the mineral sector, Zambia’s export destinations are notably diverse: it 
exports a near equal share of goods to the industrial countries, Asia, and Africa. 
Moreover, Zambia’s export dependence on the EU is the lowest among SADC nations. It 
is also one of SADC’s least dependent countries on South Africa for exports. The three 
most important export destinations in 2001 were Malawi, Thailand, and Japan. Zambia’s 
imports, however, are primarily from South Africa which accounted for 68% of total 
imports in 2001. 
 
While Zambia is a member of COMESA and the SADC, efforts at regional integration 
have been slow and delays in implementation dates are likely. For example, while 
Zambia and Zimbabwe both agreed to the COMESA free-trade zone, Zambia recently 
instituted a complete ban on 14 Zimbabwean products following Zimbabwean currency 
devaluations (country reports, article EIU??). There are now more trade barriers between 
Zambia and Zimbabwe than there were before either COMESA or SADC launched their 
free-trade areas. For further discussion on regional agreements, refer to Southern Africa 
section. 
POLITICAL RELATIONS 
Zambia is considered to be more politically stable than many of its neighbouring 
countries. Despite such stability, however, Zambia has recently had to deal with conflicts 
in its neighbouring countries Angola and DRC, and rising tensions in Zimbabwe. The 
Angola conflict, which recently ended in April 2002, not only weakened the country’s 
infrastructure and rendered its corridors impassable, but also soured relations between 
Angola and Zambia. The Zambian government was accused of funding rebels, and 
allowing Angolan rebel groups to take refuge on Zambian soil. Zambia refused Angola 
the right to purse the rebels on Zambian territory. The escalating tensions led to brief 
border skirmishes in 2000. Further contributing to the escalating tensions, Angolan   - 33 - 
soldiers embarked on a series of cross-border raids in which they plundered Zambian 
border villages in 2001. The end of the war and the establishment of a tripartite security 
mechanism with Namibia, however, promise to improve relations. Border regions still 
remain volatile.  
 
Zambia has also suffered from the civil war in the DRC: Congolese rebels have crossed 
into Western Zambia looting Zambian villages, and the influx of Congolese refuges is 
placing additional strains on an already weak Zambian economy. The Zambian 
government, however, has refused to become militarily involved in the crisis and remains 
neutral.  
 
Relations with South Africa show signs of improvement with the elections of President 
Patrick Levy Mwanawasa of Zambia and President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa. The 
countries’ previous presidents had a history of soured relations. The 2001 ratification of a 
trade protocol between SADC and SACU will guarantee Zambian producers access to 
South African markets and should help further improve relations.    - 34 - 
ZIMBABWE 
TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE 
Zimbabwe’s transport system is both extensive and in relatively good condition. After 
significant improvements in the 1990s, Zimbabwe is now considered to have one of the 
most efficient transport networks in Sub Saharan Africa 
(http://www.cdr.dk/working_papers/02-4-abs.htm). Its geographical position also allows 
it several possible corridors to the sea: via Mozambique to the ports of Beira, Maputo and 
Nacala; via South Africa to the ports of Durban, Port Elizabeth and Capetown; and via 
Botswana and Namibia to the port of Walvis Bay.  
Road 
Zimbabwe’s trunk road network is in relatively good condition and provides adequate 
access to the region’s primary corridors. Its rural road network, while less developed, has 
benefited from significant improvements in the latter half of the 1990s. Despite such 
improvements in rural access, many rural feeder roads remain in poor condition and in 
need of backlog maintenance. Zimbabwe’s rainy season presents further difficulties for 
its rural road network. For further information on transit corridors, see the above 
Southern Africa regional overview. 
Rail 
Zimbabwe’s already extensive rail network has recently benefited from the construction 
of the Bulawayo to Beitbridge railway line. The construction of this line will allow 
Zimbabwe to transport freight directly to South African ports, thereby bypassing 
Botswanan rails. In contrast, Botswanan freight destined for the northern tier of Southern 
African countries still requires passage on Zimbabwean railways. Zimbabwe has further 
aggravated the tension caused by this disparity by requiring that any freight passing 
through Zimbabwe from third countries such as Zambia use this Bulawayo to Beitbridge 
route, thereby limiting transit freight on Botswanan rails.  
Ports 
An increasing share of Zimbabwean trade is being shipped through the South African 
ports (most notably Durban) despite lower simple transport costs to the Mozambiquan 
ports of Beira and Maputo. The shift is largely seen as a product of the improved 
efficiency of the South African ports associated with economies of scale (i.e. container 
shipping). The South African corridors are also considered more reliable and provide 
more regular service than the Mozambiquan corridors. Overall, the ports serving 
Zimbabwe are operating relatively efficiently. For further discussion of these ports, 
please refer to the Southern Africa section of the report. 
TRADE 
The bilateral tariffs and non-tariff barriers of neighbouring SADC countries on 
Zimbabwean exports are significantly higher than those on any other SADC country’s 
exports. Botswana, for example, levies an average tariff of 43% on Zimbabwean exports   - 35 - 
while maintaining free trade relations with South Africa. Even South Africa, Zimbabwe’s 
most important regional trading partner retains an average 18.9% tariff against 
Zimbabwean exports. Interestingly, while Zimbabwe is the most export dependent on 
South Africa of the SADC countries it faces the third highest average tariff from South 
Africa. Conversely, Zimbabwe maintains the highest average tariff barriers against other 
SADC counties.  
  
Zimbabwe also faces the second highest EU import tariff of SADC countries. Moreover, 
the recently signed free trade pact between South Africa and the EU may hurt 
Zimbabwean exports by diverting investment into South Africa. Zimbabwe has also been 
excluded for the first group of countries selected to gain improved terms of access to the 
United States through the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act. It is, however, a member 
of both COMESA and SADC and has recently been promoting a free-trade pact for the 
whole SADC. 
POLITICAL RELATIONS 
While Zimbabwe has not been subject to the violent border clashes common in western 
and eastern Africa, it has recently suffered from increased regional tensions and political 
isolation in the SADC. The deteriorating relations can be largely attributed to the 
pernicious regime of President Robert Mugabe, who has received international criticism 
not only from the SADC and the Commonwealth but also from the EU, and US 
governments. The Commonwealth even suspended Mr. Mugabe from the organisation. 
One of the primary sources of increased tension has been Zimbabwe’s continuing deep 
military involvement in the war in the DRC, despite pleas from its neighbours to 
withdraw.  
 
Zimbabwe’s relations with South Africa have been particularly strained over both trade 
disputes and personal differences between Mr. Mugabe and Thabo Mbeki, president of 
South Africa.   - 36 - 
AFRICA - CENTRAL AND EASTERN  
BURUNDI 
Besides lying over 1,400km from the nearest port, Burundi is faced with the constant 
challenge of navigating its international freight through the surrounding, and internal, 
ebullitions of ethnic tensions and civil war. Unable to trade to the East, because of the 
violent civil war in the DRC, Burundi must rely on the Northern Corridor (via Rwanda, 
Uganda and Kenya) to the port of Mombasa and Central Corridor (to Dar es Salaam). The 
Northern corridor includes three border crossings for Burundi; all three of which have 
been particularly vulnerable to regional instability. The Central Corridor, while only 
necessitating one border crossing (Burundi-Tanzania), is marred by relatively poor 
infrastructure, and further threatened by increasing tensions between Tanzania and 
Burundi. In dire circumstances, as during the period of regional sanctions (1996-7), a 
third corridor from Bujumbura to South Africa via Mpulungu on Lake Tanganyika is an 
alternative route. At a total distance of nearly 4,500km, and including up to four border 
crossings and three modal changes (depending on routing), this corridor under usual 
circumstances is a poor substitute for more direct links.  
TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE 
Roads 
Both of Burundi’s direct transit corridors are largely dominated by road transport. The 
Central Corridor to Dar es Salaam, by which Burundi transports a majority of its freight, 
is marked by poor road conditions, and is considered to be considerably worse than the 
Northern Corridor roads. Flooding associated with the wet season further hampers 
transport on these corridors. A new Tanzanian project, however, supported by the EU 
will upgrade several segments of the Central Corridor. The project will also include the 
construction of a weighbridge to ensure its sustainability. For more discussion on these 
corridors, please refer to the Rwanda and Uganda studies. 
 
Burundi’s internal road network is in good condition. The trunk roads to the Rwanda and 
Tanzania border have both recently undergone improvements, including the construction 
of a modern parking facility at the Kobero (Tanzania) crossing. 
Rail 
Burundi has no internal rail system but depends on the Tanzanian rail from Kigoma on 
Lake Tanganyika to Dar es Salaam for much of its transport. The Tanzanian railway is 
considered to be unreliable and in poor condition (EIU Tanzania). Earlier this year, the 
Tanzania Railways Corporation suffered one of the deadliest train crashes in the 
continent’s history when one of its trains lost power and rolled backwards down a slope 
crashing into a freight train. 
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Burundi also uses the Ugandan railway from Kampala to Mombasa, although this 
corridor is dominated by road transport. While this line has the potential to reduce the 
burden of transit freight on the Kampala-Mombasa highway, its dilapidated condition and 
undependability prevent it from doing so in any significant quantity. It is estimated that 
an average trip from Kampala to Mombasa takes 21 days, with trips often taking as many 
as 60 days (IG). The unreliability of the rail arrivals often make it impossible to book 
ships ahead of time at the port of Mombasa, causing further delays. (EIU) 
Ports/Inland Waterways 
The inland port of Bujumbura on Lake Tanganyika plays a major role in Burundi’s 
international flow of goods. Approximately 80% of Burundi’s external trade passes 
through this port on its way to Kigoma and ultimately Dar es Salaam. The port is 
operating at under-capacity, and is not considered to require additional capacity in the 
near future. (UNCTAD) 
 
Most of Burundi’s goods eventually pass through the port at Dar es Salaam, while a 
smaller percent use the port at Mombasa. Handling charges at the port of Dar es Salaam 
are cheaper than those at Mombasa: charges for a 20ft container at Dar es Salaam are 
about $1,470, compared to $1,870 at Mombasa. Dar es Salaam, however, has 
traditionally had relatively higher tariffs than the other major African ports including 
Mombasa. (USAID) Both ports have benefited from recent infrastructural improvements, 
including the construction of a grain handling facility at the port of Mombasa. Many of 
the recent improvements undertaken by these ports can be seen as a product of the direct 
competition of these ports for East Africa’s landlocked countries’ trade.  
TRADE 
Ethnic tensions, political instability, and international sanctions have all contributed to 
Burundi’s struggling economy and weak external trade sector. In 1996, after Major Pierre 
Buyoya seized power, Burundi’s neighbouring countries imposed strict sanctions on the 
country, including the closure of all transportation links. It is estimated that these 
sanctions led to a 50 per cent loss in Burundi's export earnings in 1996 and a 25 per cent 
increase in import costs. In addition to the sanctions, an international aid freeze was 
inflicted on Burundi. The sanctions necessitated the diversion of much of Burundi’s 
external trade to the aforementioned Zambian corridor, and forced much of the regional 
trade into the informal sector. Such instability has also restricted Burundi’s former role as 
a regional exporter and re-exporter of manufactured goods (EIU).  
 
Moreover, despite efforts to promote diversification of exports, including the 1992 
declaration of the country as a duty-free zone for enterprises promoting non-traditional 
exports, Burundi remains heavily dependent on coffee and tea which combined represent 
94% of total exports. Most of its coffee exports are shipped to the Europe, and in 
particular Belgium, UK, Switzerland and the Netherlands. The most important regional 
market for Burundian exports continues to be Kenya. Its imports, primarily fuel and 
manufactured goods, mainly originate from France and Belgium. Regionally, Burundi 
imports mainly from Kenya and Tanzania. Exact trade figures for Burundi are unreliable. 
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Burundi is a member of COMESA, but did not meet its October 2000 deadline for 
elimination of all tariffs on regionally traded goods and has not agreed to participate 
fully. In fact, it still maintains a rate of 40% of the general duty rate on COMESA 
originating goods. The withdrawal of Tanzania, one of Burundi’s main regional trading 
partners from COMESA in 2000 will further hamper reductions in tariffs. Burundi is also 
a member of the Communauté économique des Etats d’Afrique centrale (CEEAC)
14, and 
the Communauté économique des pays des grands lacs (CEPGL)
15. Neither of these 
regional organizations has operated effectively. Burundi has also applied to join the East 
African Community (EAC) but there is currently resistance amongst the current members 
to accept it until a stable democracy is restored. (EIU) 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
For the last decade and much of its history Burundi has been marked by violent civil wars 
and unstable relations with its neighbours. The assassination of its first democratically 
president, Melchior Ndadaye, in 1993, sparked a bloody war that has continued for over a 
decade between the minority Tutsi-dominated army and ethnic Hutu rebels. Destruction 
of infrastructure; regional economic sanctions; and aggravated tensions with 
neighbouring countries, due to increasing spillovers and refugee migrations have all 
compounded Burundi’s position as a landlocked country. While a tenuous and long-
sought cease fire was signed in December 2002, both sides accused each other of 
breaking the agreement only days later. 
 
In addition to its own political tensions, Burundi has been incommensurately affected by 
regional instability. The Northern Transit Corridor used by Burundi requires three border 
crossings, all of which have been subject to instability. The Rwanda-Uganda border has 
witnessed increasing violence as a result of differing objectives in the DRC war; and the 
Uganda-Kenya border has also been subject to periodic tensions and closures. Moreover, 
internal conflicts, such as the civil war in Rwanda, in these countries often damage the 
infrastructure and temporarily prevent the passage of freight. 
 
 Burundi’s relations with its most vital transit neighbour, Tanzania, have been particularly 
strained as a result of the ongoing civil war. Tanzania continues to strongly oppose Tutsi 
military rule, and led the campaign for regional sanctions in 1996. The hundreds of 
thousands of Burundian refugees now living in Tanzania have further weakened 
relations(CNN 2000). The refugees are not only a strain on the Tanzanian economy, but 
also often lead rebel attacks on Burundi undermining border security. Burundi accuses 
Tanzania of aiding such anti-government rebels (BBC 2002). 
 
Burundi is also involved in the civil war to its east in the DRC. Hostilities between the 
two governments are largely a product of the Congolese government’s weapons support 
for one of the main Burundian rebel groups, the CNDD-FDD. The CNDD-FDD 
continues to maintain its base in DRC, despite recent efforts by Congolese President 
Joseph Kabila to distance himself from this group. Conversely, the Burundian 
                                                 
14 Member countries include Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Gabon, Central African Republic, Rwanda, 
Chad, Congo, DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda, Sao Tomé and Principe 
15 Member countries include Burundi, DRC, and Rwanda   - 39 - 
government has good relations with Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (RCD), 
the main rebel group opposing the DRC government.  
 
Burundi has also suffered from increasing tensions with its northern neighbour Rwanda. 
Despite facing similar internal ethnic tensions, the two governments mistrust each other. 
Rwanda took part in the 1996-99 economic sanctions levied on Burundi.   - 40 - 
ETHIOPIA 
Despite losing its coastline to Eritrea in 1991, Ethiopia continued for 7 years to rely 
predominantly on the port of Assab (Eritrea) for its trade. Throughout much of the 1990s 
over 75% of Ethiopia’s international trade and 90% of its dry cargo imports passed 
through Assab. The recent border conflict with Eritrea, which began in 1998, however, 
has dramatically shifted the trading routes used by Ethiopia The port of Djibouti now 
handles the large majority of Ethiopian trade. While this port has modern facilities, it will 
require additional improvements to handle the vast increases in freight traffic on a 
sustainable basis. The railway and road route linking Addis Abba to Djibouti will also 
require significant improvements to allow this corridor to operate efficiently. 
 
Beyond the difficulties Ethiopia now faces with its international corridors, Ethiopia 
suffers from an inadequate internal transportation network. It has one of the lowest road 
densities in the world, with only 20% its land area being within 10km of an all-weather 
road and 70% of its farms being more than a half-day walk from an all weather-road. 
(CSP) (PRSP). Moreover, those roads that do exist are often of extremely poor quality. 
Such an inadequate internal transport system has been particularly devastating for 
Ethiopia which constantly struggles with chronic food shortages in certain areas, 
juxtaposed with surpluses in others. The last two years, for example, witnessed a bumper 
harvest of maize in Ethiopia. Poor infrastructure and its associated costs, however, have 
hindered the flow of this surplus to the deficit areas and have left 11 million people at 
risk of starvation.  
TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE 
Road 
As in most African countries, roads play a dominant role in Ethiopia’s trade, carrying 
approximately 95% of the country’s passenger and freight traffic (WB PID 10816). The 
primary road corridors from Addis Abba to Assab and Djibouti are considered to be of 
international standards (Giorgis). The recent closing of the Ethiopia-Eritrea border, 
however, has shifted much of Ethiopia’s freight traffic onto the Djibouti corridor, which 
was previously of ancillary importance. The road through this corridor now suffers from 
increased wear and requires further investment to sustain present volumes of trade (EIU). 
Ethiopia is investigating using roads through Kenya to Mombasa, through Sudan to Port 
Sudan and through Somalia to Berbera (The East African 2000). These routes are 
hindered by poor infrastructure levels or civil conflict. 
 
Despite its relatively adequate primary road corridors, Ethiopia suffers from a particularly 
poor internal road network with almost 70% of the country’s land area not being 
accessible by the current transport system. Moreover, the spoke-like nature of the road 
system, with Addis Abba at the centre, hinders direct transport and trade between rural 
areas. Only two main roads provide access to the highlands, and both have suffered heavy 
wear from military and food convoys (EIU). 
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Recognizing the dramatic effects its poor infrastructure system had on the economy, the 
Ethiopian government has recently exhibited significant political commitment to 
improving the transit system. Beyond dedicating an entire section of its PRSP to road 
infrastructure and its effects on poverty, the Ethiopian government now allocates over 
20% of its capital budget to improvements in the road system. It has launched the second 
Road Sector Development Project (RSDPII 2002-2007) hoping to improve upon the 
moderate successes of RSDPI; while RSDPI did not achieve many of its targets, 
significant improvements were made: the percentage of federal roads in good condition 
improved from 14% to 30% (the target was 60%), the percentage of regional roads in fair 
condition improved from 15% to 30%, and the road system witnessed a 30% increase in 
total length. Underscoring the importance of reliable coastal access, Ethiopia has granted 
priority, under the RSDPs, to those roads that provide access to ports. (PRSP) 
Rail 
Ethiopia is connected by railway to the port of Djibouti. The poor performance of this 
railway is one of the primary factors limiting growth on this corridor. The railway is more 
than 100 years old, has limited capacity, and is subject to excessive delays and 
inefficiencies. Since the closure of the Eritrean transit corridor, these inefficiencies have 
had a more pronounced effect on Ethiopia’s trade as Ethiopia is more reliant on this 
corridor. Ethiopia has recently announced plans to revitalise the railway and reduce the 
number of checkpoints along its route. The EU has provided funding for the design and 
documentation phase of upgrading the line. Ethiopia hopes to complete the rehabilitation 




Before the current conflict with Eritrea, Assab was the primary port for Ethiopian trade 
accounting for over 75% of Ethiopia’s international cargo flow. Ethiopia had even signed 
a transit services agreement with Eritrea in 1992 that provided for the expeditious 
movement of international freight between the two countries. Since the start of Ethiopia-
Eritrea conflict in 1998, the majority of Ethiopian trade has passed through the port at 
Djibouti. The only other proximate ports to Ethiopia are the Somali ports, which suffer 
from problems of domestic disorder. 
 
Ethiopian freight now accounts for 70% of the traffic passing through Djibouti giving 
Ethiopia significant bargaining leverage http://www.port-
technology.com/projects/djibouti . Ethiopia has signed an agreement with Djibouti, the 
Djibouti Port Utilization Agreement in 1993, allowing for the permanent right to use the 
port. The agreement also ensures that any preferential tariffs on services offered by the 
port of Djibouti are enjoyed by Ethiopia and that Ethiopia can obtain plots of land in the 
duty-free area (Giorgis 1995). Following the increase in goods processed at the port of 
Djibouti, port authorities were encouraged to formulate a $15 million expansion of the 
port's terminal. This includes about $2 million to pay for the computerisation of the port 
facilities.  
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Ethiopia’s export trade is overwhelmingly dominated by coffee. Much of this coffee is 
directed to Western Countries including Germany, Japan, Italy and the U.S. This 
dependence on coffee exports coupled with high transport costs makes the Ethiopian 
economy particularly vulnerable to the volatile nature of coffee prices.  
 
Ethiopia has also recently liberalised its tariff structure. The maximum tariff was reduced 
to 40% in 1998, and the average tariff to 19.5%. Ethiopia does not impose quantitative 
restrictions on imports. The biggest hindrances to imports are the strict foreign exchange 




Further to its recent liberalizations, Ethiopia is a member of the Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) which is intended to liberalise and promote 
intra-regional trade. Intra-regional trade, however, has remained low and the free-trade 
zone proposed in October 2000 has not been fully implemented - Ethiopia is one of 
eleven countries that has not yet agreed to participate fully in the zone. Ethiopia is noted 
for its relatively high customs duties and strict foreign exchange control. There are also 
preparations for a COMESA customs union by 2004.  
  
Ethiopia is also a member of the Lomé Covention which entitling its exports to duty 
reductions or exemptions and freedom from all quote restrictions. A wide range of 
manufactured products are granted preferential duty treatment from the developed 
countries under the GSP. 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
Ethiopia’s recent history has been defined by civil conflict and regional wars. The most 
recent of these has been the devastating war with Eritrea, which was ignited over a border 
dispute in 1998. Eritrea, which was unilaterally annexed by Ethiopia in 1962, did not 
regain its official independence until 1993 after the conclusion of a bloody civil war. 
Eritrean rebels had been fighting for their independence from the time of the initial 
annexation. The 1991 civil war did not only result in Eritrean independence but also a 
new Ethiopian government, which allied itself with the new Eritrean state. In 1998, 
however, such rapprochement was lost as a disagreement over the location of the border 
and bilateral trade disputes led to an explosive civil war. The war has cost Ethiopia not 
only thousands of lives, but also severe economic losses as Eritrea formerly provided 
valuable access to the sea and was an important regional trading partner.  
 
Relations with Somalia have also been strained since the 1970s when Somalia launched a 
war to capture the Ogaden region of south-eastern Ethiopia. Tensions remain high 
between the countries as Ethiopian troops have repeatedly entered Somalia in pursuit of 
groups hostile to the Ethiopian government, and the Somalian government has recently 
accused Ethiopia of providing support to Somali rebel factions (BBC Jan 8 2001).  
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Previous tensions with Sudan have recently abated as both countries view themselves as 
victims of Eritrean aggression and have tenuously united in an attempt to isolate Eritrea 
(EIU).   - 44 - 
UGANDA 
Uganda’s geographical location in Eastern Africa allows it only two possible corridors to 
the sea: the Northern Corridor to the port of Mombasa, and the Central Corridor to Dar-
es-Salaam. Since the early 19
th century, when the Kenya-Uganda railway was first 
constructed, the former has played the predominant role in Uganda’s trade flow. While it 
continues to do so, the rapid deterioration of the railroad after the East African Railway 
Corporation dissolved into three separate companies in 1977 has shifted the primary 
mode of transport from rail to road. At about the same time, however, Uganda’s notably 
good road system (considered the best in Eastern Africa) fell into a state of neglect and 
deterioration. (WB24171) It is estimated that there was a 75% loss in road network 
investment due to deterioration during this period. High transport costs, and negative 
economic growth, however, triggered a concerted approach by the Ugandan government 
to improving transport infrastructure. By 1995, approximately 70% of Uganda’s main 
roads were considered to be in good condition- a dramatic improvement from 10% in 
1986.  
TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE 
The Northern and Central Corridors are considered by a recent UNCTAD study to be in 
fair/poor condition (InfraAfrica). While the railway is generally acknowledged to be 
operating extremely inefficiently, sources disagree regarding the quality of the primary 
road from Kampala to Mombasa. The Africa News Service writes that the “Mombasa 
road is a perfect symbol of neglect. The current state of the road is appalling,” 
(http://www.peacelink.it/anb-bia/nr355/e06.html); Globalsecurity.org agrees, highlighting 
the poor condition of the road and claiming that it takes twice as long to transport a 
container from Mombasa to Kampala than it does from London to Mombasa 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/mombassa.htm). Other sources, however, 
do not consider these corridors to be nearly as bad: Lonely Planet writes that the trip from 
Kampala to Nairobi takes only 12-14 hours, and Ugandans suggest that the road is in 
vastly improved condition, allowing for speeds of up to 120km/hr for passenger traffic. 
Regardless of the condition of this road, Uganda’s freight transport suffers primarily from 
a lack of corridors, and the failure of the railway to provide any significant competition 
for the road systems.  
Roads 
Accounting for over 90% of the country’s passenger and freight traffic, Uganda’s roads 
play a dominant role in its transport system. (WB 2141) The road system as a whole has 
seen significant improvements in the last 15 years as a result of various road 
rehabilitation projects funded by the European Community, the World Bank, the African 
Development Bank, and several bilateral donors. The primary corridor roads are now 
considered to be in relatively good condition (see above) but suffer from the volatile 
heavy rains of the region. The recent rains caused by El Niño, for example, destroyed 
several bridges on the Kampala-Mombasa route, and precipitated landslides, resulting in 
the closure of “East Africa’s umbilical cord”(ANB). Moreover, the internal road network   - 45 - 
is considered to be in very good condition, especially in the major centres of southern 
Uganda. Roads to the north tend to be less adequately developed. (LP) 
 
The high transport cost faced by landlocked countries in general, is further complicated in 
the case of Uganda by high petroleum prices. The average pump price through 2002 was 
approximately US$0.87/litre (US$3.29/gallon) (East African weekly, LP). 
Rail 
The Ugandan rail system has fallen victim to decades of poor maintenance, and now 
accounts for only 10% of total domestic freight, and 30% of external trade freight 
(Investment Guide). Only the Kampala to Kenya line of the original colonial rail network 
remains operational, and only for freight (EIU). While this line has the potential to reduce 
the burden of transit freight on the Kampala-Mombasa highway, its dilapidated condition 
and undependability prevent it from doing so in any significant quantity. It is estimated 
that an average freight trip from Kampala to Mombasa takes 21 days, with trips often 
taking as many as 60 days (IG). The undependability of the rail arrivals often make it 
impossible to book ships ahead of time at the port of Mombasa, causing further delays. 
To deal with these shortcomings, East African nations are beginning to show increased 
cooperation amongst themselves. Tanzanian railways, for example, is now offering 
Ugandan businesses their own “dedicated wagons” which will help alleviate delays at 
ports. The possibility of creating a new rail network linking East, Central and Southern 
Africa through the railheads at Uganda and Zambia is also being discussed with support 
from Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Zambia (EIU).  
 
Ports/Waterways 
Uganda primarily uses the ports of Mombasa and Dar-es-Salaam, with Mombasa carrying 
the bulk of Uganda’s freight. Efforts were recently made by Tanzania to improve the port 
of Dar-es-Salaam in order to attract trade from the landlocked countries of the region. 
Such efforts have been relatively successful. Ugandan bound imports through the port of 
Dar-es-Salaam increased by 10,000 tons from January to October of 2000. Mombasa port 
has also witnessed recent improvements, most notably the US$65 million grain handling 
facility, which will help relieve general congestion and decrease ships’ turn-around times. 
Many of the recent improvements undertaken by these ports can be seen as a product of 
the direct competition of these ports for East Africa’s landlocked countries’ trade.  
TRADE 
As a result of recent liberalization efforts, Uganda’s economy is now considered to be 
“one of the most open in sub-Saharan Africa. Both current and capital accounts controls 
have been eliminated. The internal trade, foreign exchange and financial market are 
already liberal.” (Africa Competetiveness Report). Such openness has led to a steep 
increase in both export and import volumes: from 1990-7, annual growth of export 
volumes averaged 23.3%, compared to a decline of 3.1% in the 1980s, while import 
volumes grew an average of 34.2%, compared to a decline of 10.2% a decade earlier. 
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Uganda depends primarily on coffee for its export revenue. Most of this coffee, and the 
overwhelming majority of Uganda’s exports, goes to the European Union. In 2001, 63% 
of Ugandan exports were directed to the EU, compared to only 7% to African countries. 
In contrast, Uganda imports primarily from southern African countries which accounted 
for 55% of Ugandan imports in 2001, while EU imports accounted for 20%. The vast 
majority of these imports come from Kenya.  
 
In addition to national liberalization efforts, Uganda has joined two regional 
organizations: COMESA and the East African Community (EAC). While these 
organizations strive to facilitate intraregional commerce, progress has been slow in 
implementation. In fact, over the past thirty years the “share of intraregional trade in total 
exports has fallen from 9% in 1970 to 7.7% is 1998 amongst COMESA countries”. And 
despite Uganda’s national liberalization, it has chosen not to join the COMESA free-trade 
area due to concerns about the effects of a zero tariff on its manufacturing industries and 
government revenue. (EIU) The East African Community, which only includes Kenya, 
Tanzania and Uganda is hindered by structural differences amongst the countries’ 
economies. Tanzania and Uganda fear not being able to compete with Ugandan goods 
after the reduction in barriers. 
POLITICAL RELATIONS 
The formation of the East African Community in 2001, promises to improve the already 
close diplomatic relations amongst Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Recent elections in 
Kenya should further improve Uganda’s relationship with Kenya as President Yoweri 
Museveni of Uganda and former Kenyan President Daniel Arap Moi was somewhat 
strained.  
 
Uganda’s relationships with its other neighbours, however, are not nearly as strong and 
perhaps best described as unstable. To the north, the civil war in Sudan frequently spills 
over into northern Uganda making this border crossing nearly impossible. Moreover, 
Sudan continues to support the Ugandan rebel group, the Lord’s Resistance Army, while 
Uganda supports the Sudan People’s Liberation Army. These alliances led to a 
diplomatic rift in 1995. While a peace agreement was signed in 1999, the treaty has never 
been implemented.  
 
To the south, relations with Rwanda continue to deteriorate as a result of conflicting 
agendas in the DRC civil war. Not only does each country support a different rebel 
faction, but there also appear to be conflicts over resources found in Eastern DRC. Such 
hostilities have been aggravated by personal differences between Mr. Museveni and 
Rwanda’s President Paul Kagame. Escalating tensions brought the two nations to the 
brink of war in 2001, but attempts at mediation by the UK have temporarily mollified 
both sides. (EIU, CountryWatch)   - 47 - 
RWANDA 
Rwanda is faced with the particular challenge of being over 1500 km from the nearest 
ports. The challenges posed by this distance are exacerbated by the current lack of 
surface transport modes: Rwanda has no railways, placing the burden of transport on its 
road corridors. The two main corridors are the Northern Corridor from Kigali to 
Mombasa, which passes through Uganda, and the Central Corridor from Kigali to Dar es 
Salaam. Despite reports that the Central Corridor is cheaper and more convenient as it 
does not require passage through a third country, the Northern Corridor continues to be 
the most important for Rwandan trade: this route normally accounts for more than 70% of 
Rwanda’s imports and about 80% of its exports. 
TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE 
The Northern route is dominated by the road between Mombasa and Kigali, but also uses 
the rail from Kampala to Mombasa; the Central Corridor also has an all road route, and a 
recently developed road to rail route via Isaka (Tanzania), where a dry-dock was 
completed in 1999 to allow goods to be pre-cleared through customs at Isaka rather than 
in Dar es Salaam (TRC 2002). Both the Tanzanian and Ugandan railways play a minimal 
role in Rwanda’s flow of goods. (Rugumba) 
 
Rwanda’s transport infrastructure has also suffered twofold from the recent civil war: on 
one hand, immediate damage was caused to existing infrastructure by the fighting, and in 
particular several key bridges, which often rendered vital corridors impassable; in 
addition to this, the Rwandan government was forced to focus its government policy on 
relief and humanitarian assistance rather than development. Heavy government deficits 
persist and limit the amount of funds available to dedicate to the transport sector. (WB 
PIF 9465) 
Road 
Both Rwanda’s primary road corridors and internal road network are in good condition 
and compare favorably with those of its neighbours. Moreover, the internal network has 
rather extensive coverage with an average distance from household to nearest trunk road 
of 4 km. The greatest problem facing the Rwandan road system is a general lack of funds. 
In fact, the Rwandan Road Fund is now collecting only US$4 million per annum, 
compared to US$10 million per annum before the civil war. 
 
The road between Kigali (Rwanda) and Kampala (Uganda) is of reasonable quality. See 
the section on Uganda for a discussion of the Kampala – Mombasa road. 
Rail 
Rwanda has no railways. There are plans to construct a railway from Kigali to Isaka 
(Tanzania), where the Tanzanian railway from Dar-es-Salaam currently terminates, but 
has not been able to secure funds for this proposal. The construction of this rail section 
would allow direct rail service from Kigali to the port of Dar es Salaam. (EIU) 
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The Tanzanian railway that Rwanda uses for some if its freight transport is considered to 
be unreliable and in poor condition (EIU Tanzania), as detailed in the Burundi section. 
Attempts to modernise are being made, such as the dry dock at Isaka completed in 1999 
(TRC 2002) which allows customs clearance at Isaka with no further customs 
requirements at Dar es Salaam (TRC 2002). 
Ports 
Although the port of Dar es Salaam is consistently rated as the most efficient East 
African port, Rwanda continues to use the port of Mombasa for a majority of its 
international trade (http://www.readafrica.com/cmag.html). Both ports, however, 
continue to improve their efficiency as a result of the direct competition for the 
landlocked countries’ trade. 
TRADE 
Rwanda’s trade policy is considered to be one of the most liberal in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
The government is even now considering establishing the country as an economy-wide 
free trade zone similar to that of Hong Kong and Singapore. Moreover, the licensing 
system is considered to be simple and fast, thereby further encouraging trade. 
 
Despite having such a liberal policy, Rwanda did not meet COMESA’s October 2000 
deadline for elimination of all tariffs on regionally traded goods. Since then, however, it 
has implemented an 80% reduction. Rwanda hopes to fully eliminate such tariffs by 
2004. Its participation in COMESA, and in particular the proposed customs union and 
CET, will need to be resolved with its proposal for an economy-wide free trade zone. 
 
Rwanda is also a member of the Communauté économique des Etats d’Afrique centrale 
(CEEAC)
16, and the Communauté économique des pays des grands lacs (CEPGL)
17. 
Neither of these regional organizations has operated effectively. Rwanda has also applied 
to join the EAC but there is currently resistance amongst the current members to accept 
Rwanda until a stable democracy is restored. (EIU) 
 
Like its landlocked neighbours, Rwanda is heavily dependent on primary products, with 
coffee and tea accounting for 46% of total exports in 2000. Rwanda, however, exports an 
uncharacteristically high amount of its goods to regional neighbours, primarily Kenya 
and Tanzania (31% and 13% of total exports respectively). The next most important 
destinations for Rwandan goods are Germany, Belgium and the United States. Rwanda 
also imports a high percentage of total imports from regional neighbours Kenya, 
Tanzania and Uganda (25%, 4% and 3% respectively). The other primary sources of 
imports are Belgium and UAE (19% and 4 % respectively) (IMF BOPS 2001). 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
Plagued by the remnants of a civil war, and one of the worst genocides in modern history, 
Rwanda has recently begun to establish a semblance of domestic stability. Regional 
                                                 
16 Member countries include Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Gabon, Central African Republic, Rwanda, 
Chad, Congo, DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda, Sao Tomé and Principe 
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conflicts and less-than-stable relations with neighbour countries, however, have further 
complicated Rwanda’s prospects for development. The most immediate of these crises 
has been the ongoing civil war in DRC, in which Rwanda is directly involved. In 1999, 
Rwanda invaded DRC in an attempt to remove the current government of President 
Laurent Kabila and to protect its western border from Hutu rebel groups. Rwanda backs 
the Congolese Rally for Democracy – Goma (RCD – Goma). Some suggest that 
Rwanda’s continuing involvement is related to newly developed commercial and political 
interests in eastern DRC (Reuters 2002a). Earlier this year a tentative peace agreement, 
providing for the withdrawal of Rwandan troops, was signed (Reuters 2002b). 
 
The conflict in the DRC has also soured relations with Uganda. While Rwandan and 
Ugandan forces began the war fighting on the same side, a split in the Congolese rebel 
forces exposed the differing objectives of the two nations. Such tensions have been 
further heightened by the personal animosity between President Museveni and President 
Kagame. In 1999-2000, there were several clashes between the two nations in the 
mineral-rich Congolese town of Kisangani. Both sides appeared close to war in 2001, but 
attempts at mediation by the UK calmed the situation. Tension between these Rwanda 
and Uganda is not infrequent, as a 1990 dispute led to the temporary closing of the 
border. 
 
Relations with another of Rwanda’s vital transit neighbours, Tanzania, remain cordial but 
have been strained by the lingering Rwandan refugee population. Tanzania has called for 
the repatriation of all refugees by December 31, 2002. Rwanda also harbors suspicions 
that the Tanzanian government supports Rwandan rebel group. Tanzania denies such 
accusations.  
 
Rwanda’s final transit neighbour, Kenya, partially severed diplomatic ties with Rwanda 
in 1996, when it ordered the closure of the Rwandan embassy in Nairobi. This followed 
the arrest of a Rwandan official connected to the assassination of the Rwandan Interior 
Minister. More recently, Kenya is accused of harboring genocide suspects from the 1994 
killings.   - 50 - 
AFRICA - WESTERN  
BURKINA FASO 
Lying in the semi-arid tropical Sahel zone just south of the Sahara, Burkina Faso is 
confronted by a harsh environmental landscape with high climatic variability. Most of the 
country is flat, arid and scrubby with only 13% of the land considered arable (CIA). Like 
other Sahel countries, Burkina Faso is marked by a wet and dry season and is subject to 
severe recurrent droughts and floods. Desertification also presents a serious threat to 
Burkina Faso, as overpopulation and overgrazing continue to destroy precious land.  
 
Despite being landlocked, Burkina Faso’s geographic position allows it numerous routes 
to the sea. Most Burkinabe trade, however, still passes through its Francophone 
neighbours Côte d’Ivoire and Togo. Shorter trade routes through Ghana are less 
frequently used (less then 5% of Burkinabe transit uses these routes) due to language 
difficulties, currency problems, and bad road conditions (UNCTAD 95). Moreover, the 
distribution of Burkina Faso transit trade is highly dependent on the political situation of 
its volatile surrounding neighbours (i.e. Côte d’Ivoire, Togo). Between 1990-3, as a result 
of the crisis in Togo, the volume of Burkina Faso transit through the port of Lomé fell by 
60%. (UNCTAD 95) 
TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE  
Although still largely inefficient, Burkina Faso’s transport network has seen significant 
improvements in recent years, reflecting the government’s prioritization of this sector.  
In addition to the US$360m transport sector adjustment programme recently undertaken, 
the Burkinabe government has signed several regional agreements and bilateral treaties 
on transport with neighbouring countries. These agreements focus on the physical 
integration of the region and the streamlining of border crossings. Often, a special anti-
competitive provision is included that reserves two thirds of freight for carriage by 
vehicles from landlocked countries, often resulting in significant delays as goods at 
maritime ports wait for the arrival of vehicles from landlocked countries despite the 
presence of vehicles from maritime nations
18. 
Roads 
While the two main road corridors from Ouagadougou to Abidjan and Ouagadougou to 
Lomé are good condition, the poor condition of its road vehicles significantly hinders 
efficient trade. Most Burkinabe road vehicles are over 10 years old and cannot be 
fastened or securely sealed to carry international freight. In fact, it is estimated that 
transporting a load of 500 metric tons of rice from Accra-Tema to Ouagadougou using 
Burkinabe trucks would cost US$7,500, or 37.5% more than the same shipment using 
                                                 
18 Hence, while assisting trucking companies from landlocked countries, it significantly delays goods 
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Ghanian trucks (UNCTAD 99). Vehicle overloading has also been a recent problem 
leading to the increasing deterioration of roads.  
 
In addition to poor transport vehicles, cumbersome administrative processes and border 
crossings significantly increase the cost of transport. It is estimated that delays at border 
crossing for customs procedures can range anywhere from 24-48 hours. Trade routes are 
also littered with rigorous police checkpoints that cost not only time, but often money in 
the form of bribes. Furthermore, customs escorts are required for transport and only 
depart three times a week resulting in further delays. Vehicles waiting for a convoy to 
form often wait on the side of the road not only hindering normal road traffic but also 
contributing to road damage.  
Rail 
The Abidjan – Ouagadougou rail corridor is the principal railway serving Burkina Faso. 
Like much of Africa’s rail infrastructure, it is in poor condition and lacks proper 
maintenance. The average age of the rolling stock exceeds 25 years. A 1995 UNCTAD 
study reports that the 2,308 km
19 round-trip between Abidjan and Ouagadougou takes 
approximately 30 days. The deterioration of the railway is also having adverse effects on 
the road system since more freight must now be shipped by road. Recent efforts to 
improve this railway, including a $31m dollar loan from the World Bank, have resulted in 
sharp increases in carried freight (EIU).  
Ports and Waterways 
The primary ports serving Burkina Faso, Abidjan and Lomé, are considered to be two of 
the best ports in Western Africa. Both are well-equipped, competitive, and in good 
condition with sufficient storage for processing Burkinabe cargo. Burkina Faso, however, 
only uses a small fraction of its allotted storage space at these ports. The one problem 
lobbied in negotiations regarding the port of Abidjan concerns the delays caused by 
cumbersome customs formalities, which can often take up to 10 days. 
 
None of the three rivers passing through Burkina Faso are navigable.  
TRADE 
The primary destinations for Burkina Faso exports in 2001 were Italy, Singapore and 
Columbia reflecting the diverse nature of its trading partners. Within the West African 
region Burkina Faso exported primarily to Ghana. Over 55% of its imports, however, 
came from either France (24%), Côte d’Ivoire (25%), Togo (4%), and Nigeria (4%) (IMF 
DOTS 2002).  
 
With the exception of France and Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso’s trading partners vary 
significantly from year to year. “In 1999, for example, Venezuela emerged from a 
negligible position to become Burkina Faso’s top export destination and third most 
important source of imports.” The following year, Venezuela trade declined 
precipitously, and was replaced by Singapore as the primary destination for Burkina 
                                                 
19 This is approximately the same distance as a Los Angeles to Salt Lake City, a roundtrip that takes about 
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Faso’s exports. Such extreme variation is often a result of negotiated trade agreements 
(EIU 25).  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
Burkina Faso is a member of several regional trade agreements including the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Franc Zone, Union economique et 
momonetaire oust-africaine (UEMOA), and the Comite inter-Etats de llutte contre la 
secheresse ay Sahel (CILSS).
20 The recent proliferation of regional trade agreements has 
been accompanied by a general liberalization of protection measures: Burkina Faso has 
simplified its customs tariff, and eliminated specific import duties and non-tariff barriers.  
As of 1998, however, Burkina Faso’s import duties still remained the highest in the 
UEMOA with an average of over 30% (WTO). Both the UEMOA and ECOWAS plan to 
implement a common external tariff but the timeline for its implementation has not been 
followed (not sure of this; WTO 6). Its implementation will force Burkina Faso to further 
lower protective measures. Burkina Faso also recently agreed on bilateral relations with 
Ghana, which recognise the importance of the countries’ economic integration 
(newsinghana.com) Burkina Faso is also a member of the WTO, and receives preferential 
access to developed markets under the Generalised System of Preferences. 
                                                 
20 It is interesting to note that Ghana, Burkina Faso’s wealthiest neighbour, is not a member of any of these 
agreements with the exception of ECOWAS. Most notably, Ghana is not a member of the UEMOA and 
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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 
The Central African Republic (CAR) does not have a dependable all-weather transport 
corridor to the coast. With only two primary transport corridors: Douala (Cameroon) to 
Bangui and Point Noire (Congo) to Bangui, Central African Republic’s transport system 
is particularly vulnerable to both the harsh and unpredictable weather patterns, and the 
surrounding political crises of the region. 
 
The Douala –Bangui corridor can be subdivided into three sub-corridors: 
-  rail from Douala to Ngaounderé, then road to Bangui,  
-  rail from Douala to Belabo, then road to Bangui, and 
-  road from Douala to Bangui via Bertoua. 
All of these routes are susceptible to the heavy rains and can often be impassable during 
the wet season. 
 
The Point Noire-Bangui route has been closed to CAR transit traffic due to the recent war 
in the DRC. When the corridor is not closed due to war, it is preferable for bulk, low-
value commodities, but is dependent on river transport on the Oubangui River which 
requires a minimum level of water only present during the wet season. Two of Central 
African largest exports, coffee and cotton, are only harvested in the dry season, when the 
Point Noire corridor is closed. The volatility of world prices for these commodities also 
further aggravates the difficulties faced by CAR on account of its high transport prices.  
TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE 
Road 
Beyond the difficulties of transport to Bangui detailed above, Central African Republic 
faces immense difficulties with its internal transport network. Without any rail system, 
the Central Africa Republic depends almost exclusively on its road network for internal 
transport. This road system, however, with only 450 km of paved roads centred around 
Bangui (ITDN) is wholly inadequate for reaching much of the country. In fact, the 
northern and eastern parts of the country remain largely inaccessible for several months 
each year during the wet season.  
 
Moreover, rigorous customs procedures on the Douala-Bangui corridor and seemingly 
arbitrary checkpoints by police, gendarmerie, and the army lead to further delays and 
higher transport costs. Customs procedures at the border can take as long as two weeks, 
with goods often waiting at the border for the requisite information to be sent from 
Bangui. The full Doala to Bangui trip generally takes three weeks to a month. 
Furthermore, the Central African Customs and Economic Union (UDEAC) has been less 
successful at streamlining such processes and introducing regional standards than the 
Economic Community Of West African States.  
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The Central African Republic has no rail system. It does depend on the Cameroonian 
railway for much of its trade passing through Douala. This railway is considered to be in 
good condition and is operating below capacity. There are, however, delays associated 
with inadequate transshipment facilities.  
Port/Waterways 
The Oubangui River, which has traditionally played a vital role in CAR’s trade, was 
recently rendered impassable by the ongoing conflict in the Congo. River transport is also 
severely limited by the season, only being possible during the wettest months of the year. 
Even when the river is passable, river transit is extremely slow with the journey from 
Point Noire to Bangui normally taking 2.5 months. Now that peace has temporarily 
returned to the DRC, allowing passage on the Obanhui River, the Lake Chad Basin 
Commission has begun discussed damming the river in order to make it passable year 
round.  
 
River transport in the Central African Republic also suffers from poorly equipped river 
ports (i.e. Belabo and Bangui). Now that river transport has reopened, however, plans are 
underway to develop Bangui’s port. 
 
The Douala port has facilities for general cargo, container terminals, and specialised 
berths for minerals and fruit, but suffers from extensive delays and limitations on access 
to larger vessels in the access channel which need to be load lightly in order to access the 
port. Port and customs clearance can take as many as 30 days (UNCTAD).  
TRADE 
The Central African Republic is a member of the Communauté économique et monétaire 
de l’Afrique centrale (CEMAC), and the Franc Zone. While CEMAC’s stated objective is 
the regional integration of the Central Africa countries
21, implementation has lagged 
behind its sister organization UEMOA due to regional instability and resistance from 
Gabon and Equatoria Guinea. According to the World Bank, only 2.6% of exports from 
CEMAC countries were traded within the bloc, compared to 11.1% of exports of 
UEMOA countries.  
 
The recent political crisis in the DRC also had dramatic effects on Central African 
Republic trade as the DRC closed its border with CAR in order to prevent the cross-
border flow of arms. Not only had the DRC provided one of the major transport corridors 
for Central African Republic, but it had also served as one of its major export destinations 
within Africa (DOTS). Furthermore, the crisis in the DRC resulted in a fuel shortage in 
2000 further hampering the CAR economy (ITDN).  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
The Central African Republic, like many of its Western African neighbours, has suffered 
from a decade of political instability, border disputes, and neighbouring crises. With only 
                                                 
21 CEMAC countries include Chad, Congo, Cameroon, Gabon, the Central African Republic, and 
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two corridors to the sea, however, Central African Republic’s trade and economy have 
been particularly vulnerable to such situations. Both of these corridors, in fact, have been 
recently affected by either a border dispute or civil war: The recent crisis in the DRC 
resulted in temporary border closures and fuel shortages, while a 2001 border dispute 
with Cameroon, ignited by the dismantling of a customs post by Cameroonian official, 
further hindered the CAR economy. 
 
The Central African Republic has also witnessed increasing tensions with Chad. After the 
2001 attack on Bangui by rebel supporters of Colonel Francois Bozzie, CAR official 
accused the Chadian government of being involved in the attack. The CAR government 
has also accused Chad of trying to annex the northern part of CAR for its rich oil reserves 
(Country Report EIU). The Chadian government, meanwhile, accuses the CAR of 
supporting Chadian rebel groups.  
  
Relations with Sudan were also soured in 1989 when Sudan refused to grant CAR 
airspace for a trip to Israel. Diplomatic relations were temporarily severed, but have since 
then been restored. (atlapedia) 
 
Furthermore, as is common in the region, CAR has involved itself in neighbouring crises.  
It recently sent troops to the DRC and has been attempting to cultivate relations with both 
Joseph Kabila, president of DRC, and Jean-Pierre Bemba, leader of one of the main rebel 
movements. The CAR government also attempted to negotiate a settlement between the 
Chadian government and its opposition groups, and has been accused of supporting the 
Sudanese government against the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (CW). Conversely, 
troops from Libya, Chad and the Congolese Rebels (led by Mr. Bemba) assisted the CAR 
government in overcoming the 2001 coup d’etat.   - 56 - 
CHAD 
Chad’s challenges as landlocked country and particularly long distance to the nearest 
ports of Douala (1500 km), Port Harcourt (1700 km) and Point Noire (2215 km) are 
compounded by one of the worst transport systems in the region. Its density of paved 
roads is the lowest among all landlocked states; most of the transport tracks are unusable 
for most of the year during the wet season; and there is no rail system. Moreover, Chad 
has fallen victim to a vicious cycle of poor transport where poor transport infrastructure 
has led to the development of numerous regional enclaves making the development of 
effective transport networks both more difficult, and more necessary. With over 90% of 
the population living in rural areas, the development of an adequate transport system will 
be essential to Chad’s overall development. It is estimated that transport charges can be 
as much as 70% of marketing costs, and as much as 80% of the gross margin of local 
cereal prices in N’Djamena (Herman). Recent efforts to improve this system, including 
the Transport Sector Adjustment Project 1989-1993 and the Second Transport Sector 
Project 1994-1999, have seen limited results and a lack of sustainability (PID 8223).  
 
The primary transit corridors for Chad are: 
-  Douala to Ngaondéré by Cameroon rail, Ngaondéré to the Chad border by road, 
and then to Ndjamena by road (only 19km): this is Chad’s principal trade route 
-  Douala to Ndjamena by road  
-  Point Noire to Brazzaville by rail, the river Oubangui to Bangui, and then by road 
to Ndjamena (less frequently used than the other corridors) 
-  The corridor from Point Harcourt, Nigeria which passes through Cameroon. 
However, goods considered to be sensitive (i.e. wheat, rice, maize, wines, 
vegetables, oils, etc.) are restricted and the Cameroon border crossing presents 
addition difficulties. 
TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE 
Given that Chad is almost completely dependent on trade route from Douala to Ndajema 
corridor, and that all but 17 km of this route fall in Cameroon territory, Chad’s trade is 
deeply impacted by Cameroon’s infrastructure and border facilities, both of which are 
inadequate. Moreover, despite partaking in regional treaties and bilateral agreements, 
Chad is still highly dependent on Cameroonian policies and domestic law. 
Road 
While the roads of Chad’s neighbours are in fair condition (although extensive delays are 
common during the wet season), Chad’s internal road network, both primary and rural
22, 
is particularly poor. In fact, Chad’s primary road network is not passable for several 
months of the year. Furthermore, the failure of the rural roads to reach the 
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nations. While primary roads normally have an average of 200-500 vehicles per day in Africa, Chad’s 
primary roads generally have a traffic volume of 50 vehicles a day. Similarly, while rural roads have an 
average of 50 vehicles a day in most of Africa, Chad’s rural roads have an average of less than 5 vehicles 
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aforementioned agricultural enclaves has been a major detriment to poverty eradication. 
The high-potential Salamat, for example, which is considered to be the breadbasket of 
Chad is unreachable to larger vehicles for almost half the year. The significant impact 
even marginal transit improvements can have on human development, was dramatically 
demonstrated in the Karal area in the Chari-Baguirimi where a newly paved road 
“released a key constraint for the marketing of vegetables and grains, leading to increased 
incomes, which has led to other improvements including the construction of a school, a 
dispensary, a group warehouse and a meeting house. Housing improvements from thatch 
huts to mud-brick and cement-brick houses has also been witnessed as a result of the 
newly paved road.  
 
Chad’s trade is also hindered by extensive customs procedures and inspections along the 
road from Cameroon road from Ngaoundere to the Chad border.  
Rail 
Compounding the difficulties of its poor road system, Chad does not have a rail system. It 
does, however, depend heavily on the Cameroonian railway from Douala to Ngaoundere 
which is considered to be relatively good and is currently operating at under-capacity. 
Improvements in the rail system are also planned with the construction of the new Chad-
Cameroon pipeline. (EIU, Exxon) 
Ports and Waterways 
While the port of Douala has facilities for general cargo, container terminals, and 
specialised berths for minerals and fruit, it suffers from extensive delays and limitations 
on access to larger vessels in the access channel. Port and customs clearance can take as 
many as 30 days (UNCTAD). The Nigerian ports suffer from old port handling 
equipment.  
 
River transport is also severely limited by the climatic variability. The Oubangui river, a 
central component of the Point Noire transport route, for example, is normally impassable 
between February and May.  
Pipelines 
A 1,500km pipeline is under construction to transport up to 250,000 barrels a day from 
Chad through Cameroon to an offshore marine terminal near Kribi (World Bank 2003). 
TRADE 
Chad is a member of the Communauté économique et monétaire de l’Afrique centrale 
(CEMAC), and the Franc Zone. While CEMAC’s stated objective is the regional 
integration of the Central Africa countries
23, implementation has lagged behind its sister 
organization UEMOA due to regional instability and resistance from Gabon and 
Equatoria Guinea. According to the World Bank, only 2.6% of exports from CEMAC 
countries were traded within the bloc, compared to 11.1% of exports of UEMOA 
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countries. With the completion of the pipeline currently under construction, this promises 
to be a major export earner. 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
Chad continues to maintain strong relations with its neighbours with the notable 
exceptions of Libya and Central African Republic. It has recently signed an agreement 
with Sudan that provides for cooperation on issues relating to regional security, borders, 
and cross-border trade (CountryWatch).  
 
Relations with Libya, however, remain bitter over a disputed piece of land between the 
two countries known as the Aouzou strip. Speculation concerning the mineral resources 
of this region led to a violent conflict in the early 1980s in which Libya occupied much of 
Chad. Although it was finally agreed to take the dispute to the International Court of 
Justice which ruled in 1994 that the territory belongs to Chad, tensions have remained 
high amidst accusations that Libya has been supporting rebel groups in the north of Chad. 
 
Chad’s relations with CAR have also seen a rapid deterioration stemming from 
accusations by CAR officials that the Chadian government supported the attack against 
its capital, Bangui, by supporters of Colonol Franzois Bozzie. The CAR government has 
also accused Chad of trying to annex the northern part of CAR because of its oil resource 
(Country Report EIU). The Chadian government, meanwhile, accuses the CAR of 
supporting Chadian rebel groups.  
 
Chad also involved itself in the recent conflict in the Congo by sending 1,000 troops to 
assist President Laurent Kabila in fighting the rebellion in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo.  
 
Moreover, since independence Chad has been involved in almost continuous internal 
conflict. It has suffered greatly from decades of violent civil turmoil stemming from deep 
ethnic and regional divisions, often between the northern Muslims and southern 
Christians.   - 59 - 
NIGER 
Despite being landlocked, Niger has several access corridors to the sea via Togo, Benin, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria and Ghana. Only two of these corridors (Nigeria and Benin) 
provide direct access to the sea with the others requiring passage through a third country. 
And it is precisely these two direct corridors that serve as the primary transit routes for 
Nigerien trade. The Benin corridor accounted for 65% of Nigerien trade, while the 
Nigerian route accounted for an additional 16%.  
 
The Nigerien government, with significant assistance from donor funds (EIU), has also 
demonstrated a considerable commitment to improving both its international transport 
corridors and domestic transit system. President Mamadou Tandja recently announced a 
special programme aimed at improving transport and power systems, which will include 
the construction of a second bridge over the Niger River at Niamey, and a railway to 
Niamey from Parakou (Benin). (Country Report Dec 4) The construction of the railway 
holds great promise for Nigerien transport as it would allow direct rail access to the port 
at Cotonou. Currently, goods are transported from Cotonou to Parakou by rail, and then 
from Parakou to Niamey via road. The transit programme has already resulted in the 
successful development of 400 km of paved roads. Moreover, the Nigerien government 
has undertaken several bilateral treaties with Benin including the “Accord sur-le transit et 
l’utilization du port de Cotonou” which provides Niger with a duty-free area at the port of 
Cotonou. 
 
Efforts are also being made to liberalise the transport sector, whose monopolistic nature 
has been traditionally responsible for escalated costs. Until recently, most Nigerien 
transport was dominated by monopolies: the Organisation commune Benin-Niger 
(OCBN), a joint parastatal railway company, had a monopoly of transit from Cotonou to 
Parakou, and a monopoly to organise transshipment and onward transit to Niamey; and 
the national road transport company, Societe Nationale des Transports du Niger (SNTN) 
held a monopoly on mining freight. While the government has allowed for the 
liberalization of the sector, implementation has thus far been slow. Despite these efforts, 
however, the road transport union (Synidcat des Transporteurs Routiers du Niger, STRN) 
has implemented a system to “allocate domestic passenger traffic and international 
freight from Benin and Togo” that establishes tariffs at a rate two-thirds above those set 
by Beninese truckers. (UNCTAD, WB) 
TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE 
Road 
Niger’s primary international road corridors and domestic road network are both in 
relatively good condition. The principal challenges facing the Nigerien road system, 
include police harassment, cumbersome border delays, poorly maintained vehicles, 
frequent accidents, and a lack of competition amongst transport services. The national 
road transport company (SNTN), for example, did not purchase any new vehicles 
between 1983 and 1995. Such poor maintenance contributes to the large number of road   - 60 - 
accidents which are estimated to have cost the Nigerien economy nearly US$3 million 
dollars. Moreover, shortly after the Cotonou (Benin) – Niamey (Niger) road was freshly 
paved and upgraded it remained virtually unused for transport as the governments of 
Benin and Niger, having a monopoly on the rail route from Cotonou (Benin) – Parakou 
(Benin), refused to authorise its use.  
Rail 
Although there is currently no domestic rail system in Niger, the Beninese railway to 
Parakou plays a major role in Niger’s transit accounting for approximately 65% of all its 
transit trade (UNCTAD 1995). The railway suffers from similar problems to the other rail 
networks of the region: old, poorly maintained rolling stock and infrastructure, and 
inadequate transshipment facilities. Furthermore, the current stock is often insufficient to 
handle the high volume of trade during the peak cotton harvest season.  
 
The construction of a railway from Parakou to Niamey, which would allow direct rail 
access to the sea, has also been proposed.  
Ports/Internal Waterways 
The Cotonou port, the most important port serving Niger, is considered to be not as well 
equipped and less efficient than some of its Western African counterparts (i.e. Abidjan or 
Lomé). Moreover, the port of Lagos, another major port serving Niger, recently suffered 
from extreme congestion as a consequence of the implementation of 100% inspection of 
imported cargoes. The congestion, is estimated to have led to a 35% increase in the prices 
of certain manufactured goods (http://www.otal.com/ponig.htm) The port of Lagos, was 
also temporarily closed in 1999 due to surrounding violence. In constrast, the third major 
port for Nigerien transit trade, Lome, is scheduled to become a hub for central and 
western African trade with the new construction of a US$100m container handling 
facility. The new facility will provide loading and unloading for large container ships, 
which will reduce loading and unloading times significantly. 
(http://www.otal.com/polom.htm ) 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
Niger continues to maintain a good rapport with its neighbours. Economic and trade 
relations remain particularly strong with Nigeria, Niger’s most important regional trading 
partner. Relations with Libya also remain strong, abetted by President Khadafi 
commitment of Libyan aid to several development projects in Niger (CW). Niger also 
signed an agreement with Sudan in 1998 to increase cooperation and facilitate trade 
amongst the two countries. Moreover, the one source of ongoing confrontation, the 
border dispute with Benin over the island of Lété, appears to be nearing its conclusion 
with both sides agreeing to hand it over to the International Court of Justice for 
arbitration, and to abide by the ruling.  
 
Despite this general state of rapprochement with its neighbours, Niger has suffered both 
from domestic internal political conflict, and surrounding political crises. The crisis in 
Togo in the early 90s, for example, had series effects on the structure of Nigerien trade as 
much of it had to be diverted to other, less convenient ports. Recent crises in Nigeria, led   - 61 - 
to the closure of the Lagos port and subsequent increases in prices (see above). Even the 
ongoing conflict in Côte d’Ivoire is expected to have effects on the Nigerien economy, as 
transport bottlenecks “will reduce the supply of intermediate inputs.” (EIU outlook for 
2003). In addition to these regional crises, Niger has been plagued by continuing 
domestic turmoil since independence. The last decade has been no exception with the 
continuing violence by the Tuareg rebels, several attempted political coups (two in the 
last three years), and the assassination of President Maïnassara. 
TRADE 
Regional exports to its Western African neighbours, account for a particularly high 
percentage of Nigerien trade (42%). Of these neighbours, Nigeria is exceedingly the most 
important trade partner absorbing nearly 90% of all Nigerien exports to Africa, and 37% 
of all Nigerien exports. The primary exports traded along this corridor include livestock, 
vegetables, and products of Niger’s cotton industry (EIU). Niger also imports substantial 
quantities of oil and electricity from Nigeria. Outside of the immediate region, Niger 
trades primarily to France. This trade, however, is of a different nature being dominated 
by uranium and other ores.  
 
Niger is a member of several regional trade agreements including the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Franc Zone, Union economique et 
monetaire oust-africaine (UEMOA), and the Comite inter-Etats de lutte contre la 
secheresse ay Sahel (CILSS) which have been introduced to promote regional integration. 
The majority of Niger’s imports, however, come from outside of the Union economique 
et monetaire oust-africaine. Interestingly, Nigeria, Niger’s most important trading partner 
in the region, is not a member of UEMOA. Imports from non-member states are taxed at 
a rate of 34-57 percent. (ITDN).   - 62 - 
MALI 
Transit trade is particularly important for the Malian economy, which depends more 
heavily on export trade than the other landlocked countries of West Africa. Moreover, 
with no domestic manufacturing sector, Mali must import nearly all of its consumer 
products and energy supply (i.e. oil). 
 
While Mali has seven neighbours, only two of those countries are effective transit 
neighbours – Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire. Trade through other neighbours is hindered by 
poor infrastructure levels (Guinea), the physical barrier of the Sahara (Algeria, 
Mauritania), or they themselves are landlocked (Burkina Faso, Niger). Coupled with this 
is the high propensity for civil war in its neighbours: each of Mali’s coastal neighbours 
has been involved in violent civil conflict in the last decade, often making transport 
routes unavailable.  
TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE 
Mali’s main trade routes are the rail system from Bamako to Dakar, Senegal and the road 
network from Bamako to Abidjan. As is common in the region, however, recent 
deteriorations in the condition of the rail system have shifted trade towards the road 
network: from 1993-1999 the market share of the railway fell by nearly 50%.  
 
Due to the recent crisis in Cote d’Ivoire, however, the road corridor to Abidjan has been 
effectively impassable. Given that 80% of Malian imports passed through Cote d’Ivoire, 
an increase in the Malian price level is expected. Shortages of basic necessities and 
significant increases in the prices of consumer products are already being reported 
although no official data are available. The local press has also estimated “that 8m tonnes 
of imports, mainly rice, sugar and construction materials, were blocked in the port of 
Abidjan after the outbreak of civil unrest.” (EIU)  
 
Mali’s domestic transport system, is considered to be relatively poor within the region 
and has resulted in inflated transport costs. The World Bank estimates that transport costs 
account for 20-30% of the total cost for Mali’s most essential products. 
 
In 1991 Mali set up a Transport Sector Commission to restructure the transport system 
and engage the private sector in an attempt to improve competitiveness. A Road Fund 
was also set up in 2000. (PID 11522) 
Road 
The primary road corridor for Malian trade is from Bamako to Abidjan. As discussed in 
the Burkina Faso study, this road is in very good condition but suffers from cumbersome 
border processes and delays resulting from obligatory customs escorts. In addition to this, 
Mali’s road transport efficiency has suffered from a unique excess of vehicles, an indirect 
consequence of the emergency food aid delivered during the drought in the early 1980s. 
The excess capacity places a downward pressure on transport prices, often making it 
unprofitable, and leads to frequent overloading. In addition, low transport prices have   - 63 - 
discouraged investment which has resulted in an aging stock; over 95% of trailers and 
tankers are more than 11 years old (PID 11522).  
 
Internal road infrastructure, however, in Mali is considered to be poor and inadequate. Its 
road density of .01 km of road/km
2 remains one of the lowest in Western Africa and is 
the lowest amongst all landlocked countries. Moreover, maintenance backlogs and 
insufficient resources continue to contribute to further deterioration. Internal delays in 
transport are acutely felt in Mali as the economy is agriculturally based. Perishables such 
as mangoes, tomatoes, and oranges can often spoil as a result of excessive delays (WB 
23864). A recent World Bank study estimates that US$7-8m is needed annually for road 
maintenance. This is approximately US$3m more than the current expenditure of US$4.6 
million a year. (WB PID11522)  
Rail 
Mali’s most important rail corridor from Bamako to Dakar is in poor condition. Both the 
rails and rolling stock are old, and maintenance is inadequate (UNCTAD). In fact, the 
poor condition of the track limits speeds to under 50 km/hour (UNCTAD). Poor 
management and quality of service have also been a particular concern for this corridor. 
In 2000, the Malian parastatal company, Regie Nationale du Chemin de Fer du Mali 
(RCFM), that operates part of the railway, suffered losses of US$2.5 million.  
 
The governments of Mali and Senegal, however, have made recent attempts to improve 
the efficiency and commercialise the rail system including an agreement to transfer the 
rail services to a private operator.  
Ports 
Mali trades primarily through the ports of Dakar and Abidjan, which are both in good 
physical condition. As in the case of Burkina Faso, Mali does not fully utilise its 
exclusive port facilities (both warehousing and other physical capabilities) at Dakar or 
Abidjan, which exceed the demand generated by Mali’s current transit trade (UNCTAD). 
There are, however, some complaints about the cargo handling and stowage services at 
Dakar. Before the current crisis in Cote d’Ivoire, most of Burkian Faso’s exports left 
from the port of Abidjan, as it is geographically closer to the center of Mali’s cotton 
production, while most imports entered from Dakar which is considered to have less 
cumbersome import customs procedures  
 
River transport in Mali is limited as it is highly dependent on the level of rains and 
limited to only a few months of the year. 
TRADE 
Mali is a member of several regional trade agreements including the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Franc Zone, Union economique et 
monetaire oust-africaine (UEMOA), and the Comite inter-Etats de lutte contre la 
secheresse ay Sahel (CILSS). It is has a relatively open trade regime compared to its 
neighbours and has been in compliance with the tariff reductions adopted by the 
UEMOA. Moreover, Mali has not implemented any of the safeguard measures (i.e.   - 64 - 
antidumping tariffs, decreasing protection tax) that several other countries of the 
UEMOA have. (IMF). Mali is also a member of the WTO, and receives preferential 
access to developed markets under the Generalised System of Preferences.  
 
Despite recent efforts at regional integration, such improvements will be difficult owing 
to the similarity of resources and economies of the region, and the frequent regional 
political crises. 
 
Cote D’Ivoire has traditionally been the primary source of imports for Mali, making the 
effects of the current crisis on Mali even more severe. 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
Upon declaring independence in 1960, and thereby ending the Federation of Mali (which 
had included Senegal), Mali lost its coastline and direct access to the sea. Since then, an 
unstable border and tense relations with its neighbours have compounded the challenges 
facing Mali as a landlocked state. Relations with Mauritania, for example, are tense and 
have suffered from deep-seated resentment between black Malians, and Mauritanian 
Arabs and Tuareg
24. Moreover, a border dispute with Burkina Faso in 1985 erupted into 
armed violence and has led to a legacy of strained relations between the two nations.  
 
Perhaps even more detrimental to Mali’s development, however, are the ongoing political 
crises and civil wars of its neighbours. Each of Mali’s coastal neighbours has been 
engaged in some form of violent civil conflict in the last decade often making transport 
routes unusable. Togo was devastated by violent political protests and deep internal 
conflict in the early 90s; Algeria was involved in a macabre civil war for much of the 
decade; Ghana suffered from ethnic violence primarily between 1993-4; Sierra Leone’s 
ten year civil war has just recently come to a tenuous settlement; Guinea has been 
stricken by a series of coups and rebel wars; Liberia’s has spent most of the decade in 
violent civil wars which have threatened to spillover into neighbouring countries, thus 
jeopardizing regional stability even further; and finally, and most importantly for Mali, 
Cote d’Ivoire, a regional paradigm of stability, has recently fallen into a devastating 
political crisis which continues to deepen and has had severe effects on Mali’s most 
important corridor to the sea (the Bamako-Abidjan road corridor). In other words, while 
Mali has been recognised for its recent political stability and commitment to democracy, 
its economy has suffered incommensurately as a result of regional conflict and instability. 
 
Moreover, Mali’s current president Alpha Konaré has been a regional leader in attempts 
to bring stability and economic integration to the region. Mr. Konaré recently ended his 
term as the chairperson of the ECOWAS, and is currently the president of UEMOA. Mali 
was also recently a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council. (EIU)  
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ASIA - CENTRAL  
As part of the Soviet Union, the Central Asian republics were integrated into the Soviet 
command economy. Their specific role in this system was primarily to provide natural 
resources (in particular petroleum and metals) as well as agricultural products (cotton and 
grain) to processing industries and principal markets in today's Russia and Ukraine. As a 
result rail transport links were developed to facilitate the extraction of natural resources 
and non-perishable agricultural goods. In the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet 
Union the Central Asian countries face common problems: 
 
-  The countries' borders were drawn up by Soviet bureaucrats and do not reflect 
natural geographical or ethnic boundaries. In addition a number of countries have 
small enclaves in neighbouring countries. 
 
-  Rail and road connections within Central Asia have been built without regard to 
today's international borders. As a result, important domestic transport arteries 
often pass through neighbouring countries, which can result in long delays and 
additional costs. This requires a costly reconstruction of the countries' domestic 
transport infrastructure. 
 
-  Most major transport routes are directed towards Russia and the Ukraine. As a 
result connections through China, Iran, and Afghanistan have been poorly 
developed. This dependence on Russian and Ukrainian transport links has been 
used in the past by both countries as a political bargaining chip. It acts as a serious 
constraint on the countries' ability to increase their oil and gas exports. The 
chronic instability of Afghanistan as well as US pressure against developing 
economic ties with Iran further exacerbate the countries' reliance on Russia and 
the Ukraine. 
 
-  The Soviet command economy allocated specific roles to each region. One 
consequence is that all railway rolling stock is produced in Russia and Ukraine, 
which has severely hampered efforts to maintain and upgrade the all-important 
railway networks. More broadly, central planning has made it impossible for the 
Central Asian countries to develop a broadly diversified economy. 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
Relations between the CIS Central Asian countries vary. Kazakhstan has been promoting 
interregional cooperation through advocating a regional economic community. Despite a 
number of international agreements signed, there has been little progress on the ground 
towards promoting intra-regional trade and political cooperation - including important 
areas of international watershed management, security cooperation, and energy exports. 
Turkmenistan stands out within the region due to its isolationist policies that have strong 
nationalist tendencies. In particular relationships with Uzbekistan have deteriorated 
steadily over recent years. Kyrgyzstan and particularly Tajikistan have contributed to   - 66 - 
regional instability due to the rise of militant Islamist movements that are active in both 
countries and frequently cross the border into Uzbekistan's Fergana Valley. 
 
On balance, there has been no significant trend towards closer regional cooperation 
despite the widely accepted economic imperative to do so and the acute need for 
cooperation on environmental policies (c.f. the drying up of the Aral Lake, management 
of scarce water resources during the summer months), national security, and transport 
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AFGHANISTAN 
Two decades of war, harsh geographic conditions (including earthquakes, mountainous 
terrain, harsh winters, and vulnerability to drought), a corrupt government, and very poor 
infrastructure have all exacerbated Afghanistan’s geographic position of severe 
landlockedness, being over 1600km from the nearest port, Kabul.  While the extremist 
Taliban government has been removed, warlords continue to dominate many of the main 
trade routes limiting access to the country.  In response to illegal cross-border traffic, the 
Pakistani government has tightened transit regulations causing further difficulties for 
Afghanistan.   
 
Afghanistan’s three potential trade corridors are northward to the port of Riga (Latvia), 
south to the port of Karachi (Pakistan), and west to the port of Bandar-e Abbas (Iran).  
The third of these routes was not a significant transit corridor until after September 11 
when it became important for aid cargo.  The northern corridor through the former Soviet 
Union takes about 3 weeks and has declined in importance since the withdrawal of Soviet 
troops from Afghanistan.  The corridor through Karachi remains Afghanistan’s principal 
corridor, but has recently suffered from stricter Pakistani transit controls (primarily on 
Afghani exports) in response to illegal trafficking.   
TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE 
Road 
After the initial American and Soviet construction of Afghanistan’s roads in the 1960s 
and 1970s, intended to better connect each superpower to their regional sphere of 
influence, little has been done to maintain the infrastructure.  Two decades of war and 
neglect have all but destroyed Afghanistan’s internal road network, with nearly 50% of 
the primary network being considered in very poor condition (IDI, Japan).   Even the 
most essential transport corridors have fallen into a state of complete deterioration.  The 
Salang Tunnel, which provides a main link between the north and south of the country, 
and transporting more than 70% of Kabul’s fuel supplies has become not only a source of 
inordinate bottlenecks but also a potential death trap. A recent flash flood halted traffic 
for over 10 hours, while a February 2002 avalanche resulted in five deaths from 
asphyxiation.   
 
Moreover, the road system was initially designed by the US and USSR to connect the 
major urban centres of the country.  The resulting ring-like structure of the network, with  
few linking roads provides little access to rural communities.  
 
The international community has recently shown an increased interest in revitalizing 
Afghanistan’s transport infrastructure.  Emphasis has been placed on improving the ring 
network and international links; the Asian Development Bank estimates that it will cost 
$650 million to repair these trunk roads. The primary donors include the ADB, the World 
Bank, the United States, the EU and Saudi Arabia.     - 68 - 
Rail 
In the late 19
th century Abdur Rehman, father of the modern Afghan state, proclaimed “as 
long as Afghanistan has not arms enough to fight against any great attacking power, it 
would be folly to allow railways to be laid throughout the country.” 
(http://europe.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/east/01/21/afghan.rail/) He continued by 
barring trains from the Afghan state.  Over a century later, Afghanistan remains without a 
rail system, despite several attempts.  Neighbouring countries’ rails, constructed during 
the “Great Game” when Russia and British were rushing to lay tracks through Central 
Asia, terminate at or near the Afghan border. In an attempt to take better advantage of 
these surrounding rail links, the Afghan government has recently proposed a $120 million 
project to develop a functional rail system. 
Port 
Afghanistan depends primarily on the ports of Karachi (Pakistan) and Bandar Abbas 
(Iran) for its overseas freight traffic.  The port of Bandar Abbas is primarily used for 
humanitarian aid imports.  It offers modern facilities and is considered to be operating 
relatively efficiently.  The port of Karachi is also a major regional port, with 98% of 
Pakistan’s total foreign trade traveling through this port.  It is being modernised with 
US$91.4m of assistance from the World Bank.  According to a 1965 agreement, called 
the Afghan Trade Transit Agreement, all goods can pass through Pakistini ports to 
Afghanistan duty-free.  After the incidents of September 11, 2002, however, stricter 
border controls were introduced and the agreement abandoned.    It is estimated that 
billions of rupees worth of goods lay at Pershawar (on the Afghan-Pakistini border) and 
Karachi, awaiting export and costing Rs3000-5000 per day.  In May of this year, Pakistan 
began allowing goods destined for Afghanistan to pass duty free again. 
TRADE 
Afghanistan’s economy has been decimated by the past two decades of war. During the 
Soviet incursion, the Soviet army destroyed much of Afghanistan’s agricultural economy 
under its “scorched-earth” policy. In retaliation, the Mujahideen destroyed the advanced 
infrastructure associated with the Soviets.   Formal trade is now considered to be 
negligible, although official data is sparse.  Unofficial trade including the opium trade 
and re-export trade to Pakistan, however, continues and is an increasing source of tension 
with neighbouring Pakistan.  Recent efforts to curb such trade by Pakistan have had a 
significant impact on the Afghani economy.   
 
Afghan’s political instability has also prevented it from fully exploiting its rich resources 
of oil, gas, coal, iron, chrome, and copper.  Moreover, its location between the rich oil 
and gas reserves of the Caspian and Indian Oceans allows the potential for serving as an 
energy transit corridor.  Talks between a US oil company and Afghanistan have resumed, 
after being halted in the mid 1990s, concerning the construction of a Turkmenistan-
Afghanistan-Pakistan pipeline.   
 
Afghanistan is not a member of any major regional trade organizations and has not 
gained admission to the WTO.     - 69 - 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
Marred by over two decades of internal war, Afghanistan is just beginning to emerge 
from the resulting political isolation.  The removal of the Taliban regime in 2001 has 
allowed Afghanistan to begin to foster secure regional relations with Russia, Iran, and 
Pakistan.   Bilateral relations with these countries was previously characterised by tumult 
and instability, mirroring Afghanistan’s internal situation.  Pakistan, for example, which 
initially supported the Taliban, severed relations shortly after the incidents of September 
11, 2002.  Pakistan President Musharraf closed the Afgan-Pakistini border and asked the 
Taliban to remove all its consulates from Pakistan. 
 
Iran strongly opposed the Taliban and openly supported the Northern Alliance, an 
opposition group.  Tensions between the two governments escalated to the brink of war 
in 1998 when 10 Iranian diplomats were killed.   
 
Since the collapse of the Taliban, all three of Afghanistan’s strategic neighbours have 
made an effort to establish closer links and preserve Afghanistan’s internal stability, 
which will be vital for the overall stability of the region.  The Russian government has 
promised assistance to Afghanistan in rebuilding its economy and supporting its military.  
Russian President Vladimir Putin recently commented that “Russia has no other goals in 
Afghanistan except one- to see an independent, prosperous, neutral, and friendly 
Afghanistan.” (The Russia Journal Daily: Karzai discusses plans for Russia’s Help)  The 
past year has also witnessed unprecedented levels of cooperation between Afghanistan 
and Pakistan.  After the Afghan government demonstrated an increased willingness to 
curb the re-export trade, Pakistan responded by reinstituting the Afghan Trade Transit 
Agreement. Afghanistan’s relations with Iran have also shown dramatic signs of 
improvement, symbolised by Iranian President Mohammad Khatami’s August 2002 visit 
to Afghanistan, the first by an Iranian President in 40 years.   - 70 - 
KAZAKHSTAN 
Before independence in 1991, Kazakhstan’s specialised role in the Soviet Economy was 
focused on wheat production, metallurgy and mineral extraction. In turn, Kazakhstan 
could count on a captive market of its goods – regardless of their quality – and on a 
steady supply of underpriced energy and other cheap inputs. With the Soviet collapse 
these chains of production and trade were severed and as a result GDP fell by 36.1% 
between 1990 and 1996. 
 
Kazakhstan relies on oil and base metals for the bulk of its export revenue as it has 
significant deposits of petroleum (0.8% of world reserves), natural gas (1.2% of world 
reserves), coal, iron ore, manganese, chrome ore, nickel, cobalt, copper, lead, zinc, 
bauxite and uranium (CIA 2002; EIU 2002). 
 
Kazakh oil fields lie in the west of the country, in particular along its Caspian shore. 
About 80% of all oil in Kazakhstan is produced by foreign-owned companies. The oil is 
transported using a pipeline built by the Caspian Pipeline Consortium that connects the 
western oilfield of Tengiz to the Black Sea through Russia. 
 
Production costs in Kazakhstan’s future Caspian Sea offshore fields are likely to be as 
high as $8/barrel – compared with $3/barrel in the Persian Gulf. Export pipeline fees 
through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium add another $3.6/b to the cost of production
25. 
It is estimated that these fields will probably need to earn $15/b to break even (EIU 
2002). 
 
Base metals and other exports are exported largely using the railway system through 
Russia and China.  
TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE 
Roads 
Roads are in poor condition. In 1996 only 10% of Kazakhstan roads could accommodate 
trucks with an axle load of 10 ton (ESCAP 1996). Car ownership, at around 6 per 100 
inhabitants, is the highest in Central Asia, but is low by international standards. 
According to the Kazakhstan government, difficult natural and climatic conditions as 
well as a lack of suitable exits to China, India, Islamic Republic of Iran, Pakistan and 
Turkey constrain the development of automobile transport. The government places a 
priority on developing road facilities further with a view towards creating high-speed 
highways with international connections to the CIS countries and abroad (KIPC 2001). 
 
The road system is important for domestic cargo movement as it accounted for 74% of all 
domestic freight transport (Kazakhstan Statistics 2001). However, many traditional 
transport ties with neighbouring countries have been severed in the wake of 
                                                 
25 This compares very favorably with the cost of rail transport ($7/barrel)   - 71 - 
independence. As of 2000 only very few of the original bus connections between Central 
Asian republics remained (Mayhew et al. 2000).  
Rail 
Kazakhstan depends heavily on its ageing and badly maintained railways, which 
constitute the main form of transport. These include 13,600km of lines of which 5,500km 
are double-track and some 4,000km are electrified. Rolling stock and spare parts, which 
have to be imported from Russia and Ukraine are in short supply (EIU 2002).  
 
Kazakhstan uses trains to transport parts of its oil production to the Black Sea at a cost of 
$7 per barrel (compared to $3.6/b for the pipeline from Tengiz to the Black Sea).  
 
The country recognises the importance of international rail connections and has been 
actively expanding its network. Through the opening of the Druzhba-Alashankou and 
Tedjen-Serakhs-Meshed transit routes, Beijing is now connected via Almaty to Istanbul 
as well as Western Europe. There is potential that this transport corridor will eventually 
rival the Trans-Siberian railway and maritime routes.  
 
Rail traffic to China is complicated by a difference in track gauge standards. This 
requires border terminals for changing the wheels on carriages. The Kazakh government 
has opened a new transshipment terminal in Druzhba in 1998 to facilitate transshipments 
to China.  
 
See the rail section in the Uzbekistan chapter for major export corridors and indicative 
pricing. 
Pipelines 
Kazakhstan still relies heavily on the pipeline system that was designed during the Soviet 
Union to ship Kazakh oil from the Western part of the country to Russia and to bring 
Russia’s Siberian oil to Kazakhstan refineries.  
 
A key problem facing the country today is that important potential oil and gas export 
routes traverse the territory of two of Kazakhstan’s competitors in the global energy 
markets, Russia and Iran. The closest ports on the high seas are on the Russian and 
Georgian Black Sea coasts. Kazakh barges can enter the Black Sea through the Volga-
Don canal, but this is also a Russian sovereign waterway. 
 
In 2001 Kazakhstan opened the Caspian Pipeline Consortium pipeline from Teniz to 
Novorossiysk on the Black Sea. The pipeline is expected to initially carry 28 million tons 
per year with a potential for 67 million (KIPC 2000). However, most Black Sea traffic 
needs to pass through the Bosporus. This narrow waterway may impose constraints on 
the overall amount of oil that can be shipped to the Mediterranean. A costly alternative 
would be the construction of a bypassing pipeline through Bulgaria. To date it is not clear 
how much of a constraint the narrow Bosporus may be on scaling up Kazakh oil 
production while maintaining some degree of independence from Russian and Ukrainian 
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Waterways 
Water transportation is the third most important element in Kazakhstan transport system. 
The length of water routes is around 6,000 kilometers. The Irtysh is the main navigable 
river in the country, accounting for about 80% of cargo transported by river. The Caspian 
is increasingly used for international shipment of dry cargo, crude oil and oil products. 
Today it provides connections with Iran, Transcaucasia and, via the rivers and canals of 
Russia, with the Black and Baltic seas(KIPC 2000). The latter routes can only be used by 
barges. 
TRADE 
On the export side, Kazakhstan relies on two main commodities for the bulk of its export 
revenue: oil (50.2%) and base metals (23.5%). As a result, the economy depends highly 
on the price of these two commodities. At the same time the economy is highly import-
intensive since most domestic manufacturers have been crowded out by the oil and gas 
sector and cannot meet local demand for either capital or consumer goods.  
 
Kazakhstan’s larges trading partner is Russia (19.5% of exports and 48.7% of imports 
(IMF DOTS 2002)). Other export partners include Italy (9.8%), China (7.3%), Germany 
(6.2%) and Switzerland (5.3%). 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
Kazakhstan has good relationships with all its neighbours. The country had several 
border disputes with other former Soviet Republics after gaining full independence in 
1991, which have now all been settled by mutual agreement – including recent disputes 
with Uzbekistan. The country has also settled its claims on the Caspian with Russia and 
Azerbaijan. Kazakhstan has so far not been drawn into the looming conflict between 
Azerbaijan and Iran over claims to the Caspian. 
 
Its long-serving President Mr. Nazarbayev is keen on regional cooperation schemes as 
building blocks for the promotion of free trade. However, recent initiatives such as the 
Eurasian Economic Community (EEC) have so far not significantly enhanced intra-
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KYRGYZSTAN 
Being over 3600 km from the nearest open seas port, Kyrgyzstan is the second most 
remote of all landlocked countries.  Its extreme average elevation of 2,750 m, with 40% 
of its territory over 3,000m, further exacerbates the physical transit challenges faced by 
Kyrgyzstan.  Moreover, ongoing regional instability and border disputes with 
neighboring China, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan have resulted in sporadic border closures, 
and have prevented the effective implementation of any multilateral agreements. While it 
Kyrgyzstan is slowly changing, its transportation network is primarily the remnants of the 




Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, much of Kyrgyzstan’s extensive paved road 
network has fallen into a state of disrepair.   Primary roads of the Asian Highway connect 
Kyrgyzstan to neighboring Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and China.  Most of its 
international roads have presented significant challenges, however.  The primary road to 
Tajikistan is not an all weather route, and is often rendered impassable during the harsh 
winter months of November-February.  Transit is further complicated by the complicated 
geopolitical situation, and disputed boundaries between the countries.  From October-
December 2002 Tajikistan erected an ad hoc border post to harass Kyrgyz travelers.  In 
retaliation, Kyrgyzstan set up a similar post.  (http://eng.gateway.kg/cgi-
bin/page.pl??id=1&story_name=doc3794.shtml).   The border with Uzbekistan suffers 
from similar geopolitical disputes, as boundaries are fiercely disputed.  Uzbekistan also 
defends its border with particularly stringent border regulations, and sometimes even 
physical boundaries.  In one recent case, Uzbekistan placed cement blocks on a bridge at 
the Karu-Su border crossing. Transit to China, has the option of passing through two 
routes: the first, the tortuous Torugart Pass at 3900 m presents serious physical obstacles; 
the second, the Irkeshtam crossing has just been developed, presenting other difficulties.  
As of January 2002, the border was still closed to vehicular traffic – freight needed to be 
unloaded and reloaded at the border.  Such restrictions are largely a product of 
Kyrgyzstan’s failure to develop adequate border facilities; the Chinese have already built 
a modern border facility.  Roads passing to Kazakhstan do not suffer from such acute 
problems and have benefited from an effective border delimitation between the two 
countries 
 
Internal transport in Kyrgyzstan faces the same difficulties as international transport: 
poor infrastructure, geographic constraints, and geopolitical difficulties.  The 600 km 
journey between the nations’ two main cities, Bishkek and Osh, for example, is reported 
to take 16 hours.  Mountains divide the country into distinct north-south regions, severely 
limiting transport between the two.  Moreover, the presence of surrounding nations’ 
enclaves in Kyrgyzstan often requires internal transport to pass through international 
borders subject to the same strict control as the other borders.     - 74 - 
 
Kyrgyzstan has begun road rehabilitation projects with assistance from international 
donor agencies.  Attempts to streamline regional border crossings have faltered as a result 
of ongoing geopolitical tensions and regional corruption.  The TIR Carnet, for example, 
which allows freight to journey to its final destination (often Russia) without undergoing 
intermediate customs procedures was suspended in Russia on 24 December 2002.  The 
suspension was levied by the International Road Transport Union in response to Russian 
customs officials who were using the system as “an effective tool for protecting 
organised crime.”  (The Financial Times, December, 2002, “Russian border freight 
threat”) 
Rail 
Kyrgyzstan’s mountainous terrain makes rail transport particularly difficult.  Moreover, 
the rail network was constructed during the Soviet era and presents several problems:  
firstly, the international rail corridors only provide links north through Uzbekistan and  
Kazakhstan to Russia, not to China; secondly, the rail network is not appropriate for the 
current political boundaries, as domestic transport through Kyrgyzstan now often requires 
passage through parts of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, complicating internal transport.  
Both problems are presently being addressed: Kyrgyzstan has recently reached an 
agreement with China to construct a railway from Fergana, Uzbekistan to Kashgar in 
China; plans for an internal north-south railway in Kyrgyzstan are also being discussed. 
Port 
Kyrgyzstan’s freight is mainly shipped from the eastern Black Sea ports.  Trade also 
passes through the northern Baltic Sea ports.  These ports do not present any serious 
constraints to Kyrgyzstan’s freight transit 
(http://www.bisnis.doc.gov/bisnis/leads/990830tt.htm). 
TRADE 
Kyrgyzstan has avidly pursued a democratized liberal market economy, and boasts one of 
the most liberal trade regimes amongst the former Soviet states.  As of December 2002, 
Kyrgyzstan was still the only CIS state to gain accession into the WTO.  Kyrgyzstan has 
also been relatively successful in diversifying its economy –its newly developed gold 
mining sector as well as its services sector now contribute 30% of GDP.  Its dependence 
on fuel imports, however, has been a significant constraint to development.   
 
Kyrgyzstan has also become less dependent on the markets of neighbouring Russia and 
Kazakhstan for its exports.  The Russian share of total exports has fallen from 23% in 
1995 to 14% in 2001; Kazakhstan’s share has fallen from 24% to 14%.   Kyrgyzstan’s 
imports from its regional neighbors have been erratic over the five-year period, but have 
not seen significant overall changes.  Such trade patterns reflect the general failure of 
Kyrgyzstan’s regional trade agreements to facilitate its intraregional trade.  In 2001, 
Kyrgyzstan exported primarily to Switzerland and Germany, which, combined, accounted 
for 46% of total exports. 
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Kyrgyzstan is a member of the WTO, Commonwealth of Independent States, Economic 
Union of the CIS, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Central Asian 
Economic Union
26, and the Eurasian Economic Union
27. 
REGIONAL RELATIONS 
Traditionally recognized as a paradigm of relative internal stability, Kyrgyzstan has 
actively pursued strong relations with its neighbours and regional CIS countries. It shares 
the closest political ties with CIS countries and has ambassadors in all CIS capitals.  
Despite these attempts, however, tensions with neighboring Uzbekistan and Tajikistan 
persist, stemming largely from disputed boundaries.  The regional instability caused by 
Tajikistan’s civil war has also destabilized much of Kyrgyzstan’s western region and 
hampered bilateral discussions to reach a border agreement. Cross-border riots are 
common, and have recently involved the destruction of a Kyrgyz border post by Tajik 
villagers. In retaliation Kyrgyz villagers destroyed a Tajik border post. There have also 
been reports of Tajik border officials harassing Kyrgyz citizens at border crossings. The 
Kyrgyz governor does not, however, blame the Tajik government but rather separatists 
attempting to destabilize the region.   
 
Kyrgyzstan’s strained relations with Uzbekistan, which has shown expansionist 
tendencies, are characterized by similar problems which are complicated by Kyrgyzstan’s 
dependence on its larger neighbor for its natural gas.  Uzbekistan has used this 
dependence as a weapon to influence Kyrgyz policy: gas supplies were cut off in 1993 
when Kyrgyzstan became the first former Soviet republic to introduce its own currency, 
and again in 1998 when Kyrgyzstan became the first former Soviet Republic to gain 
accession into the WTO 
(http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2001/04/26042001120211.asp).     
Moreover, Uzbekistan has ardently defended its borders with strict controls.  In 2000, it 
even erected fences and minefields around border areas. 
 
Beyond its immediate border tensions, Kyrgyzstan is developing closer relations with the 
two regional powers, Russia and China.  In July 2000, Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev 
and Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a Declaration on Eternal Friendship, Allied 
Relations and Partnership between Russia and Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyz-Sino relations have 
also witnessed recent signs of improvement, including the joint venture to build a railway 
from Fergana to Kashgar. In 1999, the two countries signed an agreement resolving a 
border dispute.  The agreement, by which Kyrgyzstan ceded territory, however, sparked 
recent unrest as thousands of Kyrgyz citizens blocked the arterial highway from Osh to 
Bishkek for over a week. 
                                                 
26 The CAEU also includes Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. 
27 The EEU also includes Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, and Tajikistan    - 76 - 
TAJIKISTAN 
Tajikistan’s extremely mountainous terrain limits the capabilities of rail transport, and 
has placed an increased dependence on its extensive road network.  As Travel 
Tajikistan’s website warns, however, while driving the international corridor roads is 
possible “it is not advisable unless you have a great love of bureaucracy.”  Beyond the 
bureaucratic constraints, each of Tajikistan’s potential corridors faces other significant 
challenges: 
-  The Uzbek corridors which carry 80% of Tajikistan’s international traffic are 
all subject to arbitrary and frequent border closures by the Uzbek government.  
Such closures are often used by the Uzbek government as a political weapon.  
The roads were closed for several years in the late 1990s; in December 2000, 
after reopening the roads earlier that year, the Uzbek government once again 
decided to close the roads, citing independence anniversary preparations as 
the reason. 
-  The highway to Kyrgyz presents another possible option but is hampered by 
frequent violence along the border.  Moreover, this option is not particularly 
promising as Kyrgyzstan is also landlocked and faces similar transport 
problems. 
-  A potential corridor through Afghanistan would provide the shortest route to 
the sea for Tajik freight, but has not been viable because of the Afghan civil 
war. 
-  A potential route to China is being developed, as the Soviet Union’s 
infrastructure did not connect to China.  As of 2001 this road has not been 
completed.  Further complicating Tajikistan’s transport, both international and 
domestic, is the nation’s vulnerability to natural disasters including floods, 
earthquakes, and mudslides.     
TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE 
Road 
Given its rugged natural terrain, Tajikistan is more dependent on road transport (82% of 
total freight in 1997) than most other former Soviet states.  The declining importance of 
trade with Russia will shift even more freight transport to the road system.  This road 
network, constructed under the Soviet Union, is extensive and relatively well-developed.  
As the Soviet Union paved many of these roads, the impact of the neglected maintenance 
they have suffered has been mitigated.   
 
Tajikistan’s road transport suffers from the harsh geographic conditions.  In addition to 
being regularly closed due to snow, roads are also closed from mudslides, landslides, 
floods.  The country’s two major highways (Dushanbe-Aini; Kalaikhum- Khorog), for 
example, are normally closed for five to six months each winter.  In order to access this 
province during the winter, freight must be routed through Uzbekistan which poses the 
problems mentioned in the introductory paragraph.  It is estimated that from 1992 to 
1999, natural disasters and civil war destroyed 10% of Tajikistan’s roads.      - 77 - 
 
Strict border regulations and bureaucratic difficulties also severely hamper Tajikistan’s 
transport.  The complicated regulations, particularly at the Uzbek border, allow customs 
officials to harass Tajik transit, and often extort bribes.  Border difficulties persist despite 
Tajikistan’s signing of the TRACECA Multi-Lateral Agreement in which each 
participant has agreed to limit licensing and border requirements.    
  
Despite facing severely constrained budgets, Tajikistan is in the process of constructing a 
road link to China and the Karakorum Highway, as well as a tunnel that will directly link 
the northern and southern parts of the country. 
Rail 
Tajikistan’s rail network is limited owing largely to its mountainous terrain.  The 
remnants of the Soviet railway network are largely in the west and join the capital to the 
industrial parts of the country.  While the infrastructure is in relatively good condition, 
the overall system is hampered by extremely poor telecommunications.  The three 
primary lines are: 
i)  Crossing the northern Fargana Valley from Andijan (Uzbekistan) through 
Khojand (Tajikistan) to Samarkand (Uzebkistan), 
ii)  Passing south from Dushanbe through Uzbekistan to Termiz at the Afghan 
border, and 
iii)  Directly south from Dushanbe to Tugul on the Aghan border.  Afghanistan’s 
lack of railways and Uzbekistan’s aforementioned restrictions have hampered 
both of these corridors. 
 
While the design of the Soviet transport system has been largely inappropriate for the 
emerging trade patterns of the new republics, it has been doubly so for Tajikistan: not 
only does the rail system not provide links along new trade corridors (i.e. China), but also 
the traditional links to Russia now require passage through a third country.      
Port 
Tajikistan uses the Baltic Sea ports (primarily Riga), Russian ports (i.e. Novorossiysk) 
and European ports including Bremerhaven (Germany).  These ports do not pose any 
significant constraints to Tajikistan’s trade flows. 
TRADE 
While the trade deficit has been largely stable, an increase in export revenue in the first 
ten months of 2002 has resulted in a decrease in the deficit from roughly US$45 million 
to US$13 million. As a narrow range of minerals and agriculture are Tajikistan’s largest 
export earners (aluminium (61.1%) and cotton (10.1%) are the largest export earners), 
Tajikistan is highly dependent on commodity and agricultural prices (IMF 2003). 
Tajikistan’s largest export destinations are Europe (Netherlands (29.7%), Switzerland 
(8.0%) and Hungary (6.0%)) and Russia (16.1%) (IMF DOTS 2002). 
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Very few imports come from Europe, giving Tajikistan a large trade surplus with the EU. 
Instead, Tajikistan imports from Uzbekistan (21.9%), Russia (18.8%) and Kazakhstan 
(12.9%) (IMF DOTS 2002). 
 
Tariff barriers are not high, but were increased in 1996 to augment tax revenues. Import 
tariffs range from 2% on aluminium to a maximum of 25% on fabric and textiles. A 
number of trade barriers have been removed and some procedures simplified in the late 
1990s as a condition of IMF funds (IMF 2003). 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
While a relative degree of peace has existed in Tajikstan since President Imomali 
Rakhmonov and Islamic opposition leader Sayid Abdullo Nuri signed a peace agreement 
in 1997 to end the bloody civil war, a high degree of religious tension has remained in the 
area, particularly after the events of 11 September 2001. Coupled with this are the poor 
delineation of boundaries since Soviet times and the general worsening relations in the 
region, which make Tajikistan’s foreign relations quite unstable. All these have combined 
to make transit into and out of Tajikistan quite difficult. 
 
Due to the perceived Islamic fundamentalist threat through Central Asia, the Tajik 
government is supported by the governments of Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Uzbekistan against the Islamic opposition and more extreme Islamic groups such as Hizb 
ut-Tahrir (CountryWatch 2002). Concerns of Islamic guerilla groups operating from 
Tajikstan into Uzbekistan led to the Uzbek government placing landmines on the border 
– resulting in a souring of relations between the two countries (Turaev 2002). The border 
between the two countries, which is the most important border for Tajik trade, is 
regularly closed by the Uzbek government (Travel Tajikistan 2002). 
 
The poor delineation of borders in Soviet times has caused a high degree of tension 
between Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Much of this tension has centred on the 
Ferghana Valley, where all three countries dispute state boundaries (IRIN 2002, UN 
FVDP 2002). There have been a number of riots in the area, largely on the Kyrgyz/Tajik 
border (Khamidov 2002). Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have reached agreement on 86% of 
their common boundary but any further demarcation is problematic (ICG 2002). 
 
A border dipute with China was resolved in 2002 when the border was agreed between 
the two countries (CountryWath 2002). This is a positive progression because this is 
potentially Tajikstan’s most important bilateral and transit trade route (Najibullah 1997). 
 
While Russia has had a generally close relationship with Tajikistan, relations have 
become more complicated due to: (i) Tajikistan’s allowance of overfly rights for US 
aircraft involved in Afghanistan; and (ii) the large number of illegal Tajik migrants in 
Russia. The latter point has led to the deportation from Russia of a number of Tajik 
citizens (Khamidov 2003). 
 
Multilateral groups such as the Central Asian Co-operation Organisation (CACO) have 
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TURKMENISTAN 
Turkmenistan’s has access to relatively good transport links to its neighbouring countries. 
They are, however, undermined by its poor international relations with Uzbekistan in 
particular. This is particularly problematic because a number of main roads between parts 
of the country pass through Uzbekistan. Due to the restrictive visa practices of 
Uzbekistan, this limits movement through Turkmenistan, and between Turkmenistan and 
Russia. Projects are currently under construction to circumvent this problem. 
TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE 
Roads 
In 2001 Turmenistan had 22,000km of roads of which 80% were paved (CIA 2002).  
 
As with several of its Central Asian neighbours, key roads were built at times when no 
international borders existed in the area. As a result the main road connecting the north of 
the country with the East crosses through Uzbekistan. Similarly, important transport 
arteries to the East of the country pass through Uzbekistan. This imposes significant extra 
costs and visa requirements on all transit traffic (Mayhew et al. 2002). 
 
In an effort to overcome this problem, the government has launched a major highway 
construction project to link the capital Ashgabat with the Caspian Sea and Dashoguz in 
the north of the country (EIU 2002). 
 
In the wake of independence all bus connections between the Central Asian republics 
have been cut. They are now slowly being reestablished (Mayhew et al. 2000). 
Rail 
The country has 2,440km of poorly maintained railway track. Rolling stock and spare 
parts, which were imported from Russia and Ukraine before independence are in short 
supply. 
 
The break-up of the Soviet rail network in 1991 has left Turkmenistan with a fragmented 
network of main lines. No main railway connections link the East and North-West with 
the rest of the country. The government is constructing new transport lines to overcome 
this problem. International railway connections exist with Uzbekistan, but are hardly used 
for trade. The first connection to Iran was opened in 1996. 
 
See the rail section in the Uzbekistan chapter for major export corridors and indicative 
pricing. 
Pipelines 
Turkmenistan’s key problem is the reliance on Russian and Soviet gas pipelines for 
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While a pipeline to Iran exists and is used for export, these shipments have consistently 
fallen below the target and hence only account for a small share of total gas exports.  
 
Since independence the government has been pursuing the construction of a pipeline 
through Afghanistan to Pakistan, which would give it access to deep-sea ports and 
possibly the Indian market. A construction agreement was signed in December 2002. 
However, it remains doubtful if the project will be able to attract the necessary 
investments. Key concerns include political volatility in Afghanistan and the low 
throughput of the planned pipeline, which may make the project uneconomic.  
Waterways 
Turkmenistan is not as geographically isolated as its Central Asian neighbours, thanks to 
its access to the Caspian Sea and the Volga-Don canal, which provide a direct link to the 
Black Sea for barge traffic. However, this export route passes through sovereign Russian 
territory and it is unclear to what extent Turkmenistan is able to use it for its exports.  
 
In contrast to Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan exports small quantities of oil across the 
Caspian. Possibly in an effort to use this trade route more extensively, the government is 
currently rehabilitating the seaport at Tukmenbashi.  
TRADE 
Economic and trade data for Turkmenistan is considered a state secret and is therefore 
only available in the form of estimates that have limited reliability. 
 
Turkmenistan’s export is dominated by gas and cotton. The output of the latter has 
fluctuated in recent years, owing to climate variability and deteriorating soil quality. 
Despite their lower dollar value, cotton exports are particularly important to 
Turkmenistan since in contrast to gas they tend to be paid for in hard currency.  
 
Gas exports to Russia and Ukraine have been suspended four times since 1991 due to 
unpaid debt and Russian unwillingness to provide access to its pipeline network. Total 
arrears in gas bills accumulated by Russia and Ukraine are equivalent to 75% of 
Turmenistan’s GDP (EIU 2002). A recently concluded gas export agreement with both 
countries has led to a sharp increase in gas exports. Further increases in gas and oil 
exports are constrained by Turkmenistan’s dependence on Russian and Ukrainian 
pipelines. Demand constraints and a possible lack of pipeline capacity could pose a 
barrier to increasing exports much beyond 2001 levels.  
 
Due to the refusal of Russia’s distributor for gas, Gazprom, to allow Turkmen gas to 
transit to Europe, Turkmenistan’s prospects for exporting gas outside the CIS remain 
limited. The low competitiveness of its industrial products combined with the overvalued 
exchange rate make it unlikely that the country will be able to increase its export to non-
CIS countries in the medium term. 
 
Exports of electricity are another source of revenue, as Turkmenistan has substantial 
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infrastructure is undergoing substantial refurbishment, with a view to increasing exports, 
in particular, to Afghanistan.  
 
Gas and electricity exports to Iran have risen in recent years, but constitute only a small 
proportion of total exports.  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
Under its official policy of neutrality Turkmenistan has minimised relationships with 
neighbouring countries to a point of near-isolation. The country’s foreign policy is driven 
by the need to secure export routes and markets for its hydrocarbons.  
 
Its relationship with Uzbekistan have recently deteriorated sharply after the expulsion of 
the Uzbek ambassador to Turkmenistan on accusations of participating in a plot to 
assassinate the president. The country also has a long-running dispute with Azerbaijan 
over a number of oil fields in the Caspian Sea. A ruling by the CSJ on this territorial 
dispute is awaited in the near future. The country is the only CIS state not to have signed 
bilateral demarcation treaties governing access to the Caspian Sea. 
 
In contrast relationships with Iran and the new government in Kabul are fair. 
Turkmenistan has recently signed an agreement with Afghanistan and Pakistan to build a 
1,500km-long gas pipeline through both countries.  
 
Additional strains on relationships with Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan derive 
from disputes over the division of scarce water resources. Turkmenistan places a high 
priority on its relationships with Russia and Ukraine – the country’s main markets for its 
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UZBEKISTAN 
Uzbekistan is unique in being the only doubly-landlocked country apart from 
Liechtenstein as its neighbouring countries are all landlocked themselves. Uzbekistan’s 
economy is self-sufficient in energy. It focuses on agriculture and the extraction of 
natural resources, such as gold, oil and gas. It is the second largest exporter of cotton.  
 
Several major domestic roads pass through neighbouring countries’ territory since they 
were build during the Soviet Union when these borders were purely administrative. The 
principal road connecting Nukus in the east with the rest of the country passes twice 
through Turkmenistan. Similarly, The main eastbound road to the Fergana Valley crosses 
Tajikistan. Due to complex and time-consuming border procedures, trade within the 
country is significantly hampered. In particular Turkmenistan charges high transit fees on 
a number of commodities passing through its territory and continues to require special 
transit visas for each trip (Mayhew et al.2000). 
TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE 
Roads 
In 1999 Uzbekistan had 81,600km of main roads, which are poorly maintained. 
 
International road crossings exist with each neighbouring country. In the wake of 
independence all bus connections between the Central Asian republics have been cut. 
They are now slowly being reestablished (Mayhew et al. 2000). 
Rail 
The country has 3,380km of poorly maintained broad gauge railway lines. Rolling stock 
and spare parts, which were imported from Russia and Ukraine before independence are 
in short supply. 
 
Railroad transport accounted for 86% of all import/export cargo compared to 14% for air 
and road. The volume of shipments via Baltic ports, despite the transits through 
Kazakhstan and Russia remain stable. Transportation of cargo via Georgian ports is based 
on a set of agreements on coordination of railway transport signed in 1996. In the same 
year the railway route Tedhen-Serahs-Meshhed opened. This corridor is currently used 
for transportation of cotton to the ports in Bandar-Abbas, Jebel-Ali and Mersin. 
 
Transport costs through each corridor vary widely. The following table summarises rates 
and duration per ton of cotton according to terms of delivery FOB (port) and DAF 
(border): 
 





 (/t cotton) 
Cost per 
1000km 
Riga Latvia  3929  20-23  84.82  21.59 
Ilichebvsk Ukraine  4312  25-26  98.90  22.94 
Nakhodka  Russia (Sea of Japan)  8622  45-50  156.29  18.13   - 83 - 
Brest Belarus  (border  Poland, 
via road) 
4179 21-23  74.25  17.77 
Lyanyunganang  China (Yellow Sea)  5991  20-25  215.49  35.97 
Farob-Poti Georgia  (Black  Sea)  2025  10-15  75.32  37.20 
Source: BISNIS (2001) 
Rates for Georgian ports are given with 50% discounts based on 1996 agreement. Rate for Lyanyunganang 
given with 30% liability mark-up 
 
 
A number of domestic rail lines cross into Turkmenistan. In 2000 Turkmenistan had not 
signed the 72 hour transit agreement. As a result all train passengers traveling from 
Bukhara to Urgench and from there to Nukus (all in Uzbekistan) needed to be in the 
possession of transit visa for Turkmenistan or risk fines (Mayhew et al. 2000). To solve 
this problem, Uzbekistan is now building a new train line bypassing Turkmenistan.  
Pipelines 
Gas is exported mainly to Ukraine via Kazakh pipelines. In addition, both Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan purchase natural gas from Uzbekistan.  
Waterways 
Uzbekistan’s only port is Termiz on the Amu Darya at the Afghan border. The river 
constitutes an important waterway to the Caspian, but its passage through Turkmenistan 
involves high hard-currency costs. Goods from Termiz are transported domestically via 
road.  
TRADE 
Uzbekistan’s exports are dominated by cotton and gold. This dependence on commodities 
generated a volatile trade balance during the 1990s. The country’s export regime is driven 
by on official import-substitution policy. Multiple exchange-rate systems render export 
difficult. Due to the low quality of most manufactured goods a significant portion of 
international trade is conducted in soft currency and barter.  
 
Uzbekistan’s main trading partner is Russia (16.7% exports and 15.8% imports). The 
country has extremely limited trade with four of its neighbouring countries: Afghanistan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. Trade with Korea (9.8% imports), 
Uzbekistan’s second largest importer, is mainly based on Daewoo’s investment in the car 
assembly plant. 
 
A significant proportion of consumer goods are traded illegally across the Uzbek-
Kazakhstan border by small-scale shuttle traders. According to the EIU this shuttle trade 
is accounted for in the trade statistics. 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
Uzbekistan’s relationships with its neighbours are generally poor. Its border with 
Kazakhstan has been largely delimited, but unresolved Uzbek claims remain over 
sovereignty of two border villages. Disputes over access to Sokh and other Uzbek 
enclaves in Kyrgyzstan mar progress on international boundary delimitation. Uzbekistan 
has intervened repeatedly in Afghanistan and Tajikistan to combat militant political   - 84 - 
Islam. Relations with Turkmenistan have suffered from the country’s policy of extreme 
isolation. Recently Turkmenistan expelled the Uzbek ambassador on charges of 
masterminding an assassination attempt of its president.  
 
Regional tension is in part fuelled by conflict over scarce water resources. In recent years 
the Kyrgyz Republic has been retaining water in reservoirs over the summer months, 
which lead to the drying up of cotton fields in Uzbekistan’s Fergana Valley. 
 
The fight against Islamist extremism has been a shared interest between Russia and 
Uzbekistan. As a result, relations between both countries have improved significantly 
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CAUCASUS AND MOLDOVA 
ARMENIA 
While Armenia’s central geographic position in the Caucasus potentially allows it to 
serve as a regional crossroad as it did prior to independence in 1991, this has not been 
possible due to conflicts with neighbouring countries (that is, Turkey and Azerbaijan) and 
severely dilapidated infrastructure. This has also contributed to Azerbaijan’s high 
transport costs, which are significantly greater than those of most former Soviet Union 
republics.   The World Bank estimates that if Armenia’s average freight factor (ratio of 
freight costs to merchandise value) was that of the EU (8 times less than Armenia’s) it 
could save approximately US$100 million per year.    
 
Armenia’s traditional trade route through Azerbaijan, which accounted for over 85% of 
Armenian trade flows, was blockaded in 1990/1 as a result of the conflict over Nagoro-
Karabakh.  Shortly thereafter the Turkish border was also closed to transport.  With 
transit corridors undeveloped to the south, Armenia was forced to reroute near all of its 
trade through Georgia.  This too presented problems for Armenia, as civil war broke out 
in Georgia in 1992 ravaging the country.   A new corridor has been developed to Iran 
which has been witnessing increased trade flow. 
TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE 
Road 
With the closure of the Azerbaijan rail corridor, most of Armenia’s freight traffic has 
been rerouted to the road corridor from Yerevan to Georgia through Ayrum.  This 
increasing dependence on the road network, however, has been accompanied by 
significant deterioration in the infrastructure, resulting from years of neglect following 
independence.   A 1998 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development estimated 
that nearly 40% of Armenian roads were in need of immediate repair.  Many of these 
roads are considered to be in such an advanced stage of deterioration that rehabilitation 
will soon no longer be possible; reconstruction will be required.  Such deterioration has 
been aggravated by the country’s harsh winters, extreme altitudes, and susceptibility to 
earthquakes such as the one that devastated the country in 1988.   
 
In an attempt to address the deteriorated condition of the road system, Armenia initiated a 
US$16 m Highway Project and more recently, in 2000, a US$40 million Transport Sector 
Project, both with assistance from the World Bank.  Both projects will emphasise the 
rehabilitation of Armenia’s main road.  The EBRD has also helped finance the 
rehabilitation of several roads and bridges.   
   - 86 - 
Armenia’s transport difficulties are complicated by the poor condition of the roads on the 
Georgian side of the border.  Trading primarily with Turkey, Russia, Spain and Italy, 
Georgia has little interest in maintaining this corridor.   
Rail 
Prior to its collapse, the Soviet Union depended heavily on its extensive railway network 
for internal movement of raw materials.   As part of this network, the Armenian railway 
played a significant role as a central transport corridor in Caucasus.  Since the fall of the 
Soviet Union, however, rail traffic has declined significantly.  Freight traffic is estimated 
to be only 5% of the level prior to independence (WB Project). The closure of the 
Turkish and Azerbaijani borders, the dissolution of the Soviet command economy, and 
the dilapidated state of the rail infrastructure have all contributed to this decline.  As of 
2000, only 350 out of 796 km (44%) of Armenian rails were in operation.  Other factors 
contributing to the high cost of Armenia’s rail transport include the poor state of 
Georgia’s connecting railway and the monopolistic nature of Armenia Railways.   
 
The launch of the European Union Transport Corridor Europe Caucasus Asia 
(TRACECA) program, intended to better integrate Europe, the Caucasus, and Asia 
through the development of an interconnected transport network, would place Armenia at 
the center of the inter-continental traffic route.  The governments of Azerbaijan and 
Turkey, however, have both delayed the process by refusing to cooperate with Armenia.  
Ports 
With the closure of the Azerbaijan and Turkey corridors, Armenia has relied exclusively 
on the ports of Georgia and Iran.  Georgia’s primary port, Poti, was established in 1858 
and is considered to be outdated.  The port’s infrastructure was damaged in Georgia’s 
two civil wars in the mid 1990s.  It has traditionally transported cargo in bulk and will 
require significant improvements if it is to serve as one of the principle ports along the 
TRACECA route.  Recent efforts have been made to improve the efficiency and increase 
the overall capacity of the port.   
 
The primary Iranian port for Armenian freight traffic has been Bandar Abbas.  This port 
has recently become the country’s major port and handles over 75% of the total cargo 
that passes through Iranian ports.  The port offers modern facilities and is considered to 
be operating relatively efficiently.   
TRADE 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the closure of the Azerbaijani and Turkish 
borders, Armenia has recently witnessed a significant redirection of its trade flows.  
While Russia continues to remain Armenia’s main bilateral trading partner, accounting 
for 17.8% of Armenia’s total exports and 19.8% of imports, its significance and that of 
the CIS has been declining sharply:  only 24% of Armenia’s total exports went to the CIS 
in 2000, compared to 73% in 1994; similarly, only 19% of Armenia’s total imports came 
from the CIS in 2000, compared to 2% in 1994.   
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Armenia’s liberal trade regime, considered to be one of the most open in the CIS, has 
helped further the development of new trade routes.  All Armenian exports are duty free, 
and import tariffs are minimal.  Armenia was also just approved on 10 December 2002 
for accession into the WTO. Moreover, Armenia has signed bilateral free trade 
agreements (FTAs) with six CIS countries including both Georgia and Russia.   
 
Armenia is also a member of a number of regional organizations including the CIS, 
Economic Union of the CIS, the Black Sea Economic Co-operation Organisation, and the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.  Armenia’s participation in a 
multiplicity of trading regimes poses both political and logistical challenges.  Moreover, 
Armenia has not yet ratified the free trade agreement signed by the CIS member states.   
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
The ongoing conflict with Azerbaijan over the disputed Nagorny Karabakh territory, an 
ethnically Armenian enclave located between the two sections of Azerbaijan, continues to 
dominate Armenia’s geopolitical relations.  Dating back to the 1920s, the conflict can be 
traced back to a debated boundary demarcation by the Soviet Union.  It was not, 
however, until the late 1980s that the conflict exploded into a full scale military conflict 
and the resulting border closure. The conflict has not only severed relations with 
Azerbaijan, but has also been a major source of tension with Turkey which has supported 
Azerbaijan.  Turkey’s continuing failure to recognise the early 20
th century Armenian 
genocide has also been a major contributor to the severed diplomatic relations between 
the nations; Turkey continues to maintain an effective blockade against Armenian trade.  
With continuing pressure from the United States and Europe, Turkey has begun to ease 
restrictions on Armenia as relations begin to thaw.   
 
With the closure of the Turkish and Azerbaijani borders, Armenia has become 
increasingly dependent on Georgia and Iran.  Armenia’s relations with Iran are warm, 
and have witnessed increased efforts by both governments to further political relations in 
order to facilitate the nations’ increasing economic interdependence. Relations with 
Georgia have also seen recent improvements, largely relating to their increasing 
economic interdependence.  Tensions, however, do exist - stemming from Georgia’s 
increasing alliance with the West and political distance from Russia; Georgia’s 
cooperation with Azerbaijan and Turkey in the construction of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline; 
and discrimination against Armenians in Georgia. Attempting to improve their bilateral 
relations, Gerogia and Armenia signed an agreement in 2001 promising not to enter into 
alliances considered to be hostile to the other country.   Political instability in Georgia, 
most notably the two recent civil wars, have placed additional strains on this trade route 
for Armenia.   
 
Armenia’s political relations with its most important trade partner, Russia, continue to be 
extremely close.  Russia maintains a military presence in Armenia, controlling its borders 
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AZERBAIJAN 
“Ever since ancient man first began to migrate, Azerbaijan has been the 
key landbridge between Europe and Asia. The country also sits astride 
the main route between Russia and Iran and onward points in the 
Middle East and South Asia. So, the country truly is the crossroads of 
North-South and East-West traffic.” – (Azerbaijan Special Report 
2002) 
 
Azerbaijan’s strategic location has placed it at the centre of discussions for the restoration 
of both the traditional east-west Silk Route and a north-south corridor being discussed by 
Russia, Iran and India.  In addition to its fortuitous geographic position, Azerbaijan has 
benefited from a favorable climate, geography, and abundant natural reserves.  All of 
these factors contributed to the development of an extensive transportation network 
during the period of the former Soviet Union.  Serious neglect of this infrastructure and 
regional disputes following the collapse of the Soviet union, however, have resulted in 
high transport costs.  Such problems are complicated by dilapidated transport 
infrastructure in Azerbaijan’s neighbour countries (i.e. Georgia).    
 
The three main transport corridors linking Azerbaijan to the sea are through Georgia, 
Iran, and Russia.  Each of these corridors has presented significant obstacles to 
Azerbaijani trade: the Georgian corridor has suffered from particularly poor infrastructure 
on the Georgian side of the border as well as the Georgian civil wars of the 1990s; the 
Iranian corridor is the farthest of the three, generally taking 10-12 days by road; and the 
Russian corridor has been subject to the tensions between Russia and Georgia (i.e. 1994 
blockade) as well as the Chechnyan war. 
Road 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, road transport has become increasingly important 
for Azerbaijan.  The east-west corridor from Baku through Alyat to Georgia has now 
become the most important corridor for goods to and from Azerbaijan.  A 2000 World 
Bank transport study found the Azerbaijani portion of this route to be in poor/bad 
condition; the Georgian section is considered to be even worse.  In fact, while shipment 
of a container via this highway only takes 3-5 days its average cost is US$2,200; 
shipment to Bandar Abbas takes 10-12 days and costs US$700-800.  The highway’s 
incorporation into the new TRACECA Silk Route project should bring about significant 
improvements.  A US$40 million World Bank sponsored Highway Project has already 
been initiated to improve this route.   
 
Azerbaijan’s internal road network, while extensive, is also in severely dilapidated state.   
A study by Kocks Consult estimated that 56% of the main road network was in a poor 
state of repair.  The poor condition of the roads has not only contributed to costs 
associated with delays and accidents but is considered to have increased vehicle operating 
costs by between 28 and 44 percent (WB HW project).  The dilapidated condition of 
Azernaijani roads can largely be attributed to minimal road funding since independence 
which has only been one quarter of the required level.  In addition to the poor condition   - 89 - 
of the infrastructure, unofficial obstacles to trade shipments in Azerbaijan are subject to 
an ex ante facilitation payment of $500-1500 per consignment (World Bank 2002). 
 
The Azerbaijani government’s participation in the Silk Route revival project, the TIR 
Carnet Convention and the European International Highways Agreement is testimony to 
its conscious awareness of its road transport difficulties and commitment to  
them.  Such regional cooperation has been hampered by continuing tensions with 
Armenia.   
Rail 
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Azerbaijan’s railways have witnessed a precipitous 
decline (90%) in freight traffic.  The infrastructure has fallen into a state of disrepair: the 
EU estimates that nearly 900 kms of rail need to be replaced, and only 30 locomotives 
out of an “inherited fleet” of 560 are operable (EU TRACECA).  Recent efforts 
associated with TRACECA have already brought about significant improvements in rail 
efficiency.  Most of the improvements have been focused on improving the east-west rail 
corridor from Baku to Georgia, which is Azerbaijan’s most important rail corridor.  The 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development has specifically allotted US$20.2m 
for rehabilitation of these railways.   
 
Azerbaijan has also benefited from the recent (1999) construction of a rail to Russia that 
bypasses Chechnya, thereby avoiding the Chechnyan war.  The rail corridor to Iran 
remains of minimal importance, suffering from limited capacity, disrepair, and 
vandalisation. 
Ports and Waterways 
Azerbaijan’s port of Baku on the Caspian sea primarily serves as a transshipment point 
for cargo traveling east.  As Azerbaijan’s primary trading partners are primarily member 
states of the EU, the port does not handle much Azerbaijani freight traffic. The port is 
currently operating at only 30% capacity and suffers from poor infrastructure.    
 
As part of the new Silk Route the port of Poti (Georgia) will continue to play a leading 
role in Azerbaijan’s freight traffic.  The port was established in 1858 and is considered to 
be outdated.  Its infrastructure was damaged in Georgia’s two civil wars in the mid 
1990s.  It has traditionally transported cargo in bulk and will require significant 
improvements if it is to serve as one of the principle ports along the TRACECA route.  
Recent efforts have been made to improve the efficiency and increase the overall capacity 
of the port.   
 
The Caspian Sea is linked to the Black Sea by the Volgo-Don canal, which is open 220 
days of the year and has a handling capacity of 16.5 million tons through a system of 13 
locks. It is Russian sovereign territory and is currently closed to foreign ships (Golden 
Book of Russia 2000). 
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Azerbaijan’s economy has become increasingly dependent on oil (and gas) exports, 
which accounted for more than 91% of total exports in 2001 compared to 59% in 1997.  
The increased dependence on oil has been accompanied by a reorientation of trade away 
from Russia, Iran and other CIS states: Iran and Russia, combined, accounted for 4% of 
Azerbaijan’s total exports in 2001, compared to 53% in 1996.  Azerbaijan’s most 
important destination for exports was Italy in 2001 which accounted for 57% of total 
exports.  The largest share of Azerbaijani imports came from the US in 2001; five years 
earlier, the US accounted for less than 2% of Azerbaijan’s imports.  Russia and Turkey 
continue to be important sources of imports for Azerbaijan.   
 
In the last few years, Azerbaijan has demonstrated an increasing commitment to 
liberalizing trade policy.  Official trade barriers are not, however, Azerbaijan’s biggest 
obstacle to trade.  Rather, corruption, little protection from extortion, and crimes against 
property present the major barriers to trade.  While all Caucasus countries suffer from 
such obstacles, Azerbaijan is considered to suffer from the worst corruption in the region.  
It consistently ranks as one of the most corrupt and least democratic countries in the 
world (http://www.worldaudit.org/countries/aj.htm). 
 
Azerbaijan is a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States, Economic Union 
of the CIS, the Black Sea Economic Co-operation Organisation, European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, GUUAM
28, and the Economic Cooperation 
Organisation which includes Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey.  Azerbaijan’s 
participation in a multiplicity of trading regimes poses both political and logistical 
challenges.  In fact, GUUAM was organised as an alternative to CIS amongst the regional 
countries most wary of Russia’s influence.  The organisation, like CIS, has failed to 
operate on an effective multilateral scale – most agreements have thus far been bilateral.     
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
Azerbaijan’s recent political history has been marked by domestic instability and regional 
boundary conflicts.  Since independence Azerbaijan has suffered several coups and 
attempted coups, many of which related directly to the success of the Azerbaijani war 
against Armenia over Nagorny Karabakh.  The ongoing struggle with Armenia over this 
enclave, situated between the two Azerbaijani territories, continues to dominate 
Azerbaijan’s political scene.  Dating back to the 1920s, the conflict can be traced back to 
a debated boundary demarcation by the Soviet Union.  It was not, however, until the late 
1980s that the conflict exploded into a full scale military conflict and the resulting border 
closure.  The dispute has left the nation of Azerbaijan divided into two disjoint sections, 
severely complicating transport to and from the western enclave. 
 
Boundary disputes over the Caspian Sea and its rich natural resources have further 
weakened Azerbaijan’s regional relations.  The most notable of these disputes has been 
with Azerbaijan’s southern neighbour Iran.  Tensions escalated in July 2001 when two 
Azerbaijani ships surveying the Caspian Sea for BP were confronted by an Iranian 
gunboat and forced to turn back.  Azerbaijan’s economic ties to the US and Israel, and the 
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presence of separatist Azerbaijani groups in Iran have further weakened relations 
between the two countries.   Paralleling the deteriorating relations, Azerbaijan’s exports 
to Iran have fallen from 24% in 1997 to less than 0.5% in 2001.   
 
Azerbaijan’s relations with Russia have shown recent signs of improvement, but have 
traditionally been uneasy as a result of Azerbaijan’s support for Chechnia.  During the 
first Chechen conflict in 1994, Russia imposed a complete transport blockade of 
Azerbaijan, closing both its maritime and overland borders.  At this time, Russia was a 
vital trading partner of Azerbaijan accounting for 70% of its exports.   
(http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav082400.shtml)  
Russia’s close ties and military support for Armenia, as well as property right disputes on 
the Caspian Sea have also contributed to the strained relations.  Current Russian President 
Vladimir Putin, however, has demonstrated a new resolve to strengthen relations with 
Azerbaijan, including a proposed settlement over the Caspian Sea.   
 
Azerbaijan maintains warm relations with Georgia, its main transit neighbour.  The two 
nations met earlier this year and promised to seek greater political and economic 
cooperation.  Both countries have been cooperating on the construction of the new Baku-
Ceyhan pipeline.  While relations remain strong, Azerbaijan has been adversely affected 
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MOLDOVA 
The nearest open sea is the Black Sea at a distance of approximately 50km from the 
border and 200km from the capital Chisinau. Hence in distance terms, Moldova is one of 
the least landlocked of our sample. In addition, Moldova is one of few developing 
landlocked countries to have relatively wealthy neighbours. A recent civil war fuelled by 
Moldova’s largest trade partner, Russia, and poor links to surrounding countries, in 
particular Romania, has limited Moldova’s trading performance and contributing to the 
fact that Moldova is the poorest country in Europe. 
TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE 
Roads 
The country’s 12,657 km of road, of which 87% are paved, account for 96% of domestic 
cargo movement and more than 85% of passenger travel (EIU 2000, US Department of 
State 2001). During the Soviet era road connections between Chisinau and the Ukraine 
(in particular Kiev, Odessa and Western Ukraine) were reasonably well developed. In 
contrast, there is only one major road that crosses into neighbouring Romania. As a result 
road-based exports to Western Europe tend to pass via Ukraine and Poland. 
 
A significant obstacle to increasing trade relationships with the CIS is the closure of the 
main road linking Chisinau with Kiev in Ukraine due to the Transdniestr conflict. As a 
result all road traffic needs to make a detour via Tiraspol on small and poorly-maintained 
roads (Williams and Wildman, 2001). The same source describes custom checks at 
border crossings with Romania and the Ukraine as onerous and extremely time 
consuming. This results in long delays for cargo traffic. 
Rail 
The railway network includes 1,140 km of tracks and forms the principal means of 
transporting cargo. Railway freight carriage totaled 8.3m tones in 2000, up from 6.6m 
tones in 1999 (EIU 2002, p. 61) and accounted for 95% of transborder shipments (US 
Department of State 2001). 
 
Rail links with Romania are made difficult by the fact that the Moldavian railway 
network uses the wider Soviet gauge standard. At border crossings every carriage needs 
to be transferred onto a different rolling stock – a costly procedure that can take several 
days for cargo trains. Railway transport of any perishable agricultural goods for export to 
Western markets is made difficult through the difference in rail track standards. 
Waterways 
The two major rivers, the Dniestr and the Prut, are used for transport of local goods. 
Important domestic ports are Bender, Ribnita and Ungheni. 
 
It appears that the relative proximity of the Black Sea along the Dniestr (< 200km from 
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to nearby Odeassa (Ukraine) with a well-developed port. Instead Moldova has recently 
been investing in transport infrastructure along the Prut that connects to the Danube delta. 
The main purpose of constructions along the river is to facilitate oil import from non-CIS 
countries to reduce Moldova’s dependence on Russian primary energy sources.  
TRADE 
The state monopoly on foreign trade was removed in 1992, but trade diversification 
continues to progress extremely slowly. During the Soviet era, Moldova’s trade relied 
predominantly on agricultural exports and enjoyed significant subsidies, including 
artificially low prices for energy supplies. Since independence Moldova has maintained 
its dependence on agricultural exports, with food and beverages, agricultural produce and 
tobacco accounting for around 55% of export revenue (EIU 2002). 
 
Despite the fact that textiles only account for 2% of total manufacturing they make up 
20% of Moldvian exports. This sector has been growing steadily as a result of extensive 
subcontracting by foreign firms that make use of Moldova’s extremely low wages.  
 
Moldavian trade continues to depend on the CIS countries, with Russia (44% of exports 
and 15% of imports) and Ukraine (10% of exports and 17% of imports) its largest trading 
partners. Particularly noteworthy is the low contribution of trade with Romania, brought 
about due to the poor infrastructure linkages detailed above. Trade with the EU has 
doubled between 1990 and 1998. However, there have been no further increases since 
then as the economic recovery of Russia has strengthened traditional ties (Center for 
Strategic Studies and Reform, 2002). 
 
The trade deficit remains large at $306 million (2001) or 22% of GDP (IMF BOPS 2001). 
 
Moldova has set up five Foreign Trade Zones (FEZ) in Chisinau, Tvardita, Taracilia, 
Valcanes, and Otaci. Residents in the FEZ are exempted from income tax for periods 
between 5 and 10 years. However, it has been reported that the laws governing FEZ have 
changed frequently – often to the detriment of resident companies. This has acted as a 
significant obstacle to their expansion (US Department of State 2001). 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
Full independence of Moldova from the Soviet Union was achieved in 1991. The 
Transdniestr region east of the Dniestr with its predominantly Russian and Ukrainian 
population regarded Moldavian independence as an ominous first step towards 
reunification with Romania, and voted for independence in late 1991. Following the 
central government’s refusal to accept the region’s independence civil war broke out. 
During this conflict the Russian army supplied arms to the Transdniestr separatists while 
Moldova received military support from Romania. A ceasefire was negotiated in 1992. 
Since then Transdniestr has enjoyed quasi-independence, including its own currency, 
central bank and customs posts. It also continues to adhere to the Cyrillic alphabet. Trade 
links between Moldova and Transdniestr have been significantly weakened in this 
process.  
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Moldova’s constitution reaffirms its status as a neutral country and there are no open 
border disputes with either Romania or the Ukraine. Since 2001 Moldova is governed by 
the Communist Party, which has reoriented the foreign policy towards a rapprochement 
with Russia. Partly as a result, relationships with Rumania have started to deteriorate. In 
March 2002, following allegations by the Moldavian President Voronin that Romania 
was instigating protest rallies in Chisinau, the ambassadors of both countries were called 
back.   - 95 - 
ASIA - EASTERN  
BHUTAN 
India is the main partner for the overwhelming majority of trade with Bhutan: it accounts 
for 94.6% of Bhutan’s exports and 69.4% of Bhutan’s imports (IMF 1999). Transit trade 
is therefore of less importance to Bhutan than the bilateral relationship with India. In any 
case, India is Bhutan’s only transit neighbour as the Himalayan ranges block the route to 
China, Bhutan’s only other neighbour. The bilateral relationship with India is generally 
very strong and any friction between the two nations has been minimised. 
 
The generally reasonable Indian rail system is not used by Bhutan for transit as the rail 
system does not continue into Bhutan. Instead Bhutan relies on the poor quality Indian 
road system to use the reasonable quality port of Calcutta.  
TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE 
Transit trade is not subject to Customs duties and trade restrictions by Indian authorities. 
In practice, Bhutan’s transit trade at Calcutta is controlled by Royal Bhutan Customs and 
hence there is no activity involving Indian Customs at Calcutta Port. This is in contrast to 
Nepalese cargoes, which do not receive similar facilitation (Chakra Infrastructure 
Consultants 2001). 
Road 
There is one main road in Bhutan, the National Highways. Around two thirds of the roads 
are paved. In 1997, total road length was 3,375km. Three north-south roads connect 
Bhutan with India and a lateral road running roughly east-west in the middle of the 
country connects these. Normally trucks of <10 tonnes transport goods, although larger 
container vehicles can move by exception (Chakra Infrastructure Consultants 2001). 
 
Twelve exit/entry points are available in India for Bhutanese trade. In general, Bhutan’s 
imports are unstuffed in Calcutta Port and are transported break bulk with a transit pass to 
Phuentsholing/Jaigon by road. As lower tonnage trucks are only permitted on Bhutan 
roads, goods are then loaded onto smaller trucks for distribution within Bhutan (Chakra 
Infrastructure Consultants 2001). The Indian road system is of poor quality relative even 
to most African roads (Canning 1998). 
Rail 
Bhutan has neither railways nor a domestic air service. It is possible for Bhutan to use the 
Indian rail system to deliver exports within India however statistics are not available as to 
how much this mode is used. 
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Calcutta is the only port with any volume of transit trade. Calcutta Port has a throughput 
of 6,000 tonnes per year for Bhutan, comprising mainly of imports. The port is of fair 
quality and can easily handle Bhutanese trade in addition to much other trade. 
 
It is possible to utilise Haldia (also run by the Calcutta Port Authority) or alternatively the 
ports of Mongla or Chittagong in Bangladesh, although this would involve a double 
border crossing. Given current volumes of traffic (India is the destination of 94.6% of 
Bhutan’s exports (IMF 1999)), there is little benefit of an alternative route. A UNDP 
funded study for a dry port in Phuentsholing was completed in 1999 but the site was 
damaged by flooding in 2000 (Chakra Infrastructure Consultants 2001). 
TRADE 
Bhutan’s trade deficit has increased markedly in the last few years from around 14.0% of 
GDP in 1997 to 28.2% of GDP in 2000 (IFS 2002). This increase is largely due to an 
increase in the import of capital goods needed in the production of hydroelectricity, 
Bhutan’s largest export earner (ADB 2002). The deficit is financed largely by foreign aid 
so in most years there is an increase in foreign exchange (ADB 2002). 
 
Transit trade is of less importance to Bhutan as it is to most other landlocked countries 
because Bhutan trades largely with India. India is overwhelmingly Bhutan’s largest 
export market, accounting for 94.6% of exports, with Bangladesh accounting for almost 
all remaining exports. 31.8% of exports to India consisted of hydroelectric power (IMF 
1999). Further analysis of export composition is not possible because of a lack of data. 
69.4% of imports come from India, followed by Japan (16.9%) and Singapore (2.8%). 
Similarly to Nepal, trade with China (exports and imports <1%) is minimal due to the 
difficulty of travel through the Himalayan Ranges. 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
Bhutan is a protectorate of India, meaning that India protects Bhutan’s borders from 
external threat. As such, the country’s foreign policy will rarely contradict the foreign 
policy of India. Bhutan and India signed the Treaty of Friendship in 1949 and the 
bilateral relationship has since been generally very strong, partly because of India’s 
interest in minimizing China’s influence in the area. More recently, the relationship has 
been strained due to the use of southern Bhutan by north-east Indian militant groups 
fighting against India, but Bhutanese military cooperation with the Indian military has 
minimised the strain on the bilateral relationship (CountryWatch 2002). 
 
Bhutan’s relationship with Nepal has been strained by the protests by ethnic Nepalese in 
southern Bhutan. Negotiations over this issue continue and are the major component of 
the Bhutan – Nepal agenda. 
 
A small area (269 km
2) of disputed land exists between Bhutan and China. Negotiations 
between the two countries over the disputed land are progressing positively although are 
far from being tension free. No formal diplomatic ties exist between the two countries. 
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Bhutan is a member of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) 
with Bangladesh, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka (WDI 2002). SAARC 
established the SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA), which gives 
preferential treatment for trade within the region. While SAARC has had some success in 
promoting cooperation among its members, the level of integration and cooperation does 
not match that of other institutions such as the SADC in Southern Africa.   - 98 - 
LAOS 
Thailand is Laos’ main transit nation, and an agreement was reached on transit goods in 
1999. Thailand has proved itself willing to develop facilities and legal frameworks to 
facilitate the movement of Laotian goods through the country (UNCTAD 1999a). Imports 
generally pass through the border crossing at Thanaleng, while the larger share of exports 
pass through Savannakhet as this is closer to the main export producing areas (wood, 
coffee). All imports passing through Thailand must pass through the transit warehouse 
facility at Klong Toey (near Bangkok) whether the imports landed at Bangkok or 
elsewhere. Hence, there is little incentive to diversify trade routes and ports in Thailand. 
 
Most imports through Viet Nam travel through the port of Da Nang, and to a lesser 
extent, the ports of Cua Lo, Xuan Hai and Quy Nhon. The port of Vung Ang is currently 
under construction and is envisaged to be dedicated to Lao PDR transit goods. Viet Nam 
only serves a small proportion of Laos’ transit export trade as the main road routes (via 
Paksane and Savannakhet) are steep and involve tight radius turns (Cabanius and 
Bouaphanh 2001). 
 
China is not a transit country for Lao PDR. However, Lao PDR is expected to be a transit 
country between China and Thailand, as well as Cambodia. 
 
Transit operations through Cambodia are not yet operational but will potentially provide 
a link through the port of Sihanoukville. 
TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE 
While the level and quality of Laotian transport infrastructure is not high, Laos is 
fortunate to have a transit neighbour, Thailand, with a high level of infrastructure and 
strong modal links. Laos and Thailand have a mixed relationship, although Thailand has 
been willing to invest in transit infrastructure to facilitate both Thai – Laos bilateral trade 
and Laos transit trade. 
 
The Mekong, which forms much of Laos’ western border, until recently was only 
passable by ferry. However two bridges linking Laos with Thailand have now been 
completed, and work on a third is due to begin in 2003. Thailand has completed a railway 
line that now extends from Bangkok to the centre of the bridge near Vientiane. Laos has 
not yet started construction of the short section of the rail line from the bridge to 
Vientiane.  
 
The government of Laos aims to take advantage of its landlocked position by 
transforming itself into a link between the large markets of Thailand, Vietnam and China, 
however, this goal is severely hampered by Laos’ lack of reliable physical infrastructure. 
Road 
The country has 23,300 km of roads, and fewer then half were paved in 1998. 41% of the 
population live more then 6km from a main road, and many dirt roads are unusable in the   - 99 - 
rainy season (EIU 2001). Two thirds of freight traffic moves by road, and the remainder 
by river, with a small volume by air (EIU 2002). 
 
Most transit trade passes through Thailand. Thai roads are generally of high quality. 
Unfortunately, Thai-owned freight trucks (which are run as a monopoly on Laos trade) 
cannot enter Laos, and vice versa. Hence, transshipment must occur at Nong Khai (at the 
Thai-Laos border) to transfer between Thai/Laotian owned trucks. In contrast, Laotian 
and Vietnamese trucks may carry transit goods freely between the two countries 
(Cabanius and Bouaphanh 2001). This transshipment of goods through Thailand 
increases the prices of Laos’ goods greatly, between 60 – 300% depending on the good 
and source of data.  
 
The three main road transit corridors (imports & exports) between Bangkok and Laos are 
through: 
-  Vientiane: The route between Bangkok and Nong Khai (at the Thai – Laos 
border) is a four lane highway. Then it is a short trip to Vientiane. (640km) 
-  Savannaket: Currently a bridge across the Mekong is under construction. Also, 
Thailand is planning to widen the route into a four-lane highway. (663km) 
-  Pakse: The bridge across the Mekong was finished in 2000 and the route through 
Thailand is via paved road. (747km) 
 
Vietnam carries only a small proportion of Lao transit export trade as Thai routes are 
generally cheaper and more reliable. The main routes between Laos and Vietnamese 
ports are steep and involve tight radius turns (Cabanius and Bouaphanh 2001). Most 
imports through Vietnam travel through the port of Da Nang, and to a lesser extent, the 
ports of Cua Lo, Xuan Hai and Quy Nhon. The port of Vung Ang is currently under 
construction and is envisaged to be dedicated to Lao transit goods. 
 
The road link between China and Laos is in minimal use for trade and involves a 100 
kilometre stretch of dirt track passable only during the dry season (Library of Congress 
2002). 
Rail 
Laos has no rail network. 
 
Thailand has shown its willingness in supporting Laos – Thai trade by completing its 
railway section from Bangkok to the centre of the Friendship Bridge over the Mekong 
River at Nong Khai, although the short link on the Laos side from the bridge to Vientiane 
is still under survey. (Cabanius and Bouaphanh 2001)(Library of Congress 2002). 
Currently transit by rail therefore involves transshipment between truck and rail on the 
Thai side of the border.  
Waterway 
The Mekong River supplies an alternative form of transport, with 4600km of navigable 
waterways available along the river and its tributaries (EIU 2001). The government is 
encouraging waterway use by upgrading river ports and improving river access. The river   - 100 - 
is navigable upstream to China although only in smaller craft. River traffic to Cambodia 
and consequent access to the sea is prevented by the Phapheng Falls. 
TRADE 
Since the collapse of trade with the Eastern bloc, Laos has reoriented towards Asia. 
Membership of ASEAN and AFTA, which Laos joined in 1997, has prompted the 
government to pursue policies of foreign trade liberalization (MITI 2002). Almost half of 
external trade is with Vietnam and Thailand, with the majority of imports coming from 
Thailand (62.1%) and the majority of exports going to Vietnam (25.1%) and Thailand 
(19.1%) (IMF DOTS 2002). Trade with China is more significant than official statistics 
suggest, since there is a large amount of smuggling across the northern border.  
 
Laos remains economically dependant on Thailand, as Thailand is both a strong bilateral 
trading partner and a transit nation, which proved inopportune during the Asian financial 
crisis, when the collapse of Thai markets triggered triple digit inflation in Laos. Inflation 
has since stabilised, and it appears that the prevalent subsistence economy provided some 
buffer to the ravages of the crisis. 
 
A clear path to a steady foreign income and regional influence is for Laos to become the 
major source of hydroelectric power for neighbouring countries. Mountainous terrain and 
heavy annual rainfall give the Mekong River and its tributaries an estimated hydroelectric 
potential of between 18,000 and 22,000 megawatts. A major power-purchasing 
agreement, signed in February of this year, will generate a total of US$2bn in fees, 
considerably easing the dependence of Laos on foreign aid (Hirsch 1996). 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
Laos has a history of border disputes, specifically with Cambodia, Myanmar and 
Thailand. Cambodia and Laos have held four rounds of talks since 1995, agreeing to 
recognise the internationally accepted principles of border limitation. Myanmar and Laos 
have had improved relationship following the signing of the Treaty on the Demarcation 
of Boundaries in 1994. Thailand and Lao fought a war in 1987 over the ownership of 
three border villages, and although the two countries have grown closer through trade and 
investment, political relations are characterised by mistrust, with frequent border 
problems.  
 
Laos is a member of the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA), which allows the free 
movement of capital and is also expanding to include primary products. Laos has agreed 
to maximise the product lines in the 0-5% tariff categories by 2006 for AFTA members 
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NEPAL 
Due to the Himalayan range to the north of the country limiting trade and contact with 
China, and because Nepal is landlocked, Nepal remains heavily reliant for both bilateral 
and transit trade upon its only other neighbour, India. India has had a strong role in 
Nepalese politics for many years, but since the 1990 blockade of Nepal by India, causing 
the overthrow of the Nepalese panchayat government, the full independence of Nepal 
from India has been questioned. One Indian commentator stated that Nepal had to 
maintain an “image of independence… Mind you, not independence, just an image of 
independence.” (Spotlight, May 1991, as cited in (Mishra 2002)). More recently, in 2001 
and 2002, India had placed restrictions on Nepalese trade while they renegotiated trade 
treaties. Due to its landlocked status, Nepal has few alternatives but to cede to India’s 
wishes. 
 
When blockades or restrictions are not in place, Nepal is able to use the good quality 
Indian rail network as well as several Indian road corridors to the ports of Calcutta and 
Haldia. This network has recently been enhanced by the construction of an inland 
container depot (dry port) on the India/Nepal border at Birganj. This allows for the 
stuffing, customs clearance and loading onto rail of containers at Birganj so that there is 
only a modal change and no customs procedures at the land/sea port. 
TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE 
As transit operations through China are not practical due to the impassable Himalayan 
Mountains, all of Nepal’s transit trade passes solely through India. Nepal has a mixed 
although often cooperative relationship with India, which has reasonable infrastructure 
levels. Transit operations are mainly governed by the Indo-Nepal Treaty of Transit 
(renewed most recently in 2002 (Government of Nepal 2002)), which assists in the 
development of multi-modal transport systems to and from Nepal through India. India 
has provided 15 transit routes and has agreed to provide facilities for Nepalese transit 
trade through Mumbai and Kandla in addition to the existing facilities at Calcutta and 
Haldia (UNCTAD 1999b). Trade between Nepal and China is conducted through the 
Kodari route, although this route is not used for transit trade and direct trade through this 
route is minimal. Further Nepal – China routes are being investigated (WTNN 1995). 
 
While much of Nepal’s sea trade is via container, prior to the finalisation of the dry ports, 
most cargo was converted to break-bulk in facilities at port. However, in December 2000 
a US$50 million project was completed to provide three border facilities to handle 
containerised cargo. The principal one, Biranj now has a direct rail connection to Calcutta 
Port. The other two terminals, Biratnagara and Bhairava are road based. 
Roads 
Nepal has 15,500km of roads, of which less then one third are paved. Construction and 
maintenance of paved highways is heavily reliant on foreign aid – development 
assistance to the transport sector totaled $US450m between 1990-99 (Stone 2001). The 
majority of roads are graveled or dirt roads, and wash out frequently during the June-  - 102 - 
September rainy season. Most hill and mountain trails are only suitable for pedestrians 
and pack animals (EIU 2001). 
Rail 
Nepal has a new 5.2 km broad gauge railway connecting its new inland container depot 
(dry port) at Birganj to India’s rail network, allowing the direct transport of cargo to 
Indian ports. In contrast with most of India’s infrastructure, India’s rail network is of 
good quality. Nepal’s other rail line is a 41km spur connecting the eastern Terai town of 
Jankpur with the city of Jayanagar in Bihar, India. A rail route for transit through 
Bangladesh has also been agreed but is not used, most likely because of the need for two 
border crossings to provide access to the sea. 
 
The Birganj dry port was opened in February 2001 and rail traffic is now predicted to 
increase significantly as the dry port offers an improvement in cost, speed (up to 10 days 
faster (Chakra Infrastructure Consultants 2001)) and reliability of transit. Following this, 
the focus should shift towards providing Through Bills of Lading (TBLs) to remove the 
need for Customs clearance at Calcutta. This could be done electronically using 
EDIFACT (Electronic Data Interchange for Administration, Commerce and Transport) 
(Chakra Infrastructure Consultants 2001). 
Ports 
Transit trade passes mainly through Calcutta Port (425,000 tonnes p.a.) and Haldia Port 
(160,000 tonnes p.a., mainly imports), both of which are characterised by inefficient 
management and excessive delays and costs (Subramanian and Arnold 2001). There are 
direct services from Calcutta to Singapore, Colombo and Hong Kong. Nepal leases transit 
warehouses at Calcutta. Transit between the ports and the two kingdoms is almost 
entirely by road (Chakra Infrastructure Consultants 2001). 
TRADE 
The primary destination for Nepalese trade is the USA (35%) and India (34%) followed 
by Germany (11%). Due to the physical barrier of the Himalayas, Nepal trades little with 
its northern neighbour China (<1%) (IMF DOTS 2002). 
 
Nepalese trade with India will have temporarily slowed somewhat since these figures due 
to the additional duties (some as high as 20%) imposed by India during the breakdown of 
the bilateral relationship through 2001 and early 2002. These duties were removed by 
November 2002. 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
As a small country bordering two major regional powers, India and China, Nepal 
employs a policy of non-alignment. Due to Nepal’s landlocked status, and its reliance on 
Indian ports for trade, it is has historically been subject to Indian demands. The downfall 
of the Nepalese panchayat government in 1990 has been partially attributed to Indian 
blockades of the country. 
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The 1950 Peace and Friendship Treaty allows for the free movement of goods between 
the two countries while favouring India in security, investment and employment 
opportunities. A deterioration of relationships due to, according to India, a “surge” of 
Nepalese imports, led to the non-renewal of a preferential trade treaty agreement in late 
2001. Restrictions were placed on Nepalese trade until November 2002 following the 
renewal of the Treaty in March 2002 (Kahn 2000; CountryWatch 2002; EIU 2002). The 
India – Nepal treaty has been extended to 2007 allowing free trade between the two 
countries with some export quotas on key products (Government of Nepal 2002). Transit 
traffic was not harmed by the breakdown in the 2001/2002 Indo-Nepal relationship. 
 
Chinese influence has been strengthened by high-level visits in recent years, however 
trade is limited by the Himalayan Mountains between the two countries. China remains a 
substantial aid donor. 
 
Nepal’s relationship with Bhutan is marred by the tension over the presence of Nepalese 
refugees in Bhutan (CountryWatch 2002). 
 
Nepal is a member of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) 
with Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Pakistan and Sri Lanka (WDI 2002). SAARC 
established the SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA), which gives 
preferential treatment for trade within the region. While SAARC has had some success in 
promoting cooperation among its members, the level of integration and cooperation does 
not match that of other institutions such as the SADC in Southern Africa.   - 104 - 
MONGOLIA 
As the landlocked country with the largest area and lowest population density (1.5 
persons/km
2 compared with Botswana, the second least dense with 2.7 persons/km
2 
(WDI 2002)), Mongolia has a problem with both transit access to the sea and internal 
access within the country.  
 
Transit through Russia (to St Petersburg, Vladivostok, Nakhoda or Vostochny) and 
through China (to Tianjin) is almost without exception by rail. Transit infrastructure 
levels are reasonable although a diversification of modes to facilitate competition 
between road and rail would be advantageous. Mongolia’s relationship with Russia and 
China are reasonable and improving. 
 
The quality of infrastructure within Mongolia is of poor quality, hampering the transport 
of goods to market. 
TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE 
Road 
While Mongolia has a great length of roads, particularly given its population size, 
transport is hampered by a poor quality and largely unpaved road network (Canning 
1998) , limited supplies of fuel (EIU 2001) and an impoverished national air carrier (EIU 
2001). The roads are currently being upgraded, largely through external aid ($US250m in 
development assistance was committed to improving transport infrastructure between 
1990-99 (Stone 2001)). Construction of an east-west arterial road began in 2001. The low 
quality of the roads leads to the problem of long transport times, but also the destruction 
of many goods which travel over the potholed roads. 
 
While roads are not used for transit through China nor Russia, there is potential for a 
feasible road route to be improved to reasonable levels through to Tianjin. Currently 
Mongolian, Russian and Chinese trucks are not able to operate within each other’s 
territory (United Nations General Assembly 2000) so the success of a road route would 
depend on allowing trucks from Mongolia to pass through the transit route. Mongolia has 
signed bilateral transit agreements with China and Russia. A protocol was signed with 
Russia which enables the transport of passengers by road in either territory without taxes 
or fees (UNCTAD 1999a). Negotiations are currently underway which would allow the 
right of transit for Mongolia, Russia and China and the obligation to provide transit 
facilities (UNCTAD 2002a). 
Rail 
The Ulaanbaatar Railway is Mongolia’s primary transportation infrastructure, linking 
freight and passengers with Russia and China. It serves the three largest industrial areas 
of Mongolia - Ulaanbaatar, Darkhan and Erdenet. There is little competition to the rail 
network from the road network. 
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The three principal transit routes are: 
(i)  via China to Tianjin (Xingang), 
(ii)  via Russia to Vladivostok, Nakhoda or Vostochny, and 
(iii)  via Russia to St Petersburg. 
 
Currently these routes are only served only by rail. Rail cargo to and from Russia and 
Europe is transported via a broad-gauge line with no interruption. Cargo to and from 
China however must be transshipped at Zamyn Uud because of two different rail gauges. 
Slow transshipment during peak harvest period in China is still a major concern to 
Mongolia (UNCTAD 1999a). 
TRADE 
The trade balance has deteriorated over the past five years, and a deficit of US$148.4 
million was recorded in 2000, partly due to poor export performance. Mineral products, 
particularly copper, accounted for 41% of total export earnings in 2000, which makes the 
economy vulnerable to shifts in world commodity prices. China has become an 
increasingly important trade partner since 1990, accounting for 58.9% of Mongolian 
exports in 2000 and supplying 20.5% of its imports. Other important trading partners 
include Japan, South Korea and the EU. Russia, once Mongolia’s primary export market, 
purchased only 9.7% of Mongolian exports.  
 
Since 1990 the country has attracted approximately US$700m of foreign direct 
investment (UNCTAD 2002b). China has been the largest FDI contributor, with about 
one third of the total, followed by South Korea (US$58m), Japan (US$50M), the US 
(US$34m) and Russia (US$40m). Around 30% of the money has been concentrated on 
mining. Other sectors that have attracted significant amounts of FDI include light 
industry with 17% and agriculture with 10% of total FDI (EIU 2001; IMF DOTS 2002). 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
Mongolia has a free trade regime (USCS 2001). Mongolia’s relationship with Russia has 
been improving since the early 1990s and the Soviet troop withdrawal in September 
1992. The two countries have signed a number of treaties on trade, security and stability, 
including a transit agreement allowing tax-free and fee-free transit. Relations with China 
have been mixed, with a general improvement since their normalisation in 1989 to the 
point where, in that year, President Bagabandi was the first Mongolian head of state to 
visit China. China is Mongolia’s number one trade partner (IMF DOTS 2002) and is the 
largest investor in Mongolia (CountryWatch 2002).   - 106 - 
SOUTH AMERICA 
BOLIVIA 
Bolivia’s economic mainstay has been the hydrocarbons industry of oil and natural gas. 
Minerals, oil and gas activities account for 47.5% of Bolivia’s total export. Several new 
pipelines such as the Rio Grande-Campinas pipeline to Brazil in 1998 have been 
constructed and continue to spur Bolivia’s most dynamic sector. According to Castellón 
(2001), “it is expected that within 10 years 80% of regional trade could be passing 
through Bolivia’s Tax Free Zone, making it a potential regional centre of energy and 
trade.” Bolivia has also seen significant growth in its telecommunications sector after 
privatization and has become a fiber optics cable network distribution centre for South 
America. 
 
The natural environment of Bolivia presents several challenged to its development. With 
a mean elevation of over 1,000 metres, and two mountain ranges with a height of 3,650-
3,900 metres Bolivia faces severe transportation challenges. Bolivia has a poor quality 
road and rail networks, although links between Bolivia and its transit neighbours are 
strong and improving. 
TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE 
Road 
70% of intra-regional transport within the Andean Community (CAN) is by road (Vera 
25). Coupled with the fact that the Andean Community and MERCOSUR account for 
53% of Bolivia’s total exports, this suggests the vital importance of road infrastructure to 
the Bolivian economy. The road network, however, is considered the poorest in Latin 
America (Castellón) with estimates ranging from 5-20% of the road system that is paved 
(UNCTAD says its 5%, EIU 20%), and approximately 70% consisting of unmade earth.  
 
Moreover, the cost of road transport is high and there are frequent delays at international 
border crossings and in loading and unloading (C 21). The system faces difficulties due 
to poor topography, frequent flooding, social upheaval, low population density, a 
depressed economy and bad management of the system. To deal with many of these 
problems, the Andean Community has approved a program to both rehabilitate national 
roads and accelerate the development of a regional highway system, the Andean 
Highway System. Each country is pursuing its own strategy with Bolivia’s focusing on 
connecting its road system with Peru, Chile and Bolivia in order to gain access to the sea. 
(see page 30 Vera, p 13 EIU) 
Rail 
The Bolivian rail system is considered largely inadequate and has had a history of 
difficulties: in 1995 less than half of the soya produced was able to be transported to   - 107 - 
Puerto Aguirre due to a lack of hauling capacity of the railroad system. The railroad 
system continues to face difficulties dealing with the peak soya season. This poses a 
particular problem since it is essential to reach the ports during winter (in the Northern 
hemisphere) when the prices are high. In fact, much of the Bolivian soya does not reach 
the ports until the prices have begun falling.  
Much of the recent difficulties faced by the system can be attributed to a lack of 
investment. Other difficulties being faced are a lack of forwarders consolidating cargo 
which has limited the amount of container traffic, and disruptions in Peru, Chile, and 
Argentina that disrupt normal cargo exchange.  
Other Transport Infrastructure 
While river transport has yet to play a significant role in trade due to a lack of technology 
and resources, it holds the potential to do so. In 1996 the Accord of Fluvial Navigation on 
the Paraguay-Paraná Rivers was signed by Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay and 
Uruguay. It provides for “free navigation, equal treatment, free transit and reciprocity, 
multilateral treatment of cargo reservations, transport and trade facilitation, and port and 
navigational services.” Bolivia is also in the process of constructing a road that will 
connect La Paz with Puerto Suárez on the Paraguay River (V 30).  
TRADE 
Bolivia is currently a member of the CAN (Andean Community) custom union, and an 
associate member of MERCOSUR. Trade with these partners has witnessed recent 
increases, and accounts for 53% of Bolivia’s exports in 2001 while trade with the EU and 
US has been declining. Despite the increasing trade, Bolivia could potentially suffer 
economic losses as tariffs for agricultural exports from MERCOSUR to CAN are 
reduced. Bolivia is also involved in the preparatory process for the Free Trade Area of the 
Americas (FTAA), which intends to further the economic integration of the region. It 
currently operates a number of Tax Free Zones in La Paz, Santa Cruz and Puerto Suárez 
where goods can enter duty-free, be transformed or completed and then re-exported. 
Bolivia has also signed a General System of Preferences with the US, EU, and Japan.  
 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
Bolivia lost its Pacific maritime coastline to Chile in the war of 1878-1883. While 
Bolivia has gained some preferential rights of access to some of Chile and Peru’s Pacific 
coast, sovereign access to the land lost has not been achieved. In fact, many of the 
arrangements between Bolivia and Chile are seen as largely inadequate to the Bolivians 
and remain a source of tension. Relations between the two nations have been poor for 
much of the last 100 years. Diplomatic ties have been severed between the two nations, 
so Bolivia only maintains consular relations with Chile. An increase in the natural gas 
supply, however, and the corresponding increase in exports from Chilean ports promises 
to give Bolivia an additional lever in negotiating greater access to the Pacific coast, and 
the relationship has been slowly improving since 2000 when Bolivia and Chile’s 
Ministers of Defense met to discuss their border problem (EIU, CountryWatch). 
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Bolivia has a good political relationship with Peru, Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina, 
which are improving through mutual involvements in regional groups such as the 
Organisation of American States, the Rio Group, and MERCOSUR (CountryWatch).   - 109 - 
PARAGUAY 
Paraguay has several transit options through Argentina and Brazil, which take advantage 
of the good infrastructure levels in these countries. In addition, much of Paraguay’s trade 
is within the region so it does not have to travel far to reach its destination. 
 
Problematic domestic politics – including the 34 year dictatorship of General Alfredo 
Stroessner ending in 1989 and the consequent internal political conflict – have 
contributed to the poor levels of infrastructure within the country, and a level of distruct 
between Paraguay and its neighbours. 
TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE 
Paraguay has duty free zones or sheds in the ports of: 
-  Buenos Aires and Rosario in Argentina 
-  Rio Grande do Sul Paranagua and Santos in Brazil 
-  Montevideo and Nueva Palmira in Uraguay 
-  Antogafasta in Chile 
to store and distribute Paraguayan imports and exports (Castellón 2001). 
Roads 
80% of national cargo is transported by road. The road network covers 55,873km, of 
which, 3,224 are paved (Castellón 2001). Relative to other landlocked countries, the 
quality of road infrastructure is quite high. The Paraguayan government continues to 
place an emphasis on the development of an efficient road system and has negotiated a 
$82.3 million dollar loan from the IDB for several road system projects. The government 
will have to compensate for significant damage to roads and bridges cause by excessive 
flooding to the Paraguay River during El Nino (UN Department of Humanitarian 
Affairs). It should also be noted Paraguay’s first private toll project is suffering severe 
economic difficulties (27 EIU). 
 
A road from Asunción to the duty-free port of Paranagua, Brazil serves as the main route 
for both imports and exports. The bulk of goods transported to Argentina are carried 
across the Paraná and Paraguay Rivers by truck. Delays, however, are common, making 
the shipment of perishables risky (http://www.planetlatino.net/paraguay.htm). 
Rail 
Paraguay’s 135 year old railroad, The Ferrocarril Central del Paraguay, whose main line 
links Asunción with Encarnación is considered to be in substantial need of renovation. It 
currently provides links with railroads in Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil. While the 
Paraguyan government has tried to privatise the railroad, the substantial investment 
needed to upgrade the current system has precluded any private interest. 
 
The main railway line connects Asuncion city with Encarnacion and links with the 
international rail networks of Argentina, Brazil and Uraguay through the international 
bridge Encarnacion Posadas.   - 110 - 
Waterways 
The potential of Paraguay’s river system for transport has not been fully realised owing to 
insufficient storage facilities, severe financial constraints in developing and upgrading 
inland ports, irregular services, very high freight charges, and a lack of shipping space. 
These problems are complicated by navigational difficulties. To promote regional trade, 
the Paraguay-Paraná Hidrovia Project was proposed in an effort to lower transport costs 
and facilitate the interconnection of the region. If completed, it would connect Bolovia 
and Paraguay to the Atlantic Ocean. This project, however, has been delayed due to 
environmental concerns. 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
Paraguay’s political history has been characterised by a series of dictators and political 
instability. These events have had a dramatic effect on Paraguay’s relationship with it’s 
outside neighbours. For the 34 years prior to 1989, Paraguay was characterised by 
political isolation under General Alfredo Stroessner. With the overthrow of Stroessner 
came a period of attempted coups and impeachments, infighting, assassinations, 
resignations, and a constant shift in leadership. These political problems strained the 
relationship between Paraguay and its MERCOSUR partners Argentina, Brazil and 
Uruguay. Following a political upheaval in 1996, the MERCOSUR partners agreed that 
only democracies could be a member of the trading bloc, implying that Paraguay has had 
to convince its MERCOSUR neighbours that it is indeed a democracy. 
TRADE 
As a member of MERCOSUR, Paraguay trades primarily with Argentina, Brazil and 
Uruguay, accounting for over 40% of its total trade. Paraguay has imposed a 10% duty on 
332 goods imported from MERCOSUR despite the refusal from other MERCOSUR 
members to allow such a tariff. Notwithstanding this special tariff, Paraguay is noted for 
its relatively low import tariffs in the region (EIU). Paraguay has successfully negotiated 
bilateral treaties with several South American countries, Argentina and Brazil in 
particular, that allow duty-free zones and warehouses in these countries (Castellon 29). A 
recently improved customs clearing process has also helped facilitate trade. 
 
Despite these attempts to promote trade, Paraguyan trade has recently suffered from the 
decline of the Brazillian Real, the EU’s failure to grant it a Hilton quota for meat exports 
(Paraguay remains the only MERCOSUR country not to be allowed access to the EU 
beef market), and high transport costs for forest exports from the Chaco. Brazil’s recent 
decision to increase border enforcement and limit duty-free purchases has had dramatic 
consequences for the Paraguayan economy, including a doubling of its trade deficit 
(Castellón 2001). Moreover, the phase-in of the MERCOSUR Common External Tariff 
could widen the already growing trade deficit (EIU 34, 36). 
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GLOSSARY 
BOPS  IMF Balance of Payment Statistics. 
Break Bulk  Cargo which is shipped as a unit ( i.e. palletised cargo, boxed cargo, large machinery, 
trucks and pre-slung cargo). This type of cargo is not conatinerised. 
CAN  Comunidad Andina (Andean Community). 
CAR  Central African Republic. 
CEEAC/ECCAS  Communauté Economique des Etats de l’Afrique Centrale  (Economic Community of 
Central African States). 
CEMAC  Communauté économique et monétaire de l’Afrique centrale (Central African Economic 
and Monetary Community). 
CEPGL  Communauté économique des pays des grands lacs  (Economic Community of the Great 
Lakes Countries). 
CIF  Cost of a good, including insurance and freight. See also FOB and CIF/FOB ratio. 
CILSS  Comite inter-Etats de llutte contre la secheresse ay Sahel (Permanent Interstate 
Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel). 
COMESA  Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa. 
DAF Delivered  at  Frontier. 
DRC  Democratic Republic of Congo. 
EAC  East African Community. 
ECOWAS  Economic Community Of West African States. 
EU European  Union. 
FEZ  Foreign Economic Zones/Foreign Trade Zones. 
FDI  Foreign Direct Investment. 
FOB  Cost of a good, free on board. That is, cost of a good without the cost of freight and 
insurance. 
FTAA  Free Trade Area of the Americas. 
HDI  Human Development Index. 
IMF  International Monetary Fund. 
LDC  Least Developed Country. 
LLC Landlocked  Country. 
MERCOSUR  Southern Common Market/Treaty of Asunción. 
NTB Non-tariff  barrier. 
OCBN  Organisation commune Benin-Niger (Benin-Niger Organisation). 
Rake  Wagons/carriages semi permanently joined in an articulation. 
RCD-Goma  Congolese Rally for Democracy – Goma. 
SAARC  South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. 
SADC  Southern African Development Community. 
SAPTA SAARC  Preferential  Trading Arrangement. 
SNTN  Societe Nationale des Transports du Niger (Niger National Transport Society). 
STRN  Synidcat des Transporteurs Routiers du Niger (Niger Transport Route Syndicate). 
TN Transit  Nation. 
UDEAC  Douanière des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale (Central African Customs and Economic 
Union). 
UEMOA  Union economique et momonetaire oust-africaine (West African Economic and 
Monetary Union). 
UN United  Nations. 
UNCTAD  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 
WDI  World Bank World Development Indicators.   - 112 - 
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APPENDICES Table 1: Human Development Indicator - Rankings and Components











Medium human development 117 Gabon 0.64 6,237      0.46 0.76
54 Mexico 0.80 9,023      0.79 0.84 118 Nicaragua 0.64 2,366      0.72 0.65
55 Cuba 0.80 0.85 0.90 119 Sao Tome and Principe 0.63 1,792      0.67 0.75
56 Belarus 0.79 7,544      0.73 0.92 120 Guatemala 0.63 3,821      0.66 0.62
57 Panama 0.79 6,000      0.82 0.86 121 Solomon Islands 0.62 1,648      0.72 0.68
58 Belize 0.78 5,606      0.82 0.86 122 Namibia 0.61 6,431      0.33 0.81
59 Malaysia 0.78 9,068      0.79 0.80 123 Morocco 0.60 3,546      0.71 0.50
60 Russian Federation 0.78 8,377      0.68 0.92 124 India 0.58 2,358      0.64 0.57
61 Dominica 0.78 5,880      0.80 0.86 125 Swaziland 0.58 4,492      0.32 0.77
62 Bulgaria 0.78 5,710      0.76 0.90 126 Botswana 0.57 7,184      0.25 0.75
63 Romania 0.78 6,423      0.75 0.88 127 Myanmar 0.55 1,027      0.52 0.75
64 Libya 0.77 7,570      0.76 0.84 128 Zimbabwe 0.55 2,635      0.30 0.81
65 Macedonia 0.77 5,086      0.80 0.86 129 Ghana 0.55 1,964      0.53 0.62
66 Saint Lucia 0.77 5,703      0.81 0.83 130 Cambodia 0.54 1,446      0.52 0.66
67 Mauritius 0.77 10,017    0.77 0.77 131 Vanuatu 0.54 2,802      0.72 0.35
68 Colombia 0.77 6,248      0.77 0.85 132 Lesotho 0.54 2,031      0.34 0.76
69 Venezuela 0.77 5,794      0.80 0.83 133 Papua New Guinea 0.54 2,280      0.53 0.55
70 Thailand 0.76 6,402      0.75 0.84 134 Kenya 0.51 1,022      0.43 0.72
71 Saudi Arabia 0.76 11,367    0.78 0.71 135 Cameroon 0.51 1,703      0.42 0.65
72 Fiji 0.76 4,668      0.73 0.90 136 Congo 0.51 825         0.44 0.75
73 Brazil 0.76 7,625      0.71 0.83 137 Comoros 0.51 1,588      0.58 0.49
74 Suriname 0.76 3,799      0.76 0.90
75 Lebanon 0.76 4,308      0.80 0.83 Low human development
76 Armenia 0.75 2,559      0.80 0.92 138 Pakistan 0.50 1,928      0.58 0.42
77 Philippines 0.75 3,971      0.74 0.91 139 Sudan 0.50 1,797      0.52 0.50
78 Oman 0.75 13,356    0.77 0.67 140 Bhutan 0.49 1,412      0.62 0.42
79 Kazakhstan 0.75 5,871      0.66 0.91 141 Togo 0.49 1,442      0.45 0.59
80 Ukraine 0.75 3,816      0.72 0.92 142 Nepal 0.49 1,327      0.56 0.48
81 Georgia 0.75 2,664      0.80 0.89 143 Laos 0.49 1,575      0.47 0.52
82 Peru 0.75 4,799      0.73 0.87 144 Yemen 0.48 893         0.59 0.48
83 Grenada 0.75 7,580      0.67 0.85 145 Bangladesh 0.48 1,602      0.57 0.40
84 Maldives 0.74 4,485      0.69 0.90 146 Haiti 0.47 1,467      0.46 0.50
85 Turkey 0.74 6,974      0.75 0.77 147 Madagascar 0.47 840         0.46 0.59
86 Jamaica 0.74 3,639      0.84 0.79 148 Nigeria 0.46 896         0.44 0.58
87 Turkmenistan 0.74 3,956      0.69 0.92 149 Djibouti 0.45 2,377      0.30 0.50
88 Azerbaijan 0.74 2,936      0.78 0.88 150 Uganda 0.44 1,208      0.32 0.60
89 Sri Lanka 0.74 3,530      0.79 0.84 151 Tanzania 0.44 523         0.43 0.61
90 Paraguay 0.74 4,426      0.75 0.83 152 Mauritania 0.44 1,677      0.44 0.40
91 Saint Vincent and the Gre0.73 5,555      0.74 0.79 153 Zambia 0.43 780         0.27 0.68
92 Albania 0.73 3,506      0.80 0.80 154 Senegal 0.43 1,510      0.47 0.37
93 Ecuador 0.73 3,203      0.75 0.87 155 Congo, DR 0.43 765         0.44 0.51
94 Dominican Republic 0.73 6,033      0.70 0.80 156 Côte d'Ivoire 0.43 1,630      0.38 0.44
95 Uzbekistan 0.73 2,441      0.73 0.91 157 Eritrea 0.42 837         0.45 0.46
96 China 0.73 3,976      0.76 0.80 158 Benin 0.42 990         0.48 0.40
97 Tunisia 0.72 6,363      0.75 0.72 159 Guinea 0.41 1,982      0.38 0.37
98 Iran, Islamic Rep. of 0.72 5,884      0.73 0.75 160 Gambia 0.41 1,649      0.35 0.39
99 Jordan 0.72 3,966      0.76 0.78 161 Angola 0.40 2,187      0.34 0.36
100 Cape Verde 0.72 4,863      0.75 0.75 162 Rwanda 0.40 943         0.25 0.58
101 Samoa (Western) 0.72 5,041      0.74 0.75 163 Malawi 0.40 615         0.25 0.65
102 Kyrgyzstan 0.71 2,711      0.71 0.87 164 Mali 0.39 797         0.44 0.37
103 Guyana 0.71 3,963      0.63 0.88 165 CAR 0.38 1,172      0.32 0.39
104 El Salvador 0.71 4,497      0.75 0.74 166 Chad 0.37 871         0.35 0.39
105 Moldova 0.70 2,109      0.69 0.90 167 Guinea-Bissau 0.35 755         0.33 0.38
106 Algeria 0.70 5,308      0.74 0.69 168 Ethiopia 0.33 668         0.31 0.35
107 South Africa 0.70 9,401      0.45 0.88 169 Burkina Faso 0.33 976         0.36 0.23
108 Syrian Arab Republic 0.69 3,556      0.77 0.71 170 Mozambique 0.32 854         0.24 0.37
109 Viet Nam 0.69 1,996      0.72 0.84 171 Burundi 0.31 591         0.26 0.38
110 Indonesia 0.68 3,043      0.69 0.79 172 Niger 0.28 746         0.34 0.16
111 Equatorial Guinea 0.68 15,073    0.43 0.77 173 Sierra Leone 0.28 490         0.23 0.33
112 Tajikistan 0.67 1,152      0.71 0.88
113 Mongolia 0.66 1,783      0.63 0.85 Average 0.59 3,160      0.57 0.66
114 Bolivia 0.65 2,424      0.62 0.80 Average over all landlocked 0.54 2,151      0.48 0.65
115 Egypt 0.64 3,635      0.70 0.62
116 Honduras 0.64 2,453      0.68 0.70
Source: Human Development Report (2002)
Note: No data available for Afghanistan
HDI Components HDI 
rank
HDI Components HDI 
rankSouthern Africa Human Development Index Rank Human Development Index GDP per capita Education Index Health Index
Botswana 126 0.57 7184 0.75 0.25
Lesotho 132 0.54 2031 0.76 0.34
Malawi 163 0.40 615 0.65 0.25
Swaziland 125 0.58 4492 0.77 0.32
Zambia 153 0.43 780 0.68 0.27
Zimbabwe 128 0.55 2635 0.81 0.30
Average of LLCs 137.8 0.51 2956 0.74 0.29
Average of maritime neighbors 142.2 0.49 3879 0.61 0.36
East Africa Human Development Index Rank Human Development Index GDP per capita Education Index Health Index
Burundi 171 0.31 591 0.38 0.26
Ethiopia 168 0.33 668 0.35 0.31
Rwanda 162 0.40 943 0.58 0.25
Uganda 150 0.44 1208 0.60 0.32
Average of LLCs 162.8 0.37 853 0.48 0.29
Average of maritime neighbors 147.2 0.46 989 0.56 0.45
West Africa Human Development Index Rank Human Development Index GDP per capita Education Index Health Index
Burkina Faso 169 0.33 976 0.23 0.36
Central African Republic 165 0.38 1172 0.39 0.32
Chad 166 0.37 871 0.39 0.35
Mali 164 0.39 797 0.37 0.44
Niger 172 0.28 746 0.16 0.34
Average of LLCs 167.2 0.35 912 0.31 0.36
Average of maritime neighbors 145.9 0.47 1798 0.54 0.44
East Asia Human Development Index Rank Human Development Index GDP per capita Education Index Health Index
Bhutan 140 0.49 1412 0.42 0.62
Laos 143 0.49 1575 0.52 0.47
Mongolia 113 0.66 1783 0.85 0.63
Nepal 142 0.49 1327 0.48 0.56
Average of LLCs 134.5 0.53 1524 0.57 0.57
Average of maritime neighbors 105.2 0.66 3152 0.76 0.68
Central Asia Human Development Index Rank Human Development Index GDP per capita Education Index Health Index
Afghanistan
Kazakhstan 79 0.75 5871 0.91 0.66
Kyrgyzstan 102 0.71 2711 0.87 0.71
Tajikistan 112 0.67 1152 0.88 0.71
Turkmenistan 87 0.74 3956 0.92 0.69
Uzbekistan 95 0.73 2441 0.91 0.73
Average of LLCs 95.0 0.72 3226 0.90 0.70
Average of maritime neighbors 98.0 0.68 5041 0.72 0.69
Caucasus & Moldova Human Development Index Rank Human Development Index GDP per capita Education Index Health Index
Armenia 76 0.75 2559 0.92 0.80
Azerbaijan 88 0.74 2936 0.88 0.78
Moldova 105 0.70 2109 0.90 0.69
Average of LLCs 89.7 0.73 2535 0.90 0.76
Average of maritime neighbors 68.8 0.77 6782 0.88 0.74
South America Human Development Index Rank Human Development Index GDP per capita Education Index Health Index
Bolivia 114 0.65 2424 0.80 0.62
Paraguay 90 0.74 4426 0.83 0.75
Average of LLCs 102.0 0.70 3425 0.82 0.69
Average of maritime neighbors 56.8 0.79 8555 0.88 0.77
Source: Human Development Report (2002)
Table 2: Human Development - Landlocked Countries and their Maritime NeighboursCountry
Ratio of exports/capita of country 




























Source: World Development Indicators (2002)
Table 3: Ratio of Exports per Capita of Landlocked
               Countries to their Maritime NeighboursSouthern Africa
Landlocked Countries % to Africa % to Industrial Countries  % from  Africa % from Industrial Countries
Malawi 13 63 73 18
Zambia 26 32 75 14
Zimbabwe 8 34 62 18
Average of LLCs 15.7 43.0 70.0 16.7
Maritime Countries
Angola 0.2 75 12 53
Mozambique 16 67 44 25
South Africa 18 61 3 67
Average of Maritime Countries 11.4 67.7 19.7 48.3
*Data not available for Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland
West Africa
Landlocked Countries % to Africa % to Industrial Countries  % from Africa % from Industrial Countries 
Burkina Fasso 19 41 39 46
Central African Republic 3 79 12.4 53
Chad 14 68 11 83
Mali 15 34 53 33
Niger 42 57 37 40
Average of LLCs 18.6 55.8 30.48 51
Maritime Countries
Benin 14 30 9 40
Côte d'Ivoire 31 54 25 53
Ghana 11 67 34 44
Nigeria 10 69 5 59
Senegal 24 56 24 56
Average of Maritime Countries 18.0 55.2 19.4 50.4
East Asia
Landlocked Countries % to Asia % to Industrial Countries  % from Asia % from Industrial Countries 
Laos 47 30 89 8
Mongolia 58 41 75 20
Nepal 38 59 73 11
Average of LLCs 47.7 43.3 79 13
Maritime Countries
India 24 53 25 40
Thailand 35 57 33 51
Vietnam 30 62 66 29
Average of Maritime Countries 29.7 57.3 41.3 40.0
*Russia was included in Asia for Mongolia due to their shared border
Central Asia
Landlocked Countries
% to Eastern 
Europe & Former 
% to Industrial Countries 
% to Eastern Europe 
& Former USSR
% from Industrial Countries 
Armenia 38 48 41 43
Azerbaijan 15 74 48 42
Kazakhstan 34 30 57 33
Kyrgyzstan 40 53 61 21
Tajikistan 41 52 83 7
Turkmenistan 78 15 48 37
Uzbekistan 40 18 33 22
Average of LLCs 41.3 40.3 55.0 27.0
Maritime Countries
Iran 30 39 13 46
Russia 35 51 29 54
Turkey 13 63 15 60
Ukraine 49 26 61 32
Average of Maritime Countries 31.8 44.8 29.5 48.0
* Iran was included in Eastern Europe for Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan's imports & exports due to their shared border
East Africa
Landlocked Countries % to Africa % to Industrial Countries  % from Africa % from Industrial Countries 
Burundi 15 82 24 44
Ethiopia 21 51 4 33
Rwanda 8 43 33 32
Uganda 7 75 55 28
Average of LLCs 12.75 62.75 29 34.25
Maritime Countries
Djibouti 49 27 14 36
Kenya 35 42 9 49
Somalia 1 4 40 10
Tanzania 19 51 23 40
Average of Maritime Countries 26.0 31.0 21.5 33.8
* No data available for Eritrea; Somalia exports primarily to the Middle East (87%)
Latin America
Landlocked Countries % to Latin America % to Industrial Countries  % from Latin America % from Industrial Countries 
Bolivia 59 39 56 32
Paraguay 72 22 59 29
Average of LLCs 65.5 30.5 57.5 30.5
Maritime Countries
Argentina 46 31 35 48
Brazil 23 56 18 60
Chile 22 57 34 40
Peru 20 66 34 58
Average of Maritime Countries 27.8 52.5 30.3 51.5
Source: Direction of Trade Statistics, International Monetary Fund (2002)

























































Afghanistan 0.62 1,960                     0.01  1.00 0.76 0.88 0.97 
Armenia 0.49 0.08 693                        0.36 0.00 0.00 0.74  0.60
Azerbaijan 0.08 0.15 870                        0.70 0.88 0.74 1.00
Burundi 0.53 0.00 1,254                     0.37 0.16 0.72 0.49 0.00 0.81 0.00 0.00
Burkina Faso 0.46 0.01 1,154                     0.41 0.68 0.48 0.12 0.07 0.19 0.19 0.59
Bolivia 0.36 0.16 414                        0.07 0.22 0.44 0.16 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Bhutan 775                        0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Botswana 0.25 1.00 905                        1.00 1.00 1.00 0.73 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Central African Republic 0.45 0.03 1,518                     0.01 0.00 0.53 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.82
Ethiopia 0.50 0.00 781                        0.33 0.36 0.69 0.74 0.02 0.98 0.46 0.87
Kazakhstan 0.04 0.47 3,750                     0.61 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Kyrgyzstan 0.19 0.10 3,600                     0.61 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.74
Laos 0.11 0.07 620                        0.63 0.61 0.00 0.46 0.46 0.44 0.45
Lesotho 0.19 0.10 575                        0.36 1.00 0.72 0.01 0.19 0.99 0.00 0.00
Moldova 0.14 0.15 170                        1.00 0.33 0.19 0.00 0.00
Mali 0.62 0.04 1,225                     0.36 0.41 0.81 0.47 0.08 0.33 0.51 0.21 0.60
Mongolia 0.25 0.22 1,693                     0.45 0.61 0.07 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Malawi 1.00 0.03 803                        0.40 0.21 0.76 0.34 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Niger 0.48 0.02 1,057                     0.52 0.84 0.73 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Nepal 0.05 0.04 1,160                     0.95 0.58 0.00 0.00 0.54 1.00 0.00 0.00
Paraguay 0.27 0.34 1,022                     0.30 0.87 0.16 0.11 0.19 0.00 0.00
Rwanda 0.92 0.00 1,867                     0.11 0.26 0.62 0.23 0.40 0.84 0.87 0.78 0.58
Swaziland 0.00 0.89 193                        0.65 0.51 0.52 0.19 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Chad 0.92 0.02 1,669                     0.00 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.62 0.06 0.99 0.21
Tajikistan 0.09 3,100                     0.61 0.07 0.67 0.87 0.82 0.83
Turkmenistan 0.23 0.27 1,700                     0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Uganda 0.61 0.02 1,187                     0.34 0.16 0.40 0.47 0.08 1.00 0.64 0.72 0.56
Uzbekistan 0.12 2,950                     0.00 0.00 0.74 0.89
Zambia 0.28 0.07 1,975                     0.40 0.47 0.55 0.91 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Zimbabwe 0.24 0.20 464                        0.36 0.72 0.86 0.82 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.72 0.68
Sources: Trade Data: IMF BOPS (2001), WDI (2002)
Distance Data: Various
Infrastructure Data: Canning (World Bank) (2002)
Conflict Data: PRIO (2002)
Note: TN = Transit Neighbour
Measures of Trade Measures of Infrastructure Quality Measures of Civil and External Conflict
Table 5: Degree of Landlockedness